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Chapter 1
Introduction
The study of harmful customs and their interactions with economic factors
has gained increasing attention in economics. To understand development and
gender issues in particular we need to better grasp how social and cultural
factors affect people’s life. Differences in gender outcomes - both in developing
and developed countries - are partially shaped and often justified on the grounds
of cultural and social norms concerning women’s role.
Customs, in particular the ones related to women, have been studied in
economics mainly because of their effect on outcomes such as health, education,
employment and income. For instance, norms which regulate fertility can lead to
negative health outcomes for women and their children; they can constrain their
educational outcomes and therefore negatively affect their income. However,
understanding how customs evolve becomes important per se: customs can be
seen as a determinant of individual well-being.
Female genital cutting (also called female genital mutilation or female cir-
cumcision) is an example of this twofold perspective on customs: it is at the
same time considered as affecting some dimensions of women’s well-being and
as itself as being a component of this well-being.
Female genital cutting (FGC) is the practice of removing part of the external
female genitalia for non medical reasons. This custom is present (at different
degrees) in 29 African and Middle - Eastern countries. According to the latest
available data, more than 125 million girls and women are cut and 30 million
girls are at risk of being cut in the next decade (UNICEF, 2013a). The World
Health Organization (WHO) classifies four types of FGC, depending on the
severity of the mutilation, from clitoridectomy (total or partial removal of the
clitoris) to infibulation (methods to narrow the vaginal opening).
Since the eighties, attempts to eradicate this practice have been justified
on the grounds of its negative health effects. The medical literature suggests
that FGC is associated with health problems, both at the moment of the cut-
ting (excessive bleeding, poor sanitary conditions, etc.) and in the long term
(fistula, hemorrhagic birth delivery, etc.). The severity of the health problems
7
FIGHTING AGAINST HARMFUL CUSTOMS
depends on the type of FGC performed and on the sanitary conditions in which
it is done. However, the available evidence on the health problems related to
FGC are not very robust, mainly due to the poor quality of the existing data.
Despite this limitation, the health effects of FGC remain an important element
of justification of anti-FGC interventions. In this perspective, the relevance of
fighting this custom is related to its effects on women’s health.
However, in the last 20 years, discussions on FGC have been incorporated
in a broader reflection about women’s rights and empowerment. FGC is framed
as a human rights’ violation and its demise is regarded as part of a more gen-
eral improvement of women’s condition and status within a given society. The
custom is therefore recognized as part of a more general system of values which
regulates a society. In this sense, we can interpret FGC as a (negative) compo-
nent of women’s well-being and its study becomes relevant independently of its
possible negative health consequences. Both views of FGC justify the growing
interest for this custom in development economics.
There is still scant empirical evidence on the determinants of FGC and
almost no quantitative evaluation of the effectiveness of interventions against
it. Despite the lack of evidence, the debate on FGC among practitioners is
dominated by its definition as a coordination problem. Interventions tend to
be based on this interpretation.
In this thesis, I enter this debate by studying how FGC is shaped by inter-
ventions to eradicate it in the case of Senegal. After an introductory chapter
where I present an overview of FGC (Chapter 2), I devote two chapters to this
topic: Chapter 3, in which I analyze how a village-level programme affects FGC
incidence; and Chapter 4 where I relate the observed decrease in age at cutting
in Senegal to the growing (legal) pressure to stop the practice, which might
lead individuals to adapt it to the changing environment. Finally, Chapter 5
frames the problem of FGC within the broader question of how customs can
be changed, focusing on the theoretical underpinning of existing interventions
against harmful traditions. The remaining part of this section provides a more
detailed description of each chapter.
Chapter 2, titled “The Debate on Female Genital Cutting”, presents an
overview of the topic of this thesis. In particular, I describe the custom, its
prevalence and origin and I present the current debate on the health and hu-
man rights approaches to FGC as justifications to fight the custom. I review the
theoretical and empirical literature on FGC, focusing on the most recent works
in economics. Special attention is devoted to the problem of under-reporting
bias in FGC data and how this problem can be partially overcome. Finally,
one of the best known anti-FGC intervention, proposed by the Senegalese NGO
Tostan, is described in detail using the available scientific literature and reports
on the topic. This program can be considered the dominant framework for
anti-FGC interventions.
In Chapter 3, “Changing Female Genital Cutting: Evidence from Senegal”, I
analyze the effect of the Tostan’s program in Senegal which aims, among other
things, at convincing people to abandon FGC. To do so, I use a unique dataset
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from the region of Kolda in Senegal that I collected in 2012. An interesting
dimension of the program is that the NGO helps villagers organizing public
meetings where village representatives declare the abandonment of FGC. These
public pledges should then work as coordination devices, based on the idea that
FGC is a coordination problem. I first attempt to quantify the short-term effect
of the program using a difference in difference strategy. I find that girls at risk
during the implementation of the project are 8 percentage points less likely to
be cut, an effect that can reasonably be attributed to the program. The small
but significant decrease is compatible with both intra-village heterogeneity and
coordination within some sub-village networks.
The conditions for the Public Declaration to work as a coordination and
commitment device do not seem to be met in the context analyzed here. It
is therefore not possible to distinguish between a poor implementation of this
part of the project and an improper conceptualization of the nature of FGC as
an inter-village coordination game. With respect to other potential channels
of inter-village coordination, I find some evidence that, when extending the
analysis to girls born after the end of the program, a (female) family link to
a PRCC village is negatively correlated with FGC rate in non PRCC villages,
which is suggestive of a role of the extended family network (across villages)
in the FGC decision-making process. I cannot however exclude that some un-
observable characteristics of the extended family (such as lower preferences for
FGC) explain the result.
The existing empirical literature on FGC has focused on its incidence. How-
ever, FGC is not just a yes/no decision, but it includes other dimensions, such
as when and how to perform it. Chapter 4, “Interventions to stop female genital
cutting and the evolution of the custom: evidence on age at cutting in Senegal”
(forthcoming in Journal of African Economies1), focuses on a different dimen-
sion of FGC. I suggest that interventions against FGC such as legal sanctions
and, more generally, anti-FGC campaigns might have unintended and poten-
tially harmful effects on the way FGC is performed. Using DHS data from
Senegal, I find that girls born in a year and a region where the law against FGC
has been legally enforced are cut almost one year earlier. No significant effect
of the law is found on the prevalence of FGC. Using the dataset from the region
of Kolda in Senegal, I find a decreasing trend in age at cutting after the year of
the introduction of the law sanctioning FGC. In both cases, in line with existing
qualitative evidence, I interpret the decrease in age as the result of a process
of de-ritualisation and individualization of FGC due to the push towards the
secrecy of the practice. This study stresses the importance of taking into ac-
count all dimensions of the custom in the design of anti-FGC interventions so
that unattended evolutions of the custom can be avoided.
In Chapter 5, titled “Eradicating Women-Hurting Customs: What Role for
Social Engineering?”2 and co-authored by Jean-Philippe Platteau, we discuss
1DOI: 10.1093/jae/ejv013
2This paper is scheduled to appear in a forthcoming book co-edited by Siwan Anderson,
Lori Beaman and Jean-Philippe Platteau and published at Oxford University Press.
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existing approaches to fight women-hurting customs and how they can be con-
ceptualized from the standpoint of economic theory. A popular approach to
change harmful customs is what we call the “social engineering approach”. It
consists of two types of interventions: on the one hand, legal bans which crim-
inalize the practice; sensitization campaigns and community-based programs
aimed at changing people’s perception of the customs on the other hand. The
social engineering approach is commonly justified on the grounds of human
rights principles. In this chapter we focus on the theoretical model underpin-
ning this approach.
First, we study the expressive effect of the law (i.e., the legal intervention as
an instrument to change people’s expectations) and use a coordination model
to explain under which conditions the law works as a focal point. Second, we
analyze the deterrence effect - namely, the law as a tool to punish individuals
- mainly within a bargaining framework. Finally, we define community-based
programs and other attempts aiming at modifying people’s attitude towards
the custom as attempts to change their individuals’ preferences. In a coordina-
tion game with heterogeneous preferences we study the effect of changing the
distribution of preferences. In essence, the paper discusses the conditions under
which the “social engineering approach” can work and tries to corroborate the
theoretical discussion with the help of existing empirical evidence. We moreover
compare the social engineering approach with a less direct approach to customs
change: namely, economic reforms which modify incentives and can lead, under
some conditions, to the disappearance of a harmful practice.
It is clear from the review of the existing theoretical and empirical evidence
that a more careful understanding of the nature of women-harmful customs
is needed to more effectively fight against them. In the case of FGC, strong
claims regarding its nature being (mainly) a coordination problem are not yet
supported by robust empirical evidence, as shown in the previous chapters of
this thesis.
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Chapter 2
The Debate on Female
Genital Cutting
2.1 Introduction
The fight against female genital cutting (FGC), the practice of removing part of
the external female genitalia for non-medical reasons, has received since the late
1990s a renewed interest among practitioners, researchers and media. Interna-
tional organizations such as UNICEF are leading actors in promoting interven-
tions to end the custom. Legal reforms and grassroot-based programs to fight
FGC have steadily increased over time, justified on the grounds of health con-
cerns and human rights principles. Furthermore, a consensus seems to emerge
among anti-FGC activists regarding the definition of FGC as a social norm:
social ostracism and the strength of social ties can hinder change, even when
individuals are willing to stop.
Economists have become recently interested in the topic, thanks to the pres-
ence of an established theoretical framework to discuss FGC and the availability
of new data. Attempts have been made to understand the determinants of FGC
and to assess its theoretical foundations. This chapter proposes an overview of
the state of the art on FGC and offers an introduction to the topic from an
economic perspective.
In Section 2.2 I describe FGC, its prevalence and origin. Section 2.3 discusses
the grounds on which the fight against FGC is justified. Section 2.4 reviews the
theoretical and empirical literature on FGC, focusing on the most recent works
in economics. Furthermore, I discuss in detail the problem of under-reporting
bias in FGC data, in particular in the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS),
and how these caveats could be partially overcome. Section 2.5 describes the
anti-FGC intervention of Tostan, one of the best-known NGO working on the
topic which I will study later in this thesis: its approach has inspired UNICEF’s
anti-FGC projects and can be considered the dominant framework for anti-FGC
11
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Figure 2.1: Prevalence and legal status of FGC in Africa
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interventions. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Definition and origin
Female genital cutting (FGC), also known as female circumcision or female gen-
ital mutilation, is the practice of removing part of the external female genitalia
for non-medical reasons.The World Health Organization classifies four types of
FGC, depending on the severity of the mutilation, from clitoridectomy (total or
partial removal of the clitoris) to infibulation (methods to narrow the vaginal
opening).
This custom is present (at different degrees) in 29 African and Middle -
Eastern countries. According to the latest available data, more than 125 million
girls and women are cut and 30 million girls are at risk of being cut in the next
decade (UNICEF, 2013a). The left map in Figure 2.1 shows the FGC prevalence
in Africa, where the majority of the countries in which FGC is present are
located1. FGC incidence varies greatly across countries: in Mali, Egypt and
Sudan the practice is almost universal, while in other countries only some ethnic
minorities perform it.
The origin of FGC is a matter of speculation. Some argue that its initial
1In the Middle East FGC is practiced in Iraq and Yemen.
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purpose was to control women’s fidelity and to act as a signaling device in
a context of polygamy and hypergyny (Mackie, 1996). There is no unique
justification for the practice, but, whatever its original scope, FGC seems to be
associated with concepts of purity, sexual control, cleanliness and gender role
definition2 (Gruenbaum, 2001).
FGC has been extensively studied by anthropologists and ethnographers at
least since the 19th century3. Two lessons can be drawn from this literature.
First, in spite of some common and recurrent elements regarding the meaning
of FGC, the way it is performed can vary greatly. Age at cutting, for example,
varies (or used to vary) across ethnic groups from a few days after birth to 16-18
years (Erlich and Augé, 1995, p.31-33). The meaning and the ritual associated
with FGC vary accordingly: if performed on infants, FGC cannot be a rite of
passage to womanhood and preparation for marriage, such as in the case when
it is done just before or after puberty.
Second, FGC and its interpretation change and adapt to a changing envi-
ronment (Fusaschi, 2003, p.78). An interesting example is how this pre-Islamic
custom has survived and been accommodated after Islamisation of West African
countries in different ways. While there is no clear prescription in the Koran
with regard to FGC, nowadays people often explain FGC as a religious require-
ment. Johnson (2000) shows that FGC among the Mandinka in Guinea Bissau
has become an important part of their Muslim identity and is used to define
themselves in opposition to neighboring non-Muslim groups: FGC guarantees
the purity that is required to pray and behave as a good Muslim. In Mali,
Gosselin (2000, p. 206) suggests that the Islamisation of Malian society has
led to the de-ritualization and medicalization of the practice. A similar argu-
ment is provided in Hernlund (2000): traditional rituals can be perceived as
anti-Islamic with the result that, when the practice is adopted, its form and
meaning can evolve when a more orthodox form of Islam is established.
2.3 FGC: a harmful custom?
FGC is considered a harmful practice and a violation of women’s human rights.
At the beginning of the international movement against FGC, which can be
traced back to the late seventies4, anti-FGC campaigns were framed in terms of
the health risks associated to the custom. As remarked by Shell-Duncan (2008),
this approach presented several limits.
2It is worth noting that FGC has been practiced in Europe in the 19th century as a
medical procedure to cure female masturbation and hysteria (see Erlich and Augé 1995, p.
61-70).
3For a historical perspective on FGC see Erlich and Augé (1995, chapter 2) and, for its
relation with the rise of anthropology, Fusaschi (2003, chapter 2).
4At the Khartoum Seminar on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and
Children in 1979, the WHO discussed for the first time strategies to address FGC. In the
same year, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) was adopted by the UN general assembly. FGC was then recognized as a human
rights violation (UNICEF, 2013a, p.10).
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First, practicing communities are often aware of the risks associated to the
custom, but the social cost of not following it is considered higher than the
health cost.
Second, the medical risks associated to FGC might have been exaggerated,
in particular because most of the data were drawn from medical studies on
infibulation. This is the most invasive form of FGC, but it is not representative
of all types of cutting.
The medical literature suggests that FGC is associated with health problems:
they can occur at the moment of cutting (excessive bleeding, poor sanitary
conditions, etc.), in the long term (fistula) and at birth delivery (hemorrhagic
birth delivery). The severity of the health problems depends on the type of
FGC performed and on the sanitary conditions in which it is done. Health
problems are, however, far from systematic.
Makhlouf Obermeyer (2005) reviews the medical literature on FGC, point-
ing to the lack of robust evidence on the health effects of FGC and an overall
lack of reliable data to assess it. A recent meta-analysis of studies on the obstet-
ric consequences of FGC (Berg and Underland, 2013) suggests that cut women
are more likely to experience problems such as prolonged labor and obstetric
laceration at the moment of delivery. However, establishing a causal link be-
tween FGC and obstetric complications remains problematic due to the overall
low quality of the available data. Finally, using the largest available database
on FGC (Demographic and Health Survey Data of 13 countries out of the 28 in
which FGC is practiced), Wagner (2015) finds no statistically significant corre-
lation between FGC and long-term health consequences such as the BMI and
weight, but an increased risk of genital problems such as sexually transmitted
infections, vaginal discharge and ulcer or genital sores. She additionally finds a
positive correlation between FGC status and fertility, which seems to contradict
the belief that FGC can cause infertility. In general, it might be possible that
health effects are not important enough or not clearly linked to the practice by
cut women, making the health argument against FGC less relevant in practicing
communities5.
A third limit of the health approach to FGC is that the emphasis on the
medical risks associated to FGC can lead to the medicalization of the practice.
Practicing communities might not question the practice when FGC is performed
by trained practitioners in a controlled environment: it is likely that the risks for
women are limited, weakening the health argument against FGC. Campaigners
tend to be therefore against the medicalization of FGC: they consider it an
obstacle to the eradication of the practice. Such a statement requires however a
careful empirical validation, as remarked by Shell-Duncan (2001) in her discus-
sion on the advantages and disadvantages of medicalization: this could indeed
5Another possible effect of FGC is on women’s sexuality. In particular, FGC is often seen
(mainly from a Western perspective) as a mutilation which negatively affects women’s ability
to experience sexual pleasure. It remains however a very controversial topic of debate, given
that physiological, psychological and cultural elements play a role in the sexual experience.
For a discussion on FGC and sexuality see, for example, Gruenbaum (2001, chapter 5) and
O’Neill (2011, chapter 6).
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be seen as an intermediate step towards the disappearance of FGC. It remains a
matter of fact that medicalization is observed in several countries, among which
Nigeria (Orubuloye et al., 2000), Kenya and Egypt (Shell-Duncan et al., 2000;
UNICEF, 2013a, pp.107-110) and Mali (Gosselin, 2000).
Given the above-mentioned limits of the health approach to FGC, since
the nineties the language used in anti-FGC campaigns has shifted: the focus
is now on FGC as a human rights violation. The adoption of a human rights
framework has also been object of discussion. First, it enters the general debate
on universalism versus cultural relativism and the discussion on the relation
between culture and human rights: both topics are transversal to the human
rights literature (see Gruenbaum, 2001, pp.24-33 and Merry, 2003a). Second,
one of the least controversial way to frame FGC as a human right violation is
to consider the custom as a threat to the right to health and body integrity. It
however re-establishes a link with the health discourse on FGC and therefore
with its drawbacks (Shell-Duncan, 2008). In practice, the health perspective
on FGC remains in place in anti-FGC campaigns, mixed with the human rights
perspective.
An advantage of the human rights approach is that it allows to broaden the
discussion from the custom itself to women’s empowerment issues. As we will
see in Section 2.5, Tostan’s intervention uses human rights as a way to empower
disadvantaged groups: the discussion on FGC becomes therefore part of a larger
reflection on women’s role in their community.
Another consequence of the use of the human rights language against FGC
is that “protection from FGC/M became understood as a right to be enforced,
granted and implemented by the state [...].” (Shell-Duncan et al., 2013, p.806).
This has increased the pressure on concerned governments to adopt laws ban-
ning FGC. As the map on the right in Figure 2.1 shows, most of the African
countries where FGC is present have introduced, mainly in the 2000s, laws which
restrict the practice. The effectiveness of the legal approach against FGC has
however yet to be proven. Up to now, the main evidence available of the ef-
fect of the criminalization of FGC are: first, an increased risk of the practice
going underground (Shell-Duncan et al. (2013) and Chapter 4 in this thesis);
second, an increased risk of under-reporting FGC as the pressure to abandon it
intensifies (see Section 2.4.3).
2.4 Literature review on FGC: theoretical mod-
els and empirical evidence
2.4.1 Theoretical models of FGC
From a theoretical point of view, different ways to model FGC lead to differ-
ent predictions regarding the most effective interventions against the custom.
Following Shell-Duncan et al. (2011), we can distinguish two ways of concep-
tualizing FGC: a decision-theoretic framework, where FGC is the result of an
15
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individual cost benefit analysis; or a game-theoretic framework, where FGC is
the result of strategic interactions among actors.
An example of the first approach is Posner (1994), where FGC is the result
of a process of balancing the cost of cutting with its benefits (in his example, the
reduced wife’s infidelity). In this simple framework, other agents’ decisions over
cutting do not affect the individual choice on FGC. This model was implicitly
behind the community-based education programs on FGC health effects that
were popular until the early ’90s (Shell-Duncan, 2008). These campaigns should
have increased the individual costs of FGC, leading to the abandonment of the
practice. Yet, the impact of these projects was not satisfactory, leading to a
new reflection on the nature of the custom.
On the contrary, the game-theoretic approach implies that FGC is the out-
come of a strategic interaction with other agents. This framework (Mackie,
1996; Mackie and LeJeune, 2009) defines FGC as a social convention: whatever
its original function, FGC, where it is practiced, is a marriageability condition.
Non-cut women, in a context where all women undergo FGC, will not be able
to marry. In its simplest form, the problem of FGC can be represented as a
coordination game with two equilibria, a low-payoff equilibrium (everybody’s
cut), and a high-payoff equilibrium (nobody is cut). The structure of the pay-
offs implies that agents prefer no FGC. If the actual equilibrium is the (cut,
cut) one, then an agent has no incentive to deviate from it, in spite of the fact
that she would prefer the (no cut, no cut) equilibrium. To move to it, both
agents need to switch simultaneously. In other words, even if the negative ef-
fects of FGC are understood, people still need a way to coordinate to be able
to stop. The static model of coordination is then extended to take into account
the heterogeneity of preferences and a progressive change in the FGC rate.
Close to this view, Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010) model FGC as
a pre-marriage investment, where FGC increases the chances to get a better
(richer) husband. The model predicts that when there is a positive rate of FGC,
the returns to FGC increase with the number of cut women. No FGC is also
an equilibrium: if nobody is cut, there is no incentive to start it. Building on
this model, Molitor (2014) introduces education as an alternative pre-marriage
investment to FGC6. Education increases a woman’s chances on the job market,
making her less dependent on marriage. It additionally increases her value
on the marriage market. On the contrary, FGC only increases the marriage
prospects. Her model therefore predicts that single women are less likely to be
cut and better educated.
Within the coordination framework, a crucial question is who should coor-
dinate, or, more precisely, in which network the decision to stop FGC should
be agreed upon to avoid sanctions. If FGC is a marriage convention, then the
group inside which marriages take place should be the relevant one. However,
there are different ways to define it: at the largest level, the marriage network
is the ethnic group or, more generally, the broadest group within which mar-
6Ouedraogo and Koissy-Kpein (2012) follow a similar approach.
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riage is conceivable7. Wagner (2015) shows in her cross-country analysis that
ethnicity is robustly correlated with FGC: the FGC rate follows ethnic rather
than country borders.
However, the identification of the marriage market with the ethnic group
is uninformative in large ethnically homogenous areas: other factors, such as
geographical distance, historical links across villages as well as insurance motives
(Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2009) might be better predictors of a marriage link.
The coordination framework - which can be seen as the current paradigm
for FGC - has inspired another type of eradication programs than health sen-
sitization campaigns. If FGC is a coordination problem within the marriage
network, the decision to abandon it should be taken collectively within the
reference group. Activities targeting entire communities and the introduction
of devices which facilitate coordination such as public pledges have therefore
become an important component of current anti-FGC interventions, as I will
explain in detail in Section 2.5.
2.4.2 Empirical evidence
The discussions on the nature of FGC are not yet supported by strong quanti-
tative evidence, which is mainly due to the lack of data on the topic. Only in
recent years, modules on FGC have been introduced in the Demographic and
Health Surveys in countries where the custom is present, making large database
on this topic available. This has led to the development of a small but growing
literature in economics that empirically investigates the determinants and the
network dimension of FGC. Parallel to this development, there has been a surge
of data collection projects on smaller scales, which aim at exploring different
questions related to FGC.
At the cross-country level, Bellemare et al. (2015) contribute to the debate
on the determinants of FGC by looking at the correlation between support of
the practice and FGC in West Africa: they show that only 12% of the variation
in support of FGC is explained by village level factors. They additionally find
that the more widespread the practice is in a country, the more individuals
factors explain its persistence. Both findings are at odds with the coordination
game used to explain FGC, since, in this game, the persistence of the custom
is explained by how many people practice it rather than by household and
individual characteristics. These results also suggest that strategies other than
public pledges or declarations, such as targeting individuals, might be more
effective in countries where FGC is pervasive.
In Sudan, Efferson et al. (2015) test the validity of the coordination model
of FGC which has inspired development agencies and NGOs. If FGC is a social
norm at the community level, then communities should have either a zero or
100% FGC incidence and an important discontinuity in FGC rate between the
two types of communities should be observed. Using a sample of girls from
45 communities, they find neither extreme rates of FGC nor discontinuity in
7For example, among the Fulani, marriage takes place within a caste.
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the distribution of FGC incidence across communities: this is suggestive of
the absence of a common cutting norm at that level. It is still possible that
coordination takes place at another level than the community, in particular if
this does not completely overlap with the marriage pool (under the assumption
that coordination takes place within the marriage network). However, they
find first, a high level of endogamy within communities and, second, in each
community a substantial number of households state that their sons could marry
in families not practicing FGC.
Finally, they run an implicit association test8 within each community to test
if there is any discontinuity in normative attitudes towards FGC. If, within the
same community, two separated norms, cutting and not cutting, would coexist,
then a bimodal distribution of the individual scores from the test should be
observed: individuals should either show a positive attitude towards FGC or a
negative one. On the contrary, they do no find any implicit association between
being cut and positive or negative values: the distribution of test scores is uni-
modal and centered on zero. The authors conclude that their findings are not
compatible with a model of coordination (with homogenous preferences) either
within the communities or the marriage pool.
Naguib (2012) explores peer effects of FGC, finding a positive correlation
between individual choice of FGC the FGC rate in the peer group. Migrants
might also play a role in changing social norms: in Mali, Diabate and Mesple-
Somps (2014) find that villages with higher return migration have lower FGC
prevalence rates. The effect is driven by return-migration from Ivory Coast, a
country with low level of FGC prevalence. Finally, Blaydes and Platas Izama
(2015) observe in Egypt a more pronounced decline in FGC prevalence among
the Coptics than among the Muslims, for a similar level of wealth and educa-
tion. They suggest that the fact that Coptic religious leaders in Egypt have
strong beliefs against FGC and a more centralized authority than their Mus-
lim counterparts might partly explain the steeper decline in FGC among the
Christians.
Coordination might be a relevant dimension of FGC, but not necessarily
within the marriage network. Shell-Duncan and Herniund (2007, 2011), in a
mixed method research in Senegambia, first show the variety (and fluidity) of
the actors involved in the decision making process. Furthermore, they sug-
gest that rather than a marriageability convention, FGC is more likely to be
a peer-convention: FGC does not assure better marriage outcomes, but allows
women to gain access to the women’s network once they have moved to their
husband’s village. The authors argue that, in a hierarchical social structure
based on age such as the Senegalese one, not being cut would imply isolation
and high pressure to undergo FGC (in areas where FGC exists). They therefore
suggest that, rather than the interlinked marriage network, coordination should
8The implicit association test is a way to test the strength of the connection people make
between two concepts without explicitly asking their opinion. In this context, individuals
were shown on a screen two drawings of girls, one cut and one uncut, and a set of either
positive or negative words that they had to associate to one of the girls.
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be achieved within the (inter-generational) female family network. The role of
women (elders in particular) in perpetuating the practice within the extended
family has been widely documented in the anthropological literature (Erlich
and Augé, 1995; Mottin-Sylla, 1990).
It is too early to draw conclusions on the nature of FGC from these empirical
studies. Additional insights could be obtained by rigorous evaluations of existing
anti-FGC projects. There is however little empirical work on this issue. One
exception is Diop and Askew (2009) who present a descriptive analysis of FGC
change following Tostan’s anti-FGC intervention in the South-East of Senegal.
By comparing FGC rates before and after the program, they find a significant
decrease in FGC incidence in targeted villages and no comparable change in
non targeted villages. The paper presents some limitations, in particular with
respect to the risk of reporting bias on FGC status, but it is, to the best of my
knowledge, the only available attempt to quantitatively evaluate the impact of
an anti-FGC intervention. Chapter 3 in this thesis represents a further step in
this direction. I evaluate the same type of anti-FGC intervention as in Diop and
Askew (2009) in a small area in Senegal. The study attempts to overcome the
problem of collecting truthful information on FGC status and it quantifies the
effect of the program using a difference in difference estimator. Additionally,
it discusses potential sources of spillover effects to non-targeted villages and
links this evidence to the social norm theory of FGC. As explained at length
in the chapter, this study also presents some limitations due to the nature of
the program (which is not randomly assigned) and of the data (I can assess the
impact of the program only in the short run).
2.4.3 Caveats regarding FGC data
Before describing anti-FGC interventions, it is worth emphasizing the challenges
in collecting reliable data on this custom. FGC, due to its link to sexuality, is a
sensitive topic in many societies and it is usually not discussed in public. Asking
questions on FGC status can therefore be difficult.
However, with the expansion of anti-FGC sensitization campaigns and in-
terventions, practicing communities have started discussing it more openly, fa-
cilitating the work of data collectors. At the same time, because of these in-
terventions, people understand that FGC is less socially acceptable. Since the
FGC status of a woman can be ascertained only through a gynecological exam-
ination, the risk of under-reporting increases with the pressure on the custom.
For instance, if people are aware that FGC is illegal (as it is the case in most
of the concerned countries, see Figure 2.1), it is less likely that they will admit
practicing it.
Evidence on the accuracy of self-reported status are still limited, even if
growing. Two cross-sectional studies compared self-reported FGC status with
the results of medical examination. In Egypt, a study of the Population Council
(Huntington et al., 1996) finds a 92% agreement between self-report and medical
examination. In Sudan, Elmusharaf et al. (2006) find no misreporting of the
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FGC status. In both cases, mistakes in reporting were nevertheless made on
the type of FGC performed. Notice however that in both countries the practice
was not yet outlawed at the moment of data collection.
On the contrary, a longitudinal study in Ghana (Jackson et al., 2003) finds
that 13% of the sampled women denied being cut during the second round of
the interviews, while they had previously reported having undergone FGC. The
strongest effect was found among young women. Between the two rounds of the
data collection, a law against FGC was enforced and a local traditional cutter
jailed. Furthermore, anti-FGC campaigns took place in the area of the study.
The changing institutional environment towards FGC can possibly explain the
under-reporting. At least part of the decrease in FGC incidence which is ob-
served in the country can be due to a change in the social acceptability of the
practice rather than to an effective decrease in FGC prevalence.
A recent study by the De Cao and Lutz (2015) uses a list experiment9
to elicit unbiased answers about FGC support in Ethiopia, pointing at the
risk of under-reporting due to external interventions. The experiment runs as
follows: a sample is divided into two random groups. The control group is
given three non-sensitive statements. Respondents answer by giving only the
total number of statements they agree with. The treated group gets the same
list of non-sensitive items, plus a sensitive fourth statement. In De Cao and Lutz
(2015), the fourth statement was “a girl should be circumcised”. The proportion
of people supporting the practice is then given by the difference between the
number of items the treatment and control groups agree on. The authors also
asked directly a question on the support of the practice. FGC is outlawed in the
country and an anti-FGC intervention took place in the sampled area: the risk
of under-reporting the support to the practice was therefore high. They found
that 30% of the women were in favor of the practice when asked directly, against
39.2% when elicited using the list experiment (the difference is significant at the
10% level). Furthermore, they found that women who have been targeted by
the anti-FGC intervention were more likely to under-report their support to the
practice.
These studies suggest therefore that, at least in contexts where anti-FGC
activities have been important, direct questions on FGC can be problematic.
This casts some doubts on the quality of the information elicited with the
DHS module on FGC. A typical question asked is “Have you been circumcised?
Is your daughter circumcised? Do you intend to circumcise your daughter?”.
Direct questions concerning a woman’s FGC status and her support of the
practice might end up being biased in countries where the pressure to abandon
FGC is strong. It then becomes problematic to distinguish between a decrease
in FGC incidence and under-reporting.
When in DHS the framing of the question on FGC changes, this problem
of under-reporting can indeed emerge. For example, in Senegal, with respect
to the previous round (DHS 2010), the FGC status of each daughter is asked
9This method has been extensively used in political science and health studies to study
opinions on sensitive issues.
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directly in 2012, while in DHS 2010 a woman is asked first if she has ever heard
about FGC. Only in the case of a positive answer, the FGC status of the woman
and of her daughters is investigated. As a consequence of the reframing of the
question, the FGC prevalence among girls aged 0 to 9 increased from 12% of
DHS 2010 to 15% (ANSD and ICF, 2012). This difference can be imputed to
the change in the questionnaire rather than to an increase in FGC prevalence.
The framing of the question on FGC status is therefore crucial. A way
to potentially decrease under-reporting is the procedure I adopted in the data
collection I carried out in Senegal in 2012, in an area where Tostan’s intervention
against FGC was implemented. More generally, Senegal is a country where
FGC is under pressure, given the number of initiatives (legal and NGOs based)
undertaken to end the practice. The risk of under-reporting the FGC status is
thus present. Rather than first inquiring whether the girl was cut, we directly
asked the age at which a girl underwent FGC. The tactic was therefore to
take the practice for granted so as not to cause uneasy feelings among the
respondents. Admission of non-cutting a girl would come from denial at the
time the question about the age at cutting was raised. While this strategy does
not completely solve the problem of under-reporting bias, it is quite likely to
reduce it. Furthermore, optimally lying about the FGC status of one’s daughters
requires some calculations to be done about the timing of the program with
respect to the age of the girl at the moment of the intervention: girls who
should be reported as non-cut should be the ones affected by the intervention;
older daughters should be reported as cut. Answering strategically might not be
obvious for illiterate women. Because for girls not at risk during the program, I
have virtually 100% FGC prevalence, the strategy seems to have worked fairly
well in eliciting the FGC status of girls.
Another way to indirectly elicit information on the FGC status of a girl is
provided by Efferson et al. (2015). In Sudan, the authors exploit a local feature
of the FGC ceremony to get information on the FGC status of girls. During
the cutting ceremony, which usually takes place in the summer vacation before
entering primary school, the girls’ feet are decorated with henna, which tends to
last for some time. By checking if the girls’ feet show traces of henna, they could
get a proxy for the girls’ FGC status. The authors additionally compared this
measure with the self-reported FGC status, finding strong coherence between
the two methods (and suggesting that FGC is not a too sensitive question in
that context). This method of eliciting information on FGC however depends
on the regularities of the cutting and cannot be generalized. Furthermore,
in contexts where FGC is under pressure, the way the cutting is performed
might be affected: rituals which leave external signs of what happened might
be abandoned.
Finally, concerning the measurement of people’s attitude towards FGC, the
works of De Cao and Lutz (2015) and Efferson et al. (2015), which use respec-
tively a list experiment and an implicit association test, are promising ways to
elicit true preferences on this topic.
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2.5 Interventions to stop FGC: Tostan’s model
As already said, there has been a resurgent interest in FGC since the late
nineties, with a new wave of global and local campaigns taking place in devel-
oping and developed countries. The language to frame FGC issues has shifted
from health to human rights, even if the health component remains present.
An important actor in the fight against FGC has been the NGO Tostan. Its
community empowerment program, known in French as “Programme de Rein-
forcement des Capacités Communautaires” (PRCC), has gained international
recognition since 1997, when a group of women who attended Tostan’s program
publicly declared their intention to abandon FGC. Since then, Tostan’s activi-
ties have steadily expanded both in Senegal and in other West African countries
such as Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, and The Gambia, promoting
their human-rights based training as a community empowerment instrument.
In Tostan’s intervention, FGC is defined as a social norm. Public pledges, con-
sidered as a tool to promote coordination on FGC and social change, are an
important component of the program (Mackie, 2000). It is however worth em-
phasizing that Tostan’s intervention is a rich project which addresses several
questions such as alphabetization, health and conflict management. Sensitiza-
tion on FGC is just a part of it, although it is the dimension for which the NGO
has gained international recognition.
UNICEF has become an important partner of the NGO, financing its pro-
gram in Senegal and adopting a similar approach in other countries. In 2008,
UNICEF and UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund) started the “Joint-
Programme on Female Genital Cutting”, which is currently the largest anti-
FGC initiative in place and the main instrument for the UN system to promote
the abandonment of FGC. The program is active in 15 African countries and it
has been extended for a second phase in 2014-201710 (UNICEF and UNFPA,
2014b, pp. 1-2). The program adopts a social norm’s view of FGC and it pro-
motes an approach close to Tostan’s intervention: FGC is defined as a social
norm and public pledges for the abandonment of FGC are organized.
In practice, the PRCC consists in classes held during a 30 week period, where
different topics are discussed by participants with the help of a facilitator. The
project requires a commitment from the village to provide a space to hold the
classes and to provide shelter and food for the facilitator. Participation to
the class is voluntary. While at the beginning only women were targeted, the
program later started including men. In the next two sections I describe in
detail the classes and the meaning of human-right based education and the
public pledges.
2.5.1 Human rights to empower communities
The PRCC is a literacy-based non-formal education program. The term non-
formal refers to the fact that it focuses on the educational needs of its partici-
10Nigeria and Yemen have been added to the initial 15 targeted countries.
22
CHAPTER 2. THE DEBATE ON FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING
pants: the evolution of the contents of the program, which ended up including
sections on democracy, human rights and social norms, is seen as evolving with
the needs expressed by its participants (Gillespie and Melching, 2010).
Concepts of human rights are introduced through the use of drawings, ig-
niting a discussion on what they represent. Participants are encouraged to link
those concepts to their personal experience and to the aspirations they have for
their communities. An important dimension of the learning process is the use
of poems, songs and dances as a way to bring human rights ideas into tradi-
tional customs (Mackie, 2015; Gillespie and Melching, 2010). As remarked by
Merry (2006), to avoid that local communities consider human right concepts
as imposed or in contrast with their own culture, a process of translation to
“local language” is needed. This, according to the author, is a condition for
human-rights based programs to be effective. Tostan is indeed considered as
having successfully made such a process of translation.
Information on women and maternal health, including FGC, are also ex-
plained in the classes, and links with human rights principles are made. Being
able to connect the health risks associated to the practice with human rights
(such as the right to physical integrity) might indeed facilitate its abandonment.
O’Neill (2011, chapter 8), in an anthropological study in the Senegal River Val-
ley, argues that women who decide to stop cutting can sustain their decision
due to their ability to link it to health and human rights principles and to their
personal experience. More generally, awareness of principles such as equality
before the law and rights to non-discrimination were used by people who felt
marginalized (because of gender or social status) as a tool to gain voice within
the community and challenge the existing power structure. Tostan seems to
play an important role in the process of empowering marginalized groups (such
as women) by providing the language and the tools to act within their own
community.
It is clear from this brief description that the PRCC does not concern FGC
only, but it is a broader project aiming at bringing social change in targeted
communities. However, it is undeniable that the NGO is well-known at the
international level primarly as providing a framework to fight FGC: its name
and reputation are strongly associated with the anti-FGC movement11. More
specifically, the project’s other dimensions, such as the sensitisation activities
and the public pledges have gained great attention both in the media and among
scholars because of their consistency with a theoretical framework of FGC as
a social norm. I discuss the role of sensitization and public pledges, known as
public declarations, in the next section.
.
11For instance, The New York Times published an article focusing mainly on Tostan’s
activities titled “Senegal Curbs a Bloody Rite for Girls and Women” ( The New York Times,
16 October 2011).
23
FIGHTING AGAINST HARMFUL CUSTOMS
2.5.2 Sensitization and the public declarations
An important dimension of Tostan’s program is the process of sensitization or
“organized diffusion” (Mackie and LeJeune, 2009): topics and discussions held in
the class are communicated both inside and outside the village. Participants are
encouraged to “adopt” another non-participant to explain the topics of discus-
sions. The same is done at the village level, where participants choose another
village where they are supposed to do activities (such as cleaning activities) and
spread information on the contents of the program.
This process of sensitization is particularly relevant in relation to the theory
of FGC as a marriageability convention, as already explained in Section 2.4.1.
According to this view, sensitization is needed because people cannot sustain
the decision to abandon FGC on their own, given that non-cutting could affect
women’s marriage opportunities. The decision to stop FGC should therefore be
agreed within the intramarrying communities.
According to existing accounts (Molloy, 2013), the process of sensitization
and coordination started as a result of individual initiatives. Over time it has
become more institutionalized and embedded in the PRCC: in targeted villages,
a committee in charge of sensitizing other villages is put in place. Funding is
sometimes provided to support travel expenses. The choice of the villages to
sensitize is a priori left to the villagers and this might have been the case at
the beginning of the implementation of the project. It is however possible
that, with the formalization and expansion of the intervention, local Tostan
facilitators started to play a role in the choice of the villages to go to12.
The public declarations are public gatherings where representatives of vil-
lages declare their decision to abandon FGC and other harmful customs. Again,
the rationale is that coordination on harmful customs can be achieved within
the network through these public pledges, which allow individuals to shift expec-
tations on other people’s behaviors. The public declarations can group several
communities and they are organized with the help of the NGO. It is a day of
celebration, where plays, songs and speeches are performed. Declarations of
committment to stop FGC (and early marriage or other human-rights related
topics) are made. Ideally, such commitments should be considered as binding
by attending villages.
For the public public declaration to work as a coordination device for the
abandonment of FGC, some conditions should be met (for a detailed discussion
and available evidence from the area concerned by my study, see Chapter 3).
First, the main barrier to the abandonment of the practice is lack of coordina-
tion; second, villages which attend the pledge are inter-dependent concerning
FGC; third, attending villages must believe that the other participants are se-
riously committing to stop. It is not clear if these conditions are systematically
met and more empirical evidence is needed to assess the impact of public dec-
larations.
12This seems to be partially the case in the region of Kolda, as reported by local facilitators
and villagers in the sampled area during the interviews I did in 2012.
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What is however evident is that the number of communities attending a
public pledge has become a measure of the success of Tostan’s type of interven-
tion. The 2014 report on the “Joint-Programme on Female Genital Cutting”
states the following: “Public dialogues and declarations continue to be a pow-
erful intervention. Since 2008, more than 13,000 communities (including more
than 800 in 2014) across 15 countries - representing more than 10 million people
- have publicly committed to ending FGM/C” (UNICEF and UNFPA, 2014a,
p.35). This type of statements are not uncommon in reports on anti-FGC in-
terventions. They implicitly suggest that participation to a public pledge is
equivalent to the abandonment of the practice, an assumption which requires
careful evaluation.
Whatever the importance of public pledges and sensitization as a coordina-
tion device, it has been remarked that they represent a space of discussion and
deliberation (Mackie, 2015) with a potential to change community’s dynamics.
Deliberation has been defined as “mutual communication that involves weighting
and reflecting on preferences, values and interests regarding matters of common
concern” (Mansbridge, 2015, p.27, adapted from Dryzek (2006)) . Deliberation
can serve two purposes (Heller and Rao, 2015, pp. 1-2). First, it can be a
mechanism which helps solving a coordination failure. In this sense, sensiti-
zation activities and public pledges might play an important role in spreading
information, confronting ideas and changing preferences over FGC with the aim
of reaching an agreement over it, even when no immediate commitment is ob-
served. Second, deliberation gives voice to marginalized groups by providing a
space where their voices are listened to. This second mechanism seems to be
generally activated by Tostan’s classes, as accounted by O’Neill (2011) and it
can have a broader impact on community’s organizations than what is measured
by the reduction in FGC incidence only.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I presented different dimensions of the ongoing debate on FGC
with a specific attention to the economic perspective on the topic. Overall, in
the last 15 years a consensus has emerged among practitioners in interpreting
FGC as a social norm and, more specifically, as a coordination problem. Inter-
ventions which include public pledges have become widespread. There is now
a growing interest among scholars in exploring this perspective, both theoreti-
cally and empirically. Challenges in collecting information on the topic should
not be underestimated, but recent development in the economic literature, in
particular the use of experimental settings, is promising. What still seems to be
missing are rigorous quantitative evaluations of anti-FGC interventions. These
should not substitute, but rather complement, the existing qualitative research
on the topic.
It must nonetheless be acknowledged that randomized controlled trials to
study the impact of anti-FGC interventions might be difficult to carry out. If
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FGC is an inter-village coordination problem, the possibility of spillover effects
(that contaminate the control group) must be taken into account in the design.
There is a growing body of literature which tries to deal with this issue in
RCT settings (see, for example, Baird et al., 2014 and Miguel and Kremer,
2004). Given that, a priori, spillovers effects in FGC can be geographically
large, finding uncontaminated counter-factuals might however require quite an
extended area to be included in the design. To summarize, while there is room
for more rigorous assessment of anti-FGC interventions, there is need for a
careful reflection on the way to properly design the evaluations given the nature
of the topic.
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Chapter 3
Changing Female Genital
Cutting: Evidence from
Senegal
3.1 Introduction
How to stop female genital cutting (FGC) is still an open question. Different
strategies have so far been implemented with various degrees of effectiveness
and no systematic evaluation: from sensitization campaigns and legal bans, to
projects targeting communities or specific groups such as traditional cutters
and religious leaders or creating alternative rites of passage.
There is no easy answer or generalization to the question of what works
against FGC also because the determinants of this custom are not yet well
understood. Furthermore, the heterogeneity in the practice shows that these
determinants are quite likely to be ethnic-specific.
In the debate on the nature of FGC, however, there is an increasing con-
sensus among practitioners and international organizations such UNICEF on
conceptualizing FGC within the social norm or convention theory: FGC is seen
as a problem of strategic interaction of individuals within a given network.
A popular program, designed by the Senegalese NGO Tostan and adopted by
UNICEF for its interventions against FGC and other harmful customs, closely
follows this view. Empirically however, there is still little evidence of the va-
lidity of the coordination model for FGC and of the effectiveness of programs
adopting such a view of the custom. Only recently some steps have been made
to better understand the nature of FGC (Bellemare et al., 2015; Efferson et al.,
2015; Shell-Duncan et al., 2011) but, to my knowledge, no quantitative evalua-
tion of such a type of anti-FGC interventions has been done.
This chapter is a first attempt to fill this gap: I study the impact on FGC
incidence of Tostan’s community-based program on women empowerment which
27
FIGHTING AGAINST HARMFUL CUSTOMS
was implemented in a small area in the south-east of Senegal. This project,
called PRCC1, is a three-year program which offers alphabetization classes and
health education, but it also addresses the issue of FGC within a human right
framework. A specificity of the project is its attempt to activate coordination
beyond the boundaries of the targeted villages, adopting a view of FGC as a
coordination problem across villages. An important element of the program’s
strategy is the organization of a public pledge, called Public Declaration, where
representatives of villages (both with and without the program) meet to declare
that they will abandon the practice of FGC. Decreasing FGC incidence is only
one dimension of the intervention, even if it is the one for which the program
is most known2.
I first quantify the short-term effect of the program using a difference in
difference approach: I focus on girls that were still at risk during the period of
implementation of the project and I compare them with girls too old to be still
at risk of being cut. Given that the project was not randomly assigned, I use
a difference in difference strategy and discuss any potential bias remaining. I
find that girls at risk during the implementation of the project are 8 percentage
points less likely to be cut. No or very limited change seems to happen for
the same cohort in non targeted villages, hinting at the lack of spillovers effects
(and hence coordination) during the implementation of the project.
I additionally provide some descriptive evidence on the functioning of the
Public Declaration. Almost all the non targeted villages in the sampled area
have attended a Public Declaration, but villagers are not aware of the partic-
ipation of their village to the event. Furthermore, village leaders do not seem
to consider the participation to a Public Declaration as binding. Overall, the
conditions for the Public Declaration to work as a coordination and commit-
ment device do not seem to be met in the context analyzed here. It is therefore
not possible to distinguish between a poor implementation of this part of the
project and an improper conceptualization of the nature of FGC as an inter-
village coordination game.
With respect to other potential channels of inter-village coordination, I find
some evidence that, when extending the analysis to girls born after the end of
the program, a (female) family link to a PRCC village is negatively correlated
with FGC rate in non PRCC villages, which is suggestive of a role of the ex-
tended family network (across villages) in the FGC decision-making process. I
cannot however exclude that some unobservable characteristics of the extended
family (such as lower preferences for FGC) explain the result.
The program seems to reduce FGC incidence within the targeted villages, at
least in the time frame I consider here. While simultaneous perfect coordination
at the village level is not supported by the data, the decrease in FGC observed
in PRCC and non-PRCC villages is compatible with alternative models of FGC
such as a coordination game at the sub-village level; a cascade model with
1Programme de Reinforcement des Capacités Communautaires, also known as Community
Empowerment Program.
2For more detais on the program, see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.
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heterogeneous preferences at the village or extended family level; individual
decision over FGC in a heterogeneous population.
In short, while the evidence suggests that this kind of community-based
program can be an effective tool to fight FGC, the importance of the Public
Declaration has yet to be properly evaluated. Given that public pledges have
received a lot of attention by practitioners as a way to fight harmful social
customs, this chapter calls for a a more careful reflection and evaluation of such
a policy.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2 I describe the trend
in FGC in Senegal and in the sampled area and I briefly explain the relevant
characteristics of the program which has been presented in more details in
Chapter 2. The empirical analysis is divided in two sections. In section 3.3.1, I
present descriptive statistics on the availability of information on FGC related
issues in PRCC village and I quantify the short term effect of the project. In
section 3.3.2, I focus on the two potential sources of spillovers effects from PRCC
to non PRCC villages and provide evidence on the relevant network dimension
for FGC. In Section 3.4 discusses the results and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data and context
3.2.1 Data
I use the dataset I collected in Senegal in 2012 on demand of the NGO Tostan.
The data collection was part of a broader project to study networks and their
role on changing social norms.
Data were collected in the region of Kolda, in the administrative area of Sare
Colly Sallé and Ouassadou. In Sare Colly Sallé, seven villages that had Tostan
program were sampled. In Ouassadou, a census of all the villages (both with
and without the PRCC) in a small area at the frontier between Senegal and
Guinea Bissau was carried out to increase the likelihood to capture inter-village
networks3. The villages included in the survey were both in Senegal and Guinea
Bissau. In Guinea no sampled village in the area had the PRCC. The empirical
analysis is based on the Senegalese sample of 35 villages, for a total of of 507
households. Households were randomly selected in the sampled villages and the
household head and his wife were interviewed individually. If the household was
polygamous, one wife was randomly selected for the interview.
In Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3 I describe in detail the way to address a sensi-
tive question such as FGC. Here it is worth remembering that we asked mothers
3We had different sampling design between the two administrative areas to address dif-
ferent research questions from the ones described in this paper. It might therefore raise
concern on the validity of the identification strategy carried out here, in particular the fact
that no “control” village is sampled in Sare Colly Sallé. While the area is overall ethnically
homogenous, the administrative area of Sare Colly Sallé is relatively less isolated and had on
average bigger villages than in Ouassadou. However, the villages in the area of Sare Colly
Sallé are used only in the first part of the analysis and results are qualitatively unchanged
when excluded.
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about the age at cutting of all their daughters, not questioning therefore the ex-
istence of the custom. This method seems to reduce the risk of under-reporting
bias in FGC status.
3.2.2 The context
Senegal is classified as a moderately low FGC incidence country. According
to the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data 2010, Senegal has a FGC
prevalence rate of 26% among women aged 15-45. This average hides regional
differences, linked to the ethnic composition of the country. FGC is practiced
mainly by the Fulani, Mandinka and Diola and concentrated in the North-East
and in the South (Lower and Upper Casamance). Average age at cutting varies
from 4 years old among the Fulani to 7 years old among the Diola and, for the
same ethnic group, from area to area.
Senegal is an interesting case to study the decline in FGC. The Senegalese
government has shown since the late 90s a growing commitment in fighting
FGC4, in parallel or through NGOs and other civil society organizations. The
NGO Tostan has been a crucial actor in this process, implementing massively its
projects throughout the country and inspiring the government strategy against
FGC5.
The latest available nationally representative data on FGC (Continuous
DHS 2012-13) show a declining trend in FGC. In Figure 3.1 I compute the
FGC prevalence by year of birth for girls aged 5 or more6, grouping together
regions having similar FGC prevalence over the period considered. The graph
shows a declining trend in FGC even if FGC is far from having disappeared.
A similar decreasing trend is depicted in the sampled area, which is situated
in a high FGC incidence region. It is worth noticing that high FGC incidence,
ethnically homogenous rural areas such as Kolda are particularly challenging
environments to change harmful customs: it is easier to promote social change
where the group which practices FGC is a minority. For instance, observing
that non-cut women do not behave differently from cut women, as often it
is assumed (see, for instance, O’Neill, 2011, p.180), could help changing the
individual’s perception on the custom. This type of exposure is more likely to
lack in ethnically homogenous areas.
It is particularly interesting to compare the change in trend in FGC over
time and across the border with Guinea Bissau: in both areas the Fulani are
the dominant ethnic group (they represent 99% of the interviewed people in
Guinea, 85% in Kolda) and they share similar cultural traits. Marriage links
across the border are not uncommon. With respect to FGC, the main difference
is that, at the moment of the survey, no PRCC program was started in Guinea.
4I describe these policies in details in Chapter 4.
5However, in the latest evaluation on the anti-FGC campaigns, (UNFPA and UNICEF,
2013) the need for more experimentation and alternative approaches seems to emerge.
6I consider this age group because the risk of censoring (meaning that the decreasing
trend in FGC prevalence is due to girls who will be cut in the future) is limited: average age
at cutting in the sample is 2 years and 94% were cut by age 5.
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Figure 3.1: Trend in FGC prevalence in Senegal for girls aged 5 or more, by
year of birth. Data are aggregated in three groups, depending on average FGC
incidence at the regional level.
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Additionally, the government was not (yet) committed to eradicate FGC and
the presence of state institutions was scant7. Interviews and observations on the
field also suggest that FGC was still strongly supported by the local population
(and village authorities).
In Figure 3.2 I compare girls from 1 to 7 year old with girls from 8 to 14
when they were aged 1 to 7 in both regions.
The comparison shows that, while on the Guinean side there has been virtu-
ally no change in FGC rate over time, on the Senegalese side FGC is decreasing,
in particular in the young cohort with respect to the old one, when compared
at the same age. This could be a result of the anti-FGC interventions carried
out in Kolda. In particular, from 2005 to 2007 Tostan implemented its PRCC
project in some villages of the sampled area.
The PRCC program is a three-year program on community development,
offering alphabetization and discussing questions such as child and maternal
health. It targets mainly women, but it is also open to men. Traditional
customs such as FGC and early marriage are also discussed in a human-right
framework, without judgment of those who practice them. Although FGC is
not the main focus of the project and it is addressed towards the end of the
training, the NGO is well known for its work on it and it is often identified as
7The survey took place just after the military coup that led to the creation of an interim
technical government and to the postponement of presidential elections.
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of the FGC prevalence in the sampled area in Guinea
(region of Gabu) and Senegal (region of Kolda)
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an anti-FGC NGO.
As accounted by Mackie (2000), behind Tostan’s approach there is the view
of FGC as a social norm: spreading information on the contents of the program
outside the group of trainees and of the village, including the issues raised on
FGC, is a building block of the PRCC. This is done formally, by creating in
PRCC villages a group in charge of the sensitization of other villages on FGC
related issues, and informally, based on individual initiative. Furthermore, the
NGO helps villagers to organize a so called Public Declaration. This is a inter-
village meeting where representative of PRCC villages and sensitized ones meet
to declare that they stop cutting. The rationale behind these activities is that
the abandonment of FGC can be achieved only if a simultaneous change in
behavior takes place. A single individual or group that stop cutting will face
pressure and ostracism if the decision has not been taken within the whole
relevant network.
In this perspective, the Public Declaration should work as a coordination
device (and possibly as a commitment device). Ideally, villagers become aware
at the meeting that several other villages are stopping simultaneously, making
it possible to coordinate on a new equilibrium. Such events might serve other
functions than coordination. For example, they can be conceived as a space for
discussion and deliberation, a way to make people listen and discover alternative
views which could lead to modify their own preferences on the custom (Heller
and Rao, 2015). While this would be an interesting to explore, I focus here on
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the role of the Public Declaration as a coordination device, in accordance with
the popular definition of FGC as a social norm and a coordination problem.
The data collected contain detailed information on the PRCC, on the sensi-
tization and on the Public Declaration. The exploitation of these data can offer
useful information on the dynamics of FGC. In the next section, I start with
the PRCC to then move to the analysis of FGC in non-PRCC villages and of
the possible spillover effects of the program.
3.3 Empirical analysis
3.3.1 FGC incidence in PRCC villages
3.3.1.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics on household heads and their wife
in both types of villages. In terms of observables characteristics, PRCC villages
tend to be bigger - in line with the NGO’s criteria to implement a project -
and they are more ethnically diverse. The minority group is mainly Mandinka,
who are also Muslim and practice FGC. Households compounds are also more
likely to have cement walls rather than mud walls, a proxy for wealth. They
do not differ in terms of other observable characteristics, such as schooling and
religious education.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics PRCC and non PRCC villages: household head
and wife characteristics
PRCC village Non PRCC villages
Mean Sd Total Mean Sd Total Diff p value
Fulani 0.809 0.394 246 0.929 0.257 156 -0.121 0.001
Polygamous 0.382 0.487 246 0.462 0.500 156 -0.079 0.116
Woman attended formal school 0.138 0.346 246 0.083 0.277 156 0.055 0.096
Man attended formal school 0.199 0.400 246 0.231 0.423 156 -0.032 0.451
Woman had Koranic education 0.557 0.498 246 0.481 0.501 156 0.076 0.137
Man had Koranic education 0.728 0.446 246 0.723 0.449 155 0.005 0.912
Man was a talibé 0.321 0.468 246 0.282 0.451 156 0.039 0.409
Age woman 35.996 9.990 246 35.526 9.995 156 0.470 0.646
Age man 48.780 11.494 246 47.936 11.866 156 0.845 0.479
Wall house in cement 0.163 0.370 246 0.077 0.267 156 0.086 0.013
Number households 246 156
Number villages 13 21
As a first comparison of FGC related outcomes between PRCC and non
PRCC villages, I look at information availability on FGC8.
Figure 3.3 compares, by gender and type of village, the average number of
positive answers to the questions: “Does FGC cause health problems? ” and
8As already said, the PRCC touches multiple dimensions of women life and FGC is only
one of them. The impression from the field was that women in PRCC villages were more
assertive and ready to speak during the community questionnaire. Unfortunately, I do not
have systematic measures of these other dimensions, where the program might have indeed
an important effect.
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Figure 3.3: Information availability on FGC, mobility and exposure to media
in PRCC and non PRCC villages by gender.
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“Do you know if a law against FGC exist? ”. PRCC villages are overall better
informed, meaning that they are more likely to be aware of FGC health problems
and of the fact that the country has a law against FGC. More interestingly, the
gender ratio is reversed in PRCC villages with respect to the non-PRCC. Given
that the program targets mainly women, the fact that in the treated villages
women are at least as informed as men on FGC related issues might indeed be
an effect of the program. Furthermore, in both types of villages women are less
mobile than men and less likely to listen to the radio, the main media to which
they are exposed: PRCC villages and women in particular are equally exposed
to other potential sources of information on FGC (such as radio programmes)
and their difference in information is not due to a difference in the level of
mobility9. These data are compatible with a role of the PRCC in spreading
information on FGC.
With respect to FGC incidence, in Figure 3.4 I plot Kaplan Meyer survival
estimates10 of the survival rate in both villages, dividing the observations ac-
9There can still be a difference in the “quality” of mobility, meaning that they might visit
villages that differ in terms of exposure to FGC information.
10The Kaplan Meier is a non parametric estimate of a survival function that gives the
probability of not experiencing an event at a given time t. Here the failure is FGC and the
time at which failure occurs is the age at which a girl is cut. The estimator at a given age t is
the product of the probability of not being cut at each age j < t, conditional on survival until
that moment. Formally, Ŝ(t) =
∏
j|tj≤t
(
nj−dj
nj
)
, where nj is the number of observations (that
have not yet failed) at time j and dj is the number of failures (girls that are cut) observed in
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Figure 3.4: Kaplan-Meyer survival estimates for FGC rate, by cohort and by
PRCC
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cording to three categories: girls not at risk at the beginning of the program
(born before 2000, therefore aged 6 or more in 2005); girls at risk during the
program (born between 2000 and 2006, namely aged 5 or less in 2005) and girls
born after the end of the program (2007). The distinction is based on the fact
that both in this sample and in DHS data, average age at cutting for girls older
than 5 is below 3 and in the sample is around 3, and by age 6 more than 95%
of the cut girls have already undergone FGC.
A line measures the probability of not being cut at each possible age of
the girls (from birth to age 10)11. For girls born before 2000, there is no
statistically significant difference between PRCC and non PRCC village at age
7, when virtually all the girls are cut. The differences at earlier age are due to
to differences in age at cutting, with PRCC villages cutting relatively later than
non-PRCC villages. In the central graph, the probability of not being cut at
each age starts to increase in targeted villages: the probability of not being cut
at age 7 is 20% in PRCC villages and it is statistically different from the one
in non-PRCC at the 90% confidence level. Finally, for girls born after 2006, we
observe an additional increase in the probability of not being cut in both types
of villages. The analysis of the last cohort suffers from censoring problem (which
is the reason why I exclude it from the estimation). However, by comparing
the survival probability at age 3 across cohorts, we can reasonably argue that
that period.
11The information on the age at cutting allows to compute survival estimates.
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the probability of not (yet) being cut at that age has increased for the youngest
group12.
Table 3.2: Formal and religious education of girls, by cohort and type of village.
PRCC Non PRCC
Mean Mean Diff p value
Born between 2000 and 2006
Attended formal school 0.845 0.712 0.133 0.005
Had Koranic education 0.389 0.237 0.152 0.006
Number girls 188 118
Born before 2000
Attended formal school 0.682 0.503 0.179 0.000
Had Koranic education 0.562 0.353 0.209 0.000
Number girls 283 153
Level of observation: daughters of the household head’s wife
Table 3.2 shows that girls in PRCC villages born before 2000 are in general
more likely to have some form of formal and religious education than in non-
PRCC villages. With respect to schooling, this gap can be partially explained
by the better location of PRCC villages and the fact that they are closer to
schools. This gap persists for younger girls (born between 2000 and 2006).
Cutting takes place before the education (both formal and religious) starts.
It is theoretically possible however that the decisions over schooling, religious
education and FGC are simultaneously taken and interdependent.
3.3.1.2 Identification strategy
When estimating the decrease in FGC in PRCC villages, several identification
issues arise. First, the program was not randomized: the implementation of
the project was the result of a negotiation between the NGO and the village13.
Given that Tostan is well known for its anti-FGC activities, villages that are
not willing to discuss the topic do not get the project. This can lead to an
upward bias in the estimation of the effect of the program on FGC rate.
Second, the whole impact should arguably be measured on girls born after
the end of the program. They are however aged 5 or less in 2012, at the moment
of the survey. Given that average age at cutting is around 3 years old, there is a
censoring issue when looking at this cohort: some girls might still get cut in the
future. To address this problem, I focus on girls at risk when the PRCC starts,
meaning that they are 5 or younger in 2005. My data were collected in 2012,
therefore these girls were between 12 and 6 at the moment of the interview,
12The decision of not cutting is easily reversed: the decrease in FGC can therefore signal
that cutting takes place now at older ages than in the past. This is however unlikely, because
it would imply not only a reversal of the decreasing trend in age at cutting that has been
observed in Senegal (see Chapter 4), but that cutting has been postponed after the age at
which it was traditionally done.
13Given some initial requirements of the NGO to implement the project, such as the village
size.
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mitigating the censoring problem14. This can lead to an underestimation of the
effect of the program, given that some girls were exposed to the PRCC when
they were already cut.
Finally, generating spillover effects to non-PRCC villages is an explicit ob-
jective of the project, which attempts to coordinate villages on abandoning FGC
through the Public Declaration and the sensitization. I must therefore take the
possibility of spillover effects into account. If there is a decrease in FGC rate in
non-PRCC villages due to the project, then a comparison between PRCC and
non PRCC villages would lead to an underestimation of the project’s effect.
I use a difference in difference estimator to quantify the change in FGC
rate in PRCC villages with respect to non-PRCC villages during the period
of implementation of the project. The treated group are girls at risk at the
beginning of the program (central graph in Figure 3.4), compared with girls
not at risk anymore (left graph in Figure 3.4).
The difference in difference approach allows to partially solve the endogene-
ity problem, given that it compares girls within each type of villages. However,
there is still a possible confounding effect if PRCC villages decided to stop
cutting precisely when the PRCC started for reasons unrelated to the program.
The censoring problem is mitigated by the exclusion of the younger cohort
(born after 2006). This has the additional advantage that, in the time period
considered in the difference in difference, it is unlikely that there are important
spillover effects from PRCC to non-targeted villages. The graphs in Figure 3.4
suggest that, if there is any spillover effect from PRCC to non PRCC villages
(which could invalidate the identification strategy), it concerns mainly girls born
after the end of the program: before that period, the decrease in FGC in non
PRCC villages is very limited, and virtually all girls are cut. In any case a
decrease in FGC in non-PRCC villages due to coordination with PRCC villages
would lead to an underestimation of the impact of the program: my estimate
would then be a lower-bound (assuming no other bias is binding).
14For girls born before 2000, less than 5% has still to be cut at age 6, dropping to 2.8% at
age 7. Notice first, that the results of the difference in difference hold when I exclude the 6
years old. Second, as shown in Chapter 4, there is a downward trend in age at cutting, and
therefore at age 6 the probability of not yet being cut for girls born after 2000 is lower than
in the previous cohort.
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Figure 3.5: Quantifying potential spillovers effect during the program: compar-
ison of FGC prevalence by year of birth for the cohort at risk in targeted and
non targeted villages
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To better quantify possible spillover effects for girls in non-PRCC villages
at risk during the program, in Figure 3.5 I plot the percentage of girls cut in
the two types of villages by year of birth, within the cohort of interest. There
are only 7 girls not cut in non-PRCC village in the period of interest, and they
represent less than 6% of the total number of girls in these villages. Four of
them were born in 2006, which is the last year I use in difference in difference15.
The graph suggests that, if there is any change in FGC rate in non-PRCC
villages in this period, the decrease occurred towards the end of project and it
represents a small change. This could be just the result of an overall downward
trend in FGC rate, common to both types of villages rather than an effect of
the program.
The main disadvantage of excluding girls that are born after 2006 is that I
capture only the short-term effect of the program, potentially linked to presence
of the NGO in the village rather than to the content of the program itself.
Overall, if no other confounding factor is at play during the implementation
of the program, the results presented here should be seen as a lower-bound
estimate of the short-term impact of the PRCC.
The estimated equation is:
FGCihv = αi+βi(PRCCi∗bornafter2000i)+δDh+ageFEi+villageFEi+ihv
15Results are robust to the exclusion of the year 2006 in the estimation.
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The coefficient of interest is βi, that gives the change in FGC prevalence
for girls at risk in PRCC villages. Dh is a vector of the household (parents)
characteristics.
3.3.1.3 Results
Column (1) in Table 3.3 shows the result of the regression. I control (not shown)
for age fixed effects; household characteristics such as ethnicity, religious and
formal education, age of the mother and a proxy for wealth; at the village level
for the administrative area. Column (2) controls for village fixed effects. Results
are clustered at the village level16.
Table 3.3: Change in FGC rate in PRCC villages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FGC FGC FGC FGC
PRCC=1 -.021 0 -.0134 0
(.0132) (.) (.0161) (.)
PRCC=1 × Born after 2000=1 -.075** -.0842**
(.0336) (.0342)
PRCC=1 × Born after 1995=1 -.0147 -.0242
(.0225) (.0298)
Constant 1.01*** .733*** 1.06*** .965***
(.0995) (.109) (.118) (.078)
age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
village FE No Yes No Yes
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 695 695 389 389
(1)-(2): Born between 1982-2006; (3)-(4):Placebo test: born between 1982-1999
Controls: formal and religious education of the parents; a dummy for the Fulani;
age of the mother; a dummy for the house having cement wall; a dummy for
the administrative area. Standard errors clustered at the village level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Girls at risk in PRCC villages are 8 percentage points less likely to be cut
than in non PRCC villages. PRCC villages are 2.1 percentage points less likely
to cut before the beginning of the program, but this difference is not statistically
16The limited number of clusters (32) might raise concerns. However, results on the effect
of the program are robust both without clustering and with the use of wild bootstraps with
1000 replications.
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significant at the 90% level. As robustness check, in columns (3) and (4) I run
a placebo test, where the treated group are girls born between 1995 and 1999.
It confirms that there is no statistically significant difference in the probability
to be cut between the two types of villages, suggesting that the parallel trend
assumption is not violated.
As an additional check of the validity of the parallel trend assumption, I
run the same regression as in column (1) but I split the the control group
in several cohorts: girls born between 1982 and 1984; 1985 and 1989; 1990
and 1994; 1995 and 1999. The cohort at risk remains the same, namely girls
born in 2000 or after. Each cohort is interacted with being from a PRCC
village. Figure 3.6 shows the coefficients of the interaction terms at the 90%
confidence interval. The graph confirms that, while there was a pre-existing but
not significant difference in the past between PRCC and non PRCC in terms
of FGC prevalence, there is no differential trend before the beginning of the
program17. In Appendix A I present the same graph but introducing village
fixed effects. It confirms the absence of pre-existing differential trend. The
coefficient for the interaction term bornafter2000*PRCC remains very similar
in terms of magnitude to the one presented in Column (2) of Table 3.3 even if
it is just not significant at the 90% confidence level.
With respect to religious and formal education of the girls, I run (not shown)
a difference in difference with these two variables as outcomes and I find no
differential trend between PRCC and non PRCC. As an additional check, I run
the same specification as in (1) adding as a control an interaction term between
formal education (or Koranic education) and the cohort and the results remain
unchanged.
The result is compatible with the idea that the sheer presence of the NGO
in the village leads to a decrease in cutting. Bear in mind, indeed, that the
NGO is well-know for its work against FGC.
If we would observe within one village perfect or quasi-perfect abandonment
of the practice among the uncut girls at risk during the program and no change
in other villages, then this would be compatible with FGC being a (one-shot)
coordination game at the village level. To see if this is the case, in Figure 3.7
I plot the distribution of FGC incidence computed at the village level for the
cohort born between 2000 and 2006 in PRCC villages. With respect to the
difference in difference, I additionally exclude girls that were already cut when
the program started. The histogram shows that the decrease in FGC is not
driven by some villages which completely stopped cutting and some that did
17In an alternative specification to the one presented in column (2) of Table 3.3, I restrict
the control group to girls born after 1993 (included). The interaction term remains virtually
unchanged and significant. The pre-existing difference in FGC rate is of similar magnitude
as the one presented in column (2) but significant at the 90% level. Furthermore, given the
limited number of observations per year of birth, the significance level of the pre-existing
difference is sensitive to one-year changes in the control group. However, as shown in Figure
3.6, there seems to be no differential trend before the beginning of the program, suggesting
that the parallel trend assumption is not violated and changes in PRCC village during the
implementation of the program could be an effect of the intervention.
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Figure 3.6: Plot of the estimated coefficients of the regression as in column (1)
of Table 3.3 (age fixed effects, no village fixed effects) , where the non-treated
group is split in several cohorts (1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-1999). The coefficients
of the interaction of each cohort with PRCC are plotted with the 90% confidence
interval.
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not stop. The biggest decrease observed is of 40% of the treated girls that are
not cut. In all but two villages, there are some households who stopped cutting
and in no village total abandonment is observed in that cohort. The result is
not supportive of perfect coordination at the village level.
3.3.2 FGC incidence in non-PRCC villages after the end
of the program. Which spillover?
The comparison in Figure 3.4 between the 2000-2006 cohort and the born after
2007 suggests a decrease of FGC in both PRCC and non-PRCC villages after the
end of the program. In this section I discuss potential mechanisms of spillover
from the interventions in other villages which could suggest the presence of
coordination in the FGC decision making process. Within the project itself
there are two mechanisms through which spillovers should materialize18: the
Public Declaration and the sensitization process.
18In this section I restrict the analysis to the area of Ouassadou, given that it is the area
where all the non-PRCC villages are located.
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of FGC prevalence in PRCC villages
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3.3.2.1 The Public Declaration
In a simple game-theoretic framework, a Public Declaration is the device which
allows people to focus on the new equilibrium. The underlying assumption is
that individuals are willing to go against the norm, but peer pressure prevent
them from doing so. Furthermore, the relevant network for decision making
corresponds to a group of villages.
Given that I do not have variation at the village level in participation to
the event, I cannot empirically estimate the effect of participation on FGC
incidence. I provide instead some descriptive statistics on the perception of the
Public Declarations in the sampled area and I discuss in Section 3.4 a possible
interpretation of these evidence.
Virtually all the non-PRCC villages authorities declared that they attended
a Public Declaration, in line with the information available from the NGO.
However, there is a discrepancy between what village authorities declared during
the community interviews and individual answers to the same question. As
shown in Table 3.4, most of the villagers of non-PRCC villages either have never
heard of a Public Declaration (42%), or said that their village never attended
such a meeting.
This discrepancy can arise from a problem of information transmission
within the village. Village authorities got the information about the Public
Declaration and eventually sent a group of representatives (including in most
of the case themselves) but the information was not more widely shared at the
village level. This lack of transmission might be partially explained by the per-
ception that village authorities had of the event. As Figure 3.8 shows, when
asked the reason(s) for their village attendance of a Public Declaration, the
most common answer was “because invited” (either by Tostan or by another
village). Other stated that they were interested in getting information or see
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Table 3.4: Discordance in non-PRCC villages between village leaders and villagers’
answers to the question: did the village attende a Public Declaration (PD)?
Individual Officially not at PD Officially at PD Total
No PD 46.94 47.48 47.34
(46) (132) (178)
Yes PD 11.22 10.07 10.37
(11) (28) (39)
Don’t know PD 41.84 42.45 42.29
(41) (118) (159)
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
(98) (278) (376)
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Figure 3.8: Reasons given by village authorities to justify their village’s presence at
a Public Declaration (more than one answer per village possible)
what was happening, but without implying a willingness to abandon. Aban-
donment of FGC was explicitly stated in one village only. More generally, the
impression from these interviews was that village authorities were trying to
understate their participation to the event, saying that no commitment was im-
plied in their participation, but being at the same time aware that commitment
to stop FGC was required.
If participation did not imply any commitment but was perceived as a due
act, then it is plausible that the village was not engaged into discussions or in-
formed about participation to the Public Declaration (and therefore over stop-
ping FGC).
3.3.2.2 Family or village network?
The Public Declaration is not the only channel through which spillover effects
from PRCC to non-PRCC villages can spread. Another important dimension is
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formal and informal sensitization activities: the NGO encourages participants
to spread information on the contents learned in class and to discuss FGC with
others, inside and outside the village.
Therefore, it is possible that, while villagers in non-PRCC villages are not
aware of the Public Declaration, they have been exposed to anti-FGC arguments
or, more generally, have been involved in discussions on FGC with people from
PRCC villages19. To investigate this channel, I look at the correlation between
FGC rate and different measures of exposure to PRCC villages20. The definition
of a link between a PRCC and non-PRCC village is guided by two factors:
first, the theoretical view of FGC as a marriageability condition, second, the
anthropological evidence that female household members are important actors
in the decision making process on FGC.
As already stated, if FGC is a marriageability condition, then coordination
should be achieved within the marriage network. In an ethnically homogeneous
area such as the one considered here, the marriage network is quite dispersed
and not easily identified. One way to define it is through existing marriage
patterns and the extended family’s location. This can be done both at the
village level, assuming that FGC is a village-level problem, or at the household
level, if we think that the main source of peer pressure is within the family
network.
I therefore use four definitions of a link between PRCC and non PRCC
villages. The first two are at the village level: the percentage of wives coming
from a PRCC village (Pct wives from PRCC ); the percentage of household
having a sibling who lived in a PRCC village (Pct households with relatives in
PRCC )21. The first explicitly looks at the marriage links, the second takes into
account family links, but also potential marriage links: traditionally, indeed,
an ideal marriage partner is a cousin (from the paternal side). In both cases,
the underlying assumption is that there are village patterns that matter, rather
than household-level links.
The next two definitions of links between the two types of village are at
the household level. The first is a dummy saying if any wife of the household
head comes from a PRCC village (Any wife from PRCC ); the second dummy
takes value one if either the household head or his wife has a brother or a sister
19We must be aware that the PRCC is by no mean the only source of information on
FGC. As already said, sensitization campaigns have been massive in Senegal through other
organizations and the radio.
20I cannot use average distance to a PRCC village as a measure of exposure because
it is highly correlated with distance to the main town: PRCC villages are on average less
isolated than non-PRCC. FGC rate and distance to town are negatively correlated also in
PRCC village: this suggests that isolation, rather than distance to a PRCC, is the relevant
dimension to account for.
21Information on siblings location (including half-siblings) were asked only to the household
head and the interviewed wife, whose daughters’ FGC status is known. I do not have therefore
the complete family network, but only the location of the siblings of the parents of these girls.
Furthermore, I do not have the information on the total number of these siblings, but the
complete list of their locations. That is why I cannot construct the two variables at the village
level in the same way (one is the percentage of wives, the other of households).
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living (or that lived if dead) in a PRCC village (Any relative from PRCC ).
Using these definitions, I implicitly assume that the relevant network is at the
household rather than village level.
In all four cases, I control for an household index of information availabil-
ity on FGC (Household information FGC ). This index is the sum of positive
answers given to the questions on FGC health and the existence of the law by
the household head and the wife, normalized to one. An index of 0 means the
total absence of information in the household on FGC related issues; when it is
equal to 1, there is perfect information.
This index is endogenous and it does not imply that more information can
have a causal impact on FGC. However, it allows me to partially disentangle
the individual channel from the “network” channel. If the only role of a link to
a PRCC village is to provide information, then controlling for it should make
the result on the network not significant. Furthermore, the index can be seen
as a proxy for any unobserved individual characteristics that can explain both
better information and FGC choice.
Table 3.5: Links to PRCC villages and information on FGC related issues in
non PRCC villages: descriptive statistics on sampled households with girls born
between 2000-2009.
Non PRCC villages
Mean Sd N. obs
Household level
Any relative from PRCC 0.340 0.476 97
Any wife from PRCC 0.227 0.421 97
Village level
Distance to local administrative centre (Km) 6.702 4.539 20
Pct wives from PRCC 0.161 0.124 20
Pct households with relatives in PRCC 0.407 0.234 20
Household information FGC 0.625 0.349 20
Table 3.5 shows that links between non-PRCC and PRCC villages in the
sampled area are not negligible. On average, 34% of the households have a sib-
ling in a PRCC village and 22% of the wives (out of all the marriages contracted
by the household head) come from PRCC villages. The location of sisters of the
household head or siblings of the wife drives the result on family links: mobility
is mainly caused by women, who traditionally join the husband’s village. The
aggregation of data at the village level confirms that inter-marriage and family
links with the PRCC villages are present.
From a technical point of view, the analysis of FGC in PRCC village is
problematic because of the low number of observations per year of birth and,
more specifically, bacause of the fact that there is almost no non-cut girls in the
group “at risk during the program” used in the difference in difference above.
As already said, the decrease in FGC rate in non-PRCC seems to happen after
2006. I therefore need to extend the sample to younger girls, including 4 years
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old. This however amplifies the problem of censoring. In Appendix B I explain
in detail the magnitude of the censoring problem and the way I try to tackle it.
In Table 3.6 I present the result of a linear probability regression, where
the dependent variable is the FGC status of girls born after 2000 in non PRCC
villages and the controls are the network measures, the information index and
some parental characteristics, as in the difference in difference. I additionally
control for the isolation of a village (dummy Close to town) and for the censoring
problem (Pct girls not yet cut)22. I cannot control for age fixed effects given the
limited number of observations. I therefore control linearly for the age trend
and I additionally capture non linear trends with a quadratic term. Results are
clustered at the village level23.
Table 3.6: Correlation between FGC and links to PRCC villages in non-PRCC
villages. The level of observation is a girl.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FGC FGC FGC FGC FGC FGC
Pct wives from PRCC -0.0751
(0.331)
Pct households with relatives in PRCC 0.00537
(0.133)
Any relative from PRCC -0.0798 -0.167*
(0.0788) (0.0844)
Any wife from PRCC 0.0746 0.0424
(0.0499) (0.0443)
Close to town -0.0814* -0.0828 -0.0786 -0.0790*
(0.0429) (0.0501) (0.0485) (0.0420)
Household information FGC -0.187* -0.190* -0.170 -0.154 -0.181* -0.161
(0.0943) (0.0951) (0.102) (0.116) (0.0988) (0.129)
Number adults -0.000198 -0.000197 -0.000196 -0.000221*
(0.000119) (0.000123) (0.000135) (0.000108)
Pct girls not yet cut -0.00265 -0.0172 -0.0280 -0.363 0.0133 -0.165
(0.237) (0.228) (0.233) (0.425) (0.225) (0.434)
At least one parent has no siblings 0.000869 0.108
(0.0930) (0.132)
Constant 0.373 0.378 0.352 0.391 0.405 0.349
(0.262) (0.263) (0.275) (0.258) (0.260) (0.246)
Age trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
village FE No No No Yes No Yes
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150
Standard errors in parentheses. Results clustered at the village levels.The controls at the household level are the same as in Table 3.3
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
22To create this variable, I compute the percentage of girls that are not yet cut at each
age by village, using girls that are older than 9 and I associate such probability to each girl
below 9, by age and village. See Appendix B for the details.
23Both with wild bootstraps (1000 replications) or without clustering, results on the net-
work variables and on the household information index on FGC remain virtually unchanged.
46
CHAPTER 3. CHANGING FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING
In columns (1) and (2) the coefficients of interest are the measures of links
to PRCC at the village level, “Pct wives from PRCC” and “Pct households with
relatives in PRCC ”. In columns (3) to (6) I use the household level measures of
links, with and without village fixed effects. We can see that both measures at
the village level are not significant, and the magnitude of the coefficients is small.
Both links based on the origin of the wife, at the village and household level,
are positive but not significant. The presence of a family member in a PRCC
village, when controlling for village fixed effects, is negatively and significantly
correlated with FGC status.
In particular, by distinguishing the type of family relations (brother or sis-
ter), it turns out that the result is driven by the sisters (from the same parents)
of the wife24. This suggests that while the extended family might be a relevant
network for FGC, it is not necessarily a marriage link that matters (given that
ideal marriage takes place from the paternal side of the girl).
3.4 Discussion of the results
Two components can be distinguished in Tostan’s program: the 3-year inter-
vention at the village level, which consists in the organization of classes where
alphabetization, health care, human rights and social norms are taught and
discussed; and the sensitization - formal and informal - outside the village on
the topics discussed in the classes. The organization of a Public Declaration is
part of the second component of the intervention.
The first level of analysis therefore concerns the changes related to FGC
in PRCC villages which are suggestive of an impact of the program. Figure
3.3 shows that, compared to non-PRCC villages, PRCC villages and women
in particular, the main beneficiaries of the program, have more information
on the negative effects of FGC (both in terms of health and awareness of the
existing law) or at least they are aware of what is the correct answer to give
to that question. These correlations are suggestive of a role of the PRCC in
disseminating information on FGC, although the causality of the relation cannot
be tested. To be informed about the negative effect of a practice however does
not necessarily lead to its abandonment. As remarked by Shell-Duncan and
Herniund (2007, p.66) with respect to the relation between information on the
law against FGC and the continuation of the practice in Senegal:
those who support the practice do so not because they are un-
aware of alternatives or efforts to change the practice. Instead, they
have been exposed to, but were unpersuaded by, arguments for end-
ing the practice.
24Given that women move to the husband’s compound, there are vey few brothers that
live in a PRCC village (for the household head, this happens only if a brother migrated to a
PRCC village or if he was the one migrating from a PRCC to a non-PRCC village. For the
wife, it would mainly imply that the woman comes from a PRCC village: column (1) and (3)
shows that this link does not explain FGC status.
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With respect to changes in FGC incidence, in PRCC villages I observe a 8
percentage points decline for girls at risk during the program. Under some
assumptions, I can reasonably attribute this effect to the program. Notice that
the result is not driven by one village, since in all villages some households
did stop cutting (Figure 3.7). Furthermore, for the same age cohort, I observe
no or limited decrease in FGC incidence in non targeted villages (Figure 3.5)
suggesting that, if spillovers exists, they do not materialize immediately during
the phase of implementation of the program. A decrease in FGC incidence in
non-PRCC villages is instead observed for the cohort born after the end of the
program.
These results are not compatible with the simplest model of FGC, where
FGC is depicted as a convention with two ranked equilibria. In this model, the
agents are stuck in the low payoff equilibrium, which is the cutting equilibrium.
If no credible communication takes place, the agents cannot move to the higher
payoff equilibrium. Two assumptions are implicitly made: agents have homo-
geneous preferences and they would rather prefer not to cut (higher payoff) if
they could coordinate.
I cannot however reject the idea of the presence of a cascade mechanism,
whereby, after the intervention, a leading group of people with low preferences
for FGC will stop because they are better off without FGC. Given that the
utility of FGC depends on the number of people practicing it, the group has an
incentive in recruiting others (either inside or outside the village), whose utility
from FGC is also decreasing in the number of people stopping the practice.
To make sure that the process is irreversible, you need enough people (the
tipping point) to change behavior so that for those still cutting the utility from
FGC is lower than the utility from non cutting. Coordination in some sub-
village network is also possible but cannot be explored with the data available,
given the lack of information on within-village links. Finally, the decrease in
FGC observed in both types of villages is also compatible with a model where
individual choice of FGC is not related to other people’s decisions.
The decrease in FGC observed in non-PRCC villages after the end of the
intervention could be a possible medium-term effect of the second dimension of
the program, namely the attempts to involve non-PRCC in abandoning FGC
through sensitization activities and the public pledge. This second dimension
of the intervention is strictly linked to the conceptualization of FGC as a coor-
dination problem within the marriage network (see Mackie, 1996; Mackie and
LeJeune, 2009).
With respect to the impact of the Public Declaration, the configuration of
the program in the studied area (almost all villages attended a Public Declara-
tion) does not allow to formally test if the decrease in FGC incidence observed
after the end of the program in non-PRCC villages can be attributed to the par-
ticipation to the public pledge. However, I provide some descriptive elements
which do not seem to support this specific mechanism.
For a public pledge to work as a focal point in a coordination game, three
conditions should be met. First, the main barrier to the abandonment of the
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practice lies in coordination: everybody is individually ready to abandon the
practice, but cannot do so unless there is common agreement. The underling
mechanism implies that non-PRCC sensitized villages first agree to abandon the
cutting practice and then their representatives attend the Public Declaration:
the pledge should be the culminating point of a discussion which takes place
at the village level and makes the decision taken permanent, given that other
villages are observed to behave in the same way.
In reality, however, I observe a discrepancy in the knowledge of the village
participation to the Public Declaration between villagers and village authorities
(Table 3.4): this suggests that it is unlikely that the decision making process
followed the above pattern. Villagers in non-PRCC villages are not aware of
their village’s participation to a public pledge, which is not compatible with
the hypothesis of a process of deliberation first taking place at the village level,
then leading to participation to the pledge. It is still possible that the process
took place in the opposite direction. That is, village authorities attended the
Public Declaration and then influenced the villagers’ choice without referring
to the Public Declaration. In this case, the role of the Public Declaration would
be either to coordinate opinion leaders, or to favor discussion on FGC among
them.
The second condition required for the public pledge to work as a coordina-
tion device is that the villages attending the Public Declaration are members
of the same network in which the decision on FGC is taken. Indeed, when dis-
cussing coordination, a crucial question is the level at which coordination should
take place. Some recent works start casting doubts on the validity of the coor-
dination model for FGC (Bellemare et al., 2015) and on the assumption that
the marriage pool is the relevant dimension for decision making (Shell-Duncan
et al., 2011; Efferson et al., 2015). I find some evidence of a negative correlation
between having a family member in a PRCC village and FGC status. This is
compatible with a process of coordination at the extended family level, where
families in PRCC villages start the process and then convince families members
in non-PRCC to abandon the practice. I cannot however exclude that some
extended-family characteristics, such as lower initial preferences for FGC, drive
the result. On the other hand, measures of family links at the village level are
not significant. A tentative interpretation is that links at the household rather
than at the village level matter for FGC. If this is true, coordination across vil-
lages, as presumed in the Public Declaration process, would not be the relevant
dimension for FGC.
Third, a crucial condition for the Public Declaration to be a focal point
is that attending villages must believe that the other villages are committed
to abandon: a change in expectations about others’ behavior is a necessary
element to switch equilibrium in a coordination game. In Figure 3.8 I show
that declaring the abandonment of FGC is not the main reason given by village
authorities to explain their presence in the event. One of the most common
motives stated was the desire to reciprocate an invitation made by another
village or by Tostan. As already pointed out, the general impression from the
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interviews is that village authorities did not perceive their participation as a
commitment to stop the practice. In five non-PRCC villages I was told that
some villagers went to the public pledge, but “individually, not as a delegation”.
I interpret such kind of statements as a way to signal that their presence to the
pledge should not be considered as (collectively) binding. If this is the case,
and every participant is aware that this is the other participants’ interpretation
of the event, it is unlikely that the Public Declaration can change people’s
expectations on FGC (even assuming that the underlying coordination model
is correct).
These observations are still compatible with the idea that a public pledge
is a mechanism to change preferences. What they suggest, however, is that
in our specific context, the conditions for the Public Declaration to work as
a coordination device do not seem to be met. It might still be an important
space for discussion and information, but it does not seem to work as a focal
point in a coordination game. It is left to future research to rigorously identify
the potential impact of participation to a public pledge on FGC and, more
importantly, to test the validity of the coordination model underpinning the
Public Declaration.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I provide evidence on the impact of an anti-FGC intervention
in rural Senegal. The intervention has two components: a three-year program
which takes place in targeted villages and addresses, among other things, FGC;
sensitization activities in the direction of other villages; and the organization
of a Public Declaration to coordinate targeted and non targeted villages on the
abandonment of this harmful custom.
With respect to the first component of the program, I find a significant de-
crease in FGC rate for girls at risk during the program which can be, under
some conditions, attributed to the intervention. Some households stopped cut-
ting in each PRCC village, suggesting that the decision to abandon FGC is not a
village-level decision. There is some evidence of a negative correlation between
having a family member living in a PRCC village and the FGC prevalence in
non targeted villages after the end of the program. This is compatible both with
coordination at the extended family level and with heterogeneous preferences
on FGC across households.
Available descriptive evidence on the Public Declaration suggests that the
conditions for it to work as a coordination mechanism across villages are not
met in our context. More research is needed to assess the importance of such
public gatherings as vectors of change. This is a particularly relevant direction
of research given the actual emphasis among practitioners on public pledges as
a way to change social norms.
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Appendix A: Parallel trend assumption
In Figure 3.6 I check the validity of the parallel trend assumption in the dif-
ference in difference estimation. I do so by splitting the per-treatment group
in several cohorts. I show the results for the estimation of the same regression
as in Column (1) Table 3.3, with age fixed effects only. This is my preferred
specification for such a robustness check: given the low number of observations
per cohort, adding village fixed effects would be quite demanding. In Figure
3.9 I present the same graph, where coefficients are estimated additionally in-
cluding village fixed effects. The results are strikingly similar both in terms
of pre-existing pattern and magnitude of the effect of the program. The latter
however, is just not significant at the 90% confidence interval.
Figure 3.9: Plot of the estimated coefficients of the regression as in column
(2) of Table 3.3 (age and village fixed effects), where the non-treated group
is split in several cohorts (1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-1999). The coefficients of
the interaction of each cohort with PRCC are plotted with the 90% confidence
interval.
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Appendix B: Censoring in the data
In Section 4.2.2 I extend the sample to include girls aged 4. This makes the
censoring problem more severe, given that some girls might still be at risk of
being cut at that age. Average age at cutting in the older cohort (born before
2000) is below 3 but there are the tails of the distribution to be taken into
account.
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To illustrate the nature and the implications of censoring, I take the case of
the dummy close to town. In Table 3.6 the regressions show that, the further
away is a village, the more likely that a girl in that village is cut. However, if
some girls are still at risk of being cut, then the result could be interpreted as:
the more isolated is a village, the earlier a girl is cut.
The two effects could also exist together: more isolated villages cut more
and cut earlier. Figure 3.10 allows to visualize the magnitude of the censoring
problem. In the graph on the left, I represent the probability of not being
cut at each age, for girls that are older than 8, by type of village (close or far
from town). The cumulative density function is constructed on girls that are
cut: it represents the distribution of age at cutting in the two types of villages.
Notice that at age 3 and 4, in villages that are close to town there is a higher
probability of not being yet cut: the difference between the dark and light bar
measures therefore the magnitude of the censoring problem.
The graph on the right represents, by age, the percentage of girls that are
not yet cut in the two types of villages (close and far from town) among the
girls that are younger than 9: in this case, the difference between the dark
and light bar captures both differences in FGC rate and in age at cutting. A
comparison, at age 3 and 4, of the difference between bars across the two graphs
suggests that the censoring cannot completely explain the difference in FGC we
observe in the younger cohort: while censoring is presents, it does not seem to
be driving the result.
Figure 3.10: Magnitude of the censoring problem: example with the variable
distance to town
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As a way to account for the censoring in the regression framework, I con-
struct the variable “Pct girls not yet cut”: I compute the percentage of girls
that are not yet cut at each age by village, using girls that are older than 9.
I then associate such probability to each girl below 9, by age and village, as a
control. Stated differently, it is a way to account for the distribution of age at
cutting in each village and to use it as a control. A limit of the exercise is that I
implicitly assume that age at cutting has not changed over time. The inclusion
of this control in the regression does not strongly affect the result. As expected,
the estimated coefficient of “Pct girls not yet cut” increases when younger girls
(3 years old or less) are included in the sample, when the censoring problem is
more severe.
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Chapter 4
Interventions to Stop Female
Genital Cutting and the
Evolution of the Custom:
Evidence on Age at Cutting
in Senegal1
4.1 Introduction
FGC is nowadays defined as a harmful custom, a human right violation of
women’s physical integrity, with potentially negative consequences for their
health (see Section 2.3 in Chapter 2 for more details on this issue). The per-
sistence of harmful practices and the search for the most effective interventions
to end them are questions of great interest both for practitioners and social
scientists. However, to focus only on the persistence or decline of a custom
can be misleading if its complexity and multidimensionality are not taken into
account. Traditional practices, when put under pressure by external factors,
might not disappear, but evolve and adapt to the changing environment.
FGC is a particularly striking example in this respect. Since the late 80s
an increasing number of governments and organizations have taken steps to
reduce FGC, including laws criminalizing FGC and sensitization campaigns2.
The nature of this custom and the best way to end it have therefore attracted
the attention of social scientists3, while little attention has been paid to the
1Forthcoming in Journal of African Economies (2015), DOI: 10.1093/jae/ejv013.
2Legislations against FGC have been introduced in 24 African countries concerned by
FGC (Shell-Duncan et al., 2013).
3See, for example, the debate on the nature of FGC as a social convention in Mackie and
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question of how FGC can adapt its forms or modalities when people, in spite
of these interventions, do not abandon the practice.
The cutting itself is only part of this custom, that, depending on the con-
text, can be a complex ritual with a well-defined timing of the event, actors
involved and meaning. It is important to better understand these other dimen-
sions of FGC for two main reasons. First, a better grasp of the whole practice
can contribute to designing more effective programs to stop FGC4. Second, it
explicitly takes into account how the custom evolves when under pressure and
thereby highlights potentially perverse side effects of interventions. Such effects
are rarely anticipated at the design of the programs.
There is anecdotal evidence that in several countries FGC has recently
evolved in two important respects: age at cutting and de-ritualization of the
practice. The two dimensions can be linked: in a context where rituals are aban-
doned and the meaning of FGC is transformed, the need to perform cutting at a
specific age loses its importance. On the other hand, if people are forced to cut
earlier, then the rituals and meaning of FGC need to evolve to accommodate
that change. While in the literature the decrease in age and the disappear-
ance of rituals have been mentioned (Shell-Duncan et al. (2011) and Hernlund
(2000) for Senegal and The Gambia, Cabane (2008) and Gosselin (2000) for
Mali), the reasons that could explain this change have not been systematically
addressed. Some of the explanations given are, Islamisation (and its rejection
of pre-Islamic rituals), the unwillingness to invest important amounts of wealth
in the ceremony; beliefs that babies suffer less than girls and that enduring pain
is not anymore an important part of the ritual; and the unwillingness to keep
girls out of school to undergo FGC in the context of rising school enrollment
rates.
A factor that, to my knowledge, has not yet been systematically studied,
is the role of the introduction of laws criminalizing FGC or, more generally,
all interventions against FGC that might push people to continue the practice
in secrecy. The paper by Shell-Duncan et al. (2013) partially addresses this
issue: in their analysis on Senegal they suggest that there has been a push
towards secrecy following the introduction of the law criminalizing FGC. The
same argument is given as a possible explanation for the declining age at cutting
in different countries in a report by UNICEF et al. (2005).
Shell-Duncan et al. (2013) contribute to the more general debate on the
interaction between formal and customary law. In this perspective, Aldashev
et al. (2012b) show that, under some conditions, a law can change a custom
even when not enforced, provided that people are informed about it and the
distance between the custom and the law is not too large. In the same vein, I
suggest that awareness of the law and of campaigns against a custom can affect
the custom in an unintended negative way.
This chapter focuses on how interventions against FGC, including the crim-
LeJeune (2009) and the attempts to test different theories in Shell-Duncan et al. (2011)
4For instance, the role of traditional cutters in the perpetuation of the tradition is well
known: interventions to end FGC have tried to target them, albeit with mixed success.
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inalization of the practice, can affect the custom. Particular attention is paid to
age at cutting since interventions that do not seem to lead to the abandonment
of FGC can still modify the way it is practised. To provide some evidence on
how people adapt the custom when it is under threat, examples are drawn from
Senegal, where there are extensive interventions to fight FGC, including a law
criminalizing FGC introduced in 1999.
I exploit two different databases for this purpose. First, I use the Senegal
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 2012-13 to look at the prevalence of
FGC and age at cutting in regions where the law against FGC has been en-
forced, leading to legal sanctions for practicing FGC. I exploit geographical and
temporal variation in legal sanctions to identify the short and long term impact
of this event on FGC prevalence and age at cutting. I observe a decrease in the
age at cutting for girls born in the year of a case of law enforcement, but no
short or long term effects on FGC prevalence.
Second, I use the database that I collected in the region of Kolda, on the
border with Guinea Bissau, to show the long term evolution of the age at
cutting in a context where there is almost no change in the prevalence of FGC.
The data contain information on FGC for a longer time span than DHS and
I can therefore compare age at cutting before and after the introduction of
the law criminalizing FGC. In the post-law period, when the intensity of anti-
FGC activities and campaigns increased, but still no direct interventions in the
sampled villages have started, we observe a change in trend in age at cutting.
In both cases, I interpret the observed decrease in age at cutting - both
temporary and in the long term - as a consequence of the de-ritualization of FGC
due to the induced secrecy of the practice. Awareness of anti-FGC campaigns
and an increased perceived risk of legal prosecution might not be enough to
make people stop cutting, but they can push the practice underground. In
turn, secrecy implies the abandonment of collective rituals, and parallel to it,
cutting at an earlier age both because there is no need to wait for the ritual
and because it is easier to hide infants than children during the healing period.
In line with the existing anthropoligical literature, I further provide indirect
evidence on the role of female family members in the ceremony and I suggest
that these relations might also be affected by the changing institutional attitude
toward FGC.
It is worth emphasizing that a decrease in the age at cutting due to the
growing pressure against FGC does not only signal that the custom is evolving,
but this might also have harmful health consequences in and of itself. Prac-
tising FGC on infants can be problematic for two reasons: first, the anatomy
of a baby might make cutting more difficult, increasing the risk of more severe
cutting or bleeding. Second, babies are less resistant to infections, bleeding and
other health problems associated with the cutting, making it more dangerous.
Furthermore, it has been argued that cutting without rituals can be psycholog-
ical distressing for the child. To my knowledge, there is no systematic analysis
of the health consequences of FGC at different ages, which is crucial to properly
assess the health effects of the evolution of the custom.
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains the Senegalese
context and the way the institutional attitude toward FGC has changed over
time. Section 4.3 compare the two samples used, the continuous DHS data
2012-13 and the Kolda data I collected in 2012. In section 4.4 I describe the
empirical strategy to estimate the effect of legal sanctions on FGC and the
long term change in the age at cutting in Kolda. In Section 4.5 I discuss and
interpret the available evidence. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 The custom, the law and interventions tar-
geting FGC: the case of Senegal
Senegal is an interesting case to study the evolution of FGC. In the last 15
years Senegal has put in place an increasing number of initiatives at different
levels to stop FGC5. The government, lobbied by domestic feminist groups and
under rising international pressure6, has increasingly taken a position against
FGC since the late ’80s. This led, almost 10 years later, to the introduction of
a law criminalizing FGC7. The law N° 99-05 of 29th January 1999 condemns
whoever is responsible for a mutilation of the female genital organs to between
6 months to 5 years of prison. The law was the object of national discussion
and resistance from some religious leaders8, leading to opposition in some areas
of the country.
The importance of the law at the moment of its introduction should not,
however, be overestimated. In spite of media coverage, the population was gen-
erally not aware of it in 1999. Information campaigns through the radio started
afterward (see UNICEF et al., 2010, p.18-21), steadily increasing awareness
among people. Further, only a few cases of legal prosecution are known since
1999.
A potentially more important set of events in the fight against FGC was
the steady expansion of the activities of Tostan. It first attracted national
attention in 1997, when a group of women that attended the NGO training
program publicly declared their decision to stop FGC. The NGO has over time
become a crucial and well known actor in the fight against FGC.
Tostan was a key partner of the government in the implementation of the
first (2000-2005) and second national action plan (2010-2015) to stop FGC.
Sensitization on FGC health related issues, on the law and women’s human
rights was done in the framework of the NGO’s activities, radio programs,
schools and health centers. Other associations and NGOs (for a list, see Gomis
5For a synthesis of the main events, see UNICEF (2013a, p.10-13).
6In 1979 the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which declared FGC to be a human right violation.
7See Ndoye (2011) for detailed information on the process leading to the introduction of
the law.
8An influential religious leader of the Tijanne brotherhood clearly stood against the law,
addressing a document to MPs with information on the religious importance of FGC (see
O’Neill, 2011, p.88).
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and Wone, 2008, p.8-11) were also active on the same issues. The year 1999
is therefore not only the year of the law, but the beginning of a more intense
period of activities against FGC.
Given the level and variety of initiatives taken in Senegal against FGC since
the late ’90s, it is reasonable to argue that people’s awareness of the changing
institutional attitude towards FGC has steadily increased over time. This might
have plausibly affected the FGC prevalence rate. However, I argue that an
important unintended consequence of these initiatives is the fact that they have
affected the way FGC is performed, rather than the decision to cut itself.
4.3 Data and descriptive statistics
4.3.1 Data
4.3.1.1 Continuous DHS 2012-13
The Continuous Demographic and Health Survey (Continuous DHS) 2012-13
for Senegal collects information on a nationally representative sample of women
aged 15 to 49 on health and reproductive behaviours. It is the first phase of a
5 year data collection process (2012-2017) and it contains only some sections of
the standard DHS questionnaire. The sample includes around 4000 households
where all the eligible women (15-49) are interviewed, for a total of 8636 obser-
vations. Questions were asked to each woman about the FGC status and age
at cutting of each living daughter aged 15 or less.
The way in which the questions around FGC are posed is of crucial impor-
tance. FGC status cannot be directly observed (unless a gynecological exami-
nation is done): in a context where the practice is legally forbidden and people
are aware of the “institutional” attitude towards FGC, the risk of undereporting
FGC is high9. The way of asking about FGC can therefore considerably affect
the answers received. The continuous DHS 2012-13 substantially improves the
framing of the question on FGC with respect to the previous round (DHS 2010)
because the FGC status of each daughter is asked directly, while in DHS 2010 a
woman is asked first if she has ever heard about FGC. Only in case of a positive
answer, the FGC status of the woman and of her daughters is investigated. This
has lead to an increase in FGC rate among girls aged 0 to 9 which could be
attributed to the reframing of the question.
Furthermore, in the Continuous DHS 2012-13 information on girls’ FGC
status is avaialable for a longer time span (from 1998 to 2012 instead of 2000
to 2010) making it more suitable to studying the evolution of the practice. The
main shortcoming of the database is the lack of information on FGC and age
at cutting for girls born before the introduction of the law against FGC (1999),
which does not allow for comparison of the evolution of the trend before and
after that moment. Second, as we will see later, studying age at cutting when
9See the discussion on the problem of undereporting in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3.
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the FGC prevalence rate is decreasing might lead to sample selection issues.
This seems to be a concern for these data, as explained below.
4.3.1.2 Kolda data
The database I collected for the NGO Tostan at the border between Senegal and
Guinea Bissau in 201210 has several advantages with respect to the DHS data.
First, information on FGC is collected about all living daughters, irrespective
of their age. Second, on the sample of girls I use for the analysis (aged 8 to
29), I have limited sample selection issues, given that the FGC prevalence rate
is 96%. Third and potentially more importantly, as explained in Chapter 2,
Section 2.4.3, we directly asked the age at which a girl was cut rather than first
inquiring wether the girl was cut, which might have reduced the reporting bias.
Finally, the dataset has rich information on family characteristics and networks
that are not available in DHS data and that prove useful to better understand
the mechanisms behind FGC.
4.3.2 Descriptive statistics
4.3.2.1 The evolution of FGC over time
Both the prevalence of FGC and age at cutting are decreasing in Senegal. FGC
is not equally widespread in the country and national averages hide important
regional differences. I therefore plot in Figure 4.1 the average FGC prevalence
and age at cutting over time for girls born in 2008 or earlier and I distinguish
between regions with high, middle and low FGC prevalence11. Cutting takes
place on average before the age of 4: if we look only at girls older than this
age, censoring is limited, given that most of the non-cut girls are no longer
at risk12. The graph suggests that the custom is indeed changing over time:
middle and high incidence rate regions have experienced an average decrease in
FGC prevalence of 22 percentage points between 1998 and 2008. The average
age at cutting has decreased by 1.5 years over the same period.
The observed change in age at cutting might be, at least partially, the result
of a selection bias. Over time, some households stop cutting, as Figure 4.1
shows. If these households used to cut later than the ones that are still practicing
FGC, then the observed decrease in age at cutting is the result of a selection
process: the households that cut late are over time less represented in the sample
because they have stopped. The selection issue seems to be indeed a concern, as
Figure 4.2 suggests. In this graph I distinguish girls according to the fact that
their sisters (born from the same mother) are all cut or there is at least one not
cut. I then plot the average age at cutting by year of birth and by category.
10The sample area includes also villages in Guinea Bissau. They are not used in the
analysis
11The regions are classified according to their average FGC prevalence, computed on the
whole period of available data (1998-2013).
12Almost 90% of the girls born before 2009 (aged 4 or more at the moment of the interview)
were cut before age 5.
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Figure 4.1: FGC Prevalence (Left) and Age at Cutting (right) by Year of Birth
of the Girls and Split among Region with Low, Middle and High Prevalence of
FGC
The graph is indeed suggestive that mothers that have at least one non-
cut daughter used to cut their daughters later than mothers that continued to
practise FGC. This might lead to wrongly interpreting a decrease in the age at
cutting as an evolution of the custom, while it could just be a consequence of
the selection into the sample.
Keeping in mind this problem (I will come back to it in the analysis later), I
am interested in assessing to what degree the evolution of the FGC prevalence
and age at cutting can be imputed to the campaigns, legal interventions and
overall institutional change towards FGC that Senegal has experienced.
4.3.2.2 Cases of legal sanctions against FGC
Using DHS data, I can exploit temporal and geographical variation in the cases
of legal sanctions against FGC to see how the prevalence of FGC and age
at cutting vary. I reconstruct 4 cases of prosecutions that ended in a legal
sanction: in 2000 in the region of Tambacounda, in 2004 and 2007 in the region
of Kolda and in 2009 in Matam, which however I do not use to limit censoring
issues13. The list might not be exhaustive and it represents only the cases in
13Results are not affected by the inclusion of Matam in the analysis.
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Figure 4.2: Age at Cutting by Year of Birth and by Type of Family: Girls with
at Least One Sister not Cut and Girls Whose Sisters Are All Cut
which prosecution ended in a legal sanction (prison, even if the convicted were
later reprieved). The information collected comes from the official documents
annexed to UNICEF et al. (2010) and, according to the author of the report,
they were the only cases for which he could find the proceedings of the process.
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics at the different levels of observa-
tion: girls, mothers and households (recall that information are collected for
all the eligible women in a household). I only use girls born before 2009 and I
exclude ethnic groups that do not practice FGC (Wolof and Serer, which have
an FGC prevalence of less than 1% over the whole period), leading to a total
of 1627 households and 2764 girls, of whom 51% are cut
Each region where prosecution resulting in legal sanction took place rep-
resents around 13% of the sampled girls. The dummy “Legal sanction” takes
value 1 for girls born in the year and in the region where the law against FGC
was enforced. A caveat of the analysis is that only 3.4% of the girls in the
sample are born in a region and in the year of a case of legal sanction, mean-
ing that identification is based on a limited number of observations (95 girls).
“All sisters underwent FGC” is a dummy that takes value 1 if a girl has all
her sisters cut, and it partially accounts for the censoring problem. Fulani and
Mandinka mothers make up 76% of the sampled women and only 20% of them
ever attended school. Overall, only 36% of the households are living in a urban
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Table 4.1: Girls, Mothers and Households Characteristics
Mean Sd
(A) Girls’ Characteristics
Age 8.376 3.072
Underwent FGC 0.507 0.500
Age at FGC 1.891 1.945
All sisters underwent FGC 0.359 0.480
Legal sanction 0.034 0.182
Region of Tambacounda 0.122 0.327
Region of Kolda 0.136 0.343
Region of Matam 0.151 0.358
(B) Mothers’ Characteristics
Age mother 35.302 7.518
Pular or Mandinka 0.764 0.425
Attended formal school 0.243 0.429
(C) Households’ Characteristics
Urban household 0.359 0.480
Wealth Index
Poorest 0.282 0.450
Poorer 0.264 0.441
Middle 0.205 0.404
Richer 0.154 0.361
Richest 0.096 0.294
Observations (Girls) 2764
Observations (Mothers) 2401
Observations (Households) 1627
Data: Continuous DHS 2012-13.
area.
In Figure 4.3 I plot the average age at cutting and FGC prevalence (in
percentage) in the regions where the law was enforced. The light coloured bars
represent the years in which a case of legal sanction took place. The graph
is suggestive of a change in the custom, at least in terms of a decrease in age
at cutting in the year of the sanction. FGC prevalence seems to decrease, but
the change is less important. A note of caution is required, given the limited
number of observations per year of birth in each region.
4.3.2.3 Changing trend in age at cutting
Figure 4.3 suggests that FGC, in particular age at cutting, might have been
temporarily affected by repressive actions against the custom. However, cases
of legal prosecutions have been rare and they are not well known by the popu-
lation. This does not mean that people are not aware that the government has
taken a clear position against FGC, that a law has been introduced and that
several associations are active on this issue. Several studies, including my own
data, confirm that the knowledge of the law (and therefore awareness of the
institutional position towards FGC) is widespread.
The data collected in Kolda can shed light on how FGC is evolving when
the pressure against it increases. I consider here the year of the introduction of
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of Average FGC Prevalence (Top) and Age at Cutting
(Down) in the Two Regions with Cases of Legal Sanction for FGC. The Light
Bar is the Year of the Legal Sanction.
the law, 1999, as the turning point in the fight against FGC.
Table 4.2: Girls Characteristics, by Age Group
Variable <=1982 1983-99 2000-2004 2005-2012
Age 35.69 ( 5.411) 19.16 ( 4.769) 9.88 ( 1.457) 3.87 ( 2.201)
Underwent FGC 1.00 ( 0.000) 0.98 ( 0.134) 0.93 ( 0.255) 0.55 ( 0.498)
Age at FGC 3.60 ( 2.010) 2.75 ( 1.762) 2.36 ( 1.504) 1.87 ( 1.035)
Attended formal school 0.19 ( 0.398) 0.68 ( 0.468) 0.86 ( 0.347) 0.63 ( 0.486)
Koranic education 0.63 ( 0.486) 0.47 ( 0.500) 0.36 ( 0.480) 0.27 ( 0.446)
Observations 52 384 216 319
Data: Kolda database. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the whole sample of girls,
by age group. The comparison between the cohort 1983-1999 (born before the
introduction of the law in 1999) and 2000-2004 is at the core of the analysis.
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Over the whole period, 96% of girls are cut14. This implies that the sample
selection issue observed in the DHS data when studying age at cutting is a
minor problem.
On the contrary, censoring issues arise if we include the youngest cohort,
where the prevalence of FGC is 55% and some girls are still at risk of being
cut because of their young age. Notice that 74% of the girls aged 8 to 29 have
at least one year of formal schooling, with a rate that is increasing over time.
Moreover, 43% attended Koranic schooling, but this proportion seems to be
decreasing over time. For the girls cut, the average age at cutting is below 3.
The comparison of age at cutting before and after 1999 suggests a change
in the trend for age at cutting after 1999. Figure 4.4 shows the Kaplan Meier
survival estimates for two ages groups, girls born before the introduction of the
law (1999) and girls born after.
Figure 4.4: Survival Functions (Probability of Not Being Cut) for the Two
Cohorts (Born Before and Born After the Introduction of the Law)
The Kaplan Meier is a non parametric estimate of a survival function that
gives the probability of not experiencing an event at a given time t. Here the
14In Chapter 3, I show that the decrease in prevalence of FGC for girls born between 2000
and 2004 is driven by villages that had the Tostan’s program: these girls were still partially
at risk when the program started in 2005. This might raise some concerns, given that the
change in trend in age at cutting is observed in the same period. However, notice that the
results presented in Section 4.4 on age at cutting are robust to the exclusion of the targeted
villages from the analysis.
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failure is FGC and the time at which failure occurs is the age at which a girl
is cut. The estimator at a given age t is the product of the probability of
not being cut at each age j < t, conditional on survival until that moment.
Formally, Ŝ(t) =
∏
j|tj≤t
(
nj−dj
nj
)
, where nj is the number of observations (that
have not yet failed) at time j and dj is the number of failures (girls that are cut)
observed in that period. Age at cutting is lower for the younger cohort: girls
born before the law have a 69% probability of not being cut at age 2, against
a 55% probability for girls born after 1999. A log rank test for the equality of
the survival functions confirms that the two survival functions are different at
the 1% significance level.
Table 4.3: Households Characteristics
Mean Sd
(A) Households’ Characteristics
Muslim 0.997 0.058
Fulani 0.831 0.376
Other ethnicity 0.115 0.320
Interethnic marriage 0.054 0.227
Polygamous 0.427 0.496
Own no land 0.024 0.152
House has cement walls 0.129 0.336
Mother had Koranic education 0.515 0.501
Father had Koranic education, not talibï¿œ 0.431 0.496
Father was a talibï¿œ but no Koranic education (in the village) 0.051 0.220
Father had Koranic education and was a talibï¿œ 0.261 0.440
Attended formal school 0.210 0.408
Age mother 38.400 8.724
Age father 51.132 10.447
Mother knows law 0.793 0.405
Father knows law 0.834 0.372
(B) Family Network
Maternal grandmother lives in the village 0.298 0.458
Paternal grandmother lives in the village 0.790 0.408
Maternal aunt lives in the village 0.146 0.353
Paternal aunt lives in the village 0.288 0.454
Number paternal aunts 1.814 1.308
Number maternal aunts 1.810 1.444
Number aunts 3.624 1.884
Number uncles 3.390 2.025
Female family members live in the village 0.288 0.454
Observations (Households) 295
Observations (Adults) 590
Data: Kolda database.
The sample area is homogenous in terms of ethnicity and religious identity
(Table 4.3). Almost 100% of the parents both declared themselves Muslims,
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and 83% Fulani. Inter-ethnic marriages represent less then 6% of the sample.
Polygamy concerns almost half of the sample. Only 21% of the households
have at least one parent who had formal schooling (with only 7% of the women
having any form of schooling). In 79% of the households at least one of the
parents attended a Koranic school during childhood. Around 41% of the fa-
thers have learned the Koran in their village, while 26% of the sampled fathers
had additional training under the supervision of a religious authority called a
marabout. Notice that only 10 individuals declared that they only studied with
a marabout.
Finally, only 18.64% of the parents do not know about the law15, which is in
line with other studies in Senegal: both Shell-Duncan et al. (2013, p.347) and
UNICEF et al. (2010, p.31) find a virtually 100% awareness of the law.
As already said, the database contains rich information on the extended
family structure of the sampled households and in particular with respect to
the location of the grandmothers and aunts of the girls. These are an important
set of controls, given that it is well known from the anthropological literature
(see Erlich and Augé (1995, p.95) and accounts in Cabane (2008)), that cutting
is mainly a “women’s business”. Men are not present at the moment of cutting.
The organization is indeed done by the women of the family: grandmothers,
mothers in law and (paternal) aunts play a crucial role.
Descriptive statistics on family networks are presented in panel B of Table
4.3. Traditionally, the woman moves to her husband’s village, which explains
why it is more likely for a girl to live in the same village as her paternal grand-
mother (79% of the sample) rather than her maternal grandmother. Also, 14.6%
of the sample households live in the same village as a maternal (married) aunt
of the girl, and in 29% of cases in the village of a paternal (married) aunt. Note
that the network is measured at the moment of the interview, which is noisily
measuring location at the moment of cutting16. To capture the presence of
female relatives in the village I construct the variable “Female family members
live in the village” which takes value one when there is at least one woman
living in the same village of the girl from the maternal side of the family and
one who belongs to the paternal side.
4.4 Empirical strategy and results
4.4.1 The impact of the law: the effect of legal sanctions
4.4.1.1 Empirical strategy
I estimate the effect of legal sanctions for FGC on FGC prevalence and age at
cutting. I have two regions and three cases of enforcement of legal sanctions for
15We asked : “Do you know if in Senegal there is a law against FGC?”
16However, women’s mobility in this rural context is limited and mainly linked to marriage.
A reason why an aunt might be living in the village at the moment of the interview but not
at the time of the cutting was that she was not yet married at the moment the girl was cut.
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FGC. The main specification is the following:
yimhr = c+β1∗LegalSanctioni+λ∗Xm+δ∗Dh+AgeFEi+RegionFEr+imhr (4.1)
where y is the outcome of interest (age at cutting or FGC status) for a girl
i born from a mother m in household h in a given region r. I am interested in
the effect on age at cutting and FGC status for a girl born the same year and in
a region where the law was enforced. X is a vector of mothers characteristics,
such as ethnicity, age and education and the fact that all her daughters are
cut (for the regression on age at cutting). In Equation 4.1 D is a vector of
household characteristics such as the location (urban or rural) and the wealth
index. I additionally control for age fixed effects (AgeFEi) and region fixed
effects (RegionFEr).
As an alternative specification, I control for household fixed effects (and by
construction for region fixed effects). Results are clustered at the village level17.
The most demanding specification is the one with household fixed effects:
identification is based on within-household comparison of girls that are born
in a year and region of a legal sanction with the other girls in the households
that are born in a different year, controlling for any difference in the outcome
variable (FGC status or age at cutting) that can be explained by the time trend
(controlled for non parametrically using age dummies).
4.4.1.2 Results
Table 4.4 presents the results, where in the first two columns the dependent
variable is age at cutting, in the other two the FGC status. In columns (1) and
(3) I control for region fixed effects and age fixed effects, while in (2) and (4) I
control for household fixed effects.
Girls born in the year and in a region where the law was enforced are cut 0.74
years earlier than girls born in another year in the same region, after controlling
for the time trend and households and mother characteristics, including the fact
that at least one of her daughters is not cut. The FGC prevalence does not seem
to differ for the affected girls: the estimated coefficient, although negative, is
small and not significant. Results are robust to the inclusion of household fixed
effects.
Note that selection seems to be an issue, given that the coefficient of “All
sisters underwent FGC” is negative and significant. This can be problematic
in studying age at cutting: if some households stop cutting after the law was
enforced and they are the ones cutting later, then the drop in age at cutting is
not due to a change in the timing of cutting but to a change in the decision of
cutting. However, the coefficient of “All sisters underwent FGC” decreases by
17Note that I cannot control for mother fixed effects given that I do not have enough
observations per mother. However, given that there is on average 1.5 women per households,
fixed effects at the household level are going to control for most of the mothers’ characteristics.
With respect to the level of clustering, results do not change when clustering at the level of
region times year of birth.
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half and is not significant when controlling for household fixed effects (column
2), implying that whatever unobservable characteristics it captures, it is mainly
a household characteristic, and it is at least partially taken care of by the
fixed effects. Furthermore, there is a small and not significant impact of the
legal sanctions on FGC status: selection is not an issue when we look at the
short term impact of legal sanctions. However, it can still be problematic when
studying their long term effect, if age at cutting is correlated with households
time-variant characteristics I cannot control for.
4.4.1.3 Robustness checks
The way I constructed the variable “Legal sanction” allows me to capture
changes to FGC that occurred only in the year and region of a case of law
enforcement. The change in the age at cutting, assuming that no other event
that could affect FGC took place in the concerned areas at the time of the legal
prosecution, can be interpreted as a short term effect of the law. However, one
might wonder if any medium or long term effect should be observed. To test
this, I construct two alternative specifications. “Born maximum 2 years after
sanction” takes value one for girls born in a region and in the year of the legal
sanction or at maximum two years later, zero otherwise. The variable “Born
after legal sanction” is equal to one for girls born in the region and in the year
or after the case of legal sanction. The former should capture the medium term
effect, the latter a change in the trend in age at cutting following the legal
sanction. Notice first that the last specification reduces the number of cases of
legal sanctions to two, given that the case in Kolda in 2007 is absorbed by the
case in 2004. Second, given that NGOs and government have been very active
in the fight against FGC over time, the last specification might be capturing
more than the effect of the enforcement of the law.
Table 4.5 shows the result for the coefficient of interest using the same
specification as in column (2) and (4) of Table 4.4 (without household fixed
effects the results are similar in magnitude and precision).
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4.5 report the estimated coefficient of the main
regression for comparison. Columns (3) and (4) present the coefficients on age
at cutting and FGC prevalence for “Born maximum 2 years after sanction” and
the columns (5) and (6) for “Born after legal sanction”. The coefficient for age
at cutting drops in both the alternative specifications, even if estimation is not
precise. The correlation with FGC prevalence also remains close to zero and
not significant.
Overall, the results suggest that a legal sanction might lead to a decrease
in age at cutting in the short term, but does not refrain people from cutting.
However, the results should be interpreted with caution. First, other events
might have taken place in those years that could have affected FGC. Second,
the identification is based on a limited number of observations and cases of legal
sanctions.
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4.4.2 Age at cutting and anti-FGC activities: the case of
Kolda
The advantage of the database I collected in Kolda is that I can compare age
at cutting before and after the introduction of the law, in a context where FGC
prevalence is not (yet) changing dramatically. It is important to stress that
the year of the law is taken as a turning point in the fight against FGC, but
that any change in trend should not be interpreted causally. First, as already
explained, the law was not well known at the moment of its introduction; second,
several campaigns and events took place simultaneously in the late 90s early
2000s. If the custom is evolving, it is more likely to be due to the overall
effect of different interventions, including the introduction of the law and the
information campaigns that followed.
4.4.2.1 Empirical strategy
To assess if there has been any change in the trend in age at cutting after 1999
I estimate the following equation:
yihv = c+ β1 ∗ (BornAfter1999i ∗ Y earBirthi) + λ ∗Xh + ihv (4.2)
where yihv is age at cutting for a girl i born in household h and village v.
“Born After 1999” is a dummy saying if the girl is born after 1999 and it is
interacted with the year of birth of the girl centered on 1999.
Xh is a vector of households characteristics (parents characteristics and fam-
ily network structure). In alternative specifications I control for village fixed
effects and household fixed effects.
4.4.2.2 Results
Table 4.6 shows the results. In Column (1) I control for the two districts
(communautés rurales) in which the villages are located since the two areas
differ in terms of age at cutting. Column (2) controls for village fixed effects,
column (3) for household fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
household level18.
The coefficient of interest is the interaction term between the age trend and
the dummy “Born after 1999 ”: for girls born after 1999, being one year younger
decreases age at cutting by 0.13 year, while there is no time trend for the older
cohorts. The result is robust to village fixed effects while it evinces similar
magnitude with household fixed effects, even if it loses significance.
Turning now to the role of female members of the family in the cutting, it
appears to be confirmed by our data (alternative specifications of the family
18Clustering at the village level gives similar results. When clustering at the age level,
standard errors increases for regressions in column (1) and (2) and decreases in column (3).
Results remain virtually unchanged.
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structure give similar positive coefficients, but not always significant). There is
some evidence that the presence of women from the family in the same village
is correlated with cutting almost half a year later (controlling for the size of
the family). The result is significant when controlling for village fixed effects,
meaning that the variable “Female family members live in the village” is not
a proxy for the size of the village (within-village marriages are more likely to
happen in larger villages, leading to higher family density).
A surprising result is that religious education seems to play a role in age at
cutting. Mothers that attended Koranic school cut their daughters more than
half a year later than other parents. The father’s Koranic education does not
matter: however, the ones that studied the Koran directly under the supervision
of a marabout (without passing through the village school), cut almost one year
and a half earlier.
4.4.2.3 Robustness checks
Given that the choice of 1999 is partially arbitrary, I run placebo tests by
changing the threshold: I use other years as reference points and I estimate
the difference in trend in age at cutting using the specification in column (2) of
Table 4.6
Figure 4.5
In Figure 4.5 I plot the estimated coefficients of the interaction term (bornafteri∗
yearbirthi) at different thresholds and at the 95% confidence interval. When
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I move the threshold to the left (before 1999), I do not expect the effect of
the interaction term to disappear but the magnitude of the coefficient should
decrease. This seems to be the case, even if the interaction at 1994 is also
significant and of similar magnitude as the one at 1999. For thresholds to the
right of 1999, I have too few observations and the estimation is imprecise.
4.5 Discussion
In a context where FGC is put under pressure by legal interventions and sensi-
tization campaigns, people have two choices: either to stop cutting or, if they
wish to continue practicing FGC, they should do it in secret, or at least quietly.
This under the assumption that sanctions for practicing FGC are considered as
a potential threat. In Senegal, Shell-Duncan et al. (2013) argue that, among
their informants, the law was indeed perceived as enforceable, in spite of the
lack of knowledge of cases of legal sanctions. They claimed that “simply rumors
or imagining enforceability generated fear of prosecutions” (p.823). In the same
vein, we can consider that, cases of effective enforcements of the law, even if
ended up with a grace, can increase the perception of the risk of being legally
prosecuted.
It is however quite unlikely that the fear of prosecution can lead to the
abandonment of FGC. Shell-Duncan et al. (2013) show that the law had no
effect on individuals unwilling to stop, while it was used as an argument to
resist social pressure by people that were against the practice. In other words,
coercion, in the absence of sensitization on the harmful effects of FGC, cannot
change people’s preferences on FGC. It can rather raise the cost of FGC by
increasing the risk of being caught cutting. However, instead of abandoning
FGC, individuals can use alternative strategies to perform cutting that decrease
this risk.
Both the results I find on the effect of the enforcement of the law on FGC
and on changing trend after 1999 are coherent with this framework and with
Shell-Duncan et al. (2013) findings. Girls born in a region and year of a case of
enforcement of the law have the same probability to be cut as girls born in other
regions, controlling for differences in ages and household characteristics. Parents
do not seem to respond to legal prosecution by stopping cutting. However, they
seem to perform FGC at an earlier age, at least for the children born in the
year of the legal sanction.
A priori, we can think of two mechanisms through which legal prosecution
can affect age at cutting. It can increase age at cutting for the girls that, at
the moment of the enforcement of the law, are not yet cut, if the prosecution
increases the (temporary) fear of being caught cutting, this will push people
to wait for a more opportune time, when the situation will have calmed down.
Otherwise, it can lead to a faster decrease in the age of cutting in an area where
the prosecution took place (at least for girls born in the years around the event),
if the legal sanction increases the secrecy of the practice. Our result seems to
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suggest the latter mechanism.
One possible link between secrecy and early cutting is the progressive de-
ritualization of FGC. The need for secrecy in practicing has, as a first conse-
quence, led to the disappearance of (collective) rituals. The de-ritualization of
the practice leads in turn to a decrease in age at cutting, because there is no
need to wait for a specific moment to cut a girl. That early cutting is correlated
with individual cutting and the absence of ritual is suggested by pre-law data
(Mottin-Sylla, 199019). If a hostile environment leads to the disappearance of
rituals, the decrease in age is a plausible effect. A second mechanism through
which secrecy leads to earlier cutting is through the fact that it is easier to hide
an infant than a child while she recovers from the cutting. This explanation
becomes even more important if cutting is done on girls aged 5 to 7, when
they have to be taken out of school during recovery. It is nonetheless not quite
relevant in our sample, since even in the older cohort cutting was done before
schooling age.
The results on Kolda suggest that the same mechanism can also apply in
the long run. The comparison of pre and post law data in the Kolda database
suggests a change in age at cutting, with a decrease in age when the intensity
of interventions in the area (sensitization, law information campaigns and NGO
programs) increases. I interpret this as the result of increased secrecy of the
custom, or, in other words, the fact that the practice is going underground.
As already said, it would be preferable to interpret the decrease in age as a
gradual process due to increasing pressure on the custom, and 1999 as a year
that signals the beginning of increasing activities around FGC rather than as
the year of the introduction of the law itself. As explained before, the law
was unknown to most of the population at the moment of its introduction,
and sensitization went hand in hand with the unfolding of other programs and
activities. In the region of Kolda, for example, the first public declaration of
abandonment of FGC took place in 1998, and other organizations were active,
not necessarily in the sample villages20. Further, the lack of prosecution cases
signals that people might indeed react more to an overall changing environment
rather than the law itself.
This relation between the law (and, more in general, increasing awareness
of anti FGC campaigns) and early cutting has been suggested by some studies
and during interviews I conducted in Dakar with actors involved in FGC-related
activities21. In a report by UNICEF (2013b, p. 31) it is stated that “the
19The sample included women aged between 10 and 45 in 1990. To my knowledge, this is
one of the most detailed and systematic quantitative analysis of FGC in Senegal done before
the introduction of law.
20Indeed, as shown in Chapter 3, the effect of being targeted by a women-empowerment
program which includes discussion on FGC such as the PRCC, can have an effect on the
decision to stop cutting. There might therefore be different reactions to “hearing” about
anti-FGC interventions and being directly exposed to a program.
21During a stay in Dakar in June 2014 I contacted people involved in anti FGC activities
at different levels. I managed to meet 10 of them, holding a variety of positions, from civil
servants and government consultants on women rights and FGC issues, to NGOs members
and human right activists against FGC. I conducted unstructured interviewed, focusing on
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criminalization of FGC has led to alternative strategies among mothers who
value the heritage of their ancestors [...] We observe in some areas the de-
ritualization of cutting FGC”22.
A human rights activist I interviewed claimed that the law had an impact,
even in the absence of systematic law enforcement, by increasing the fear of
being exposed to the police. As a consequence, people cut new born, in the
household compound, without ceremony. She thought that family pressure was
still too strong for parents to stop cutting but she argued that aside from age,
the type of cutting might also be changing, with only a symbolic cutting being
carried out.
The feeling that FGC is increasingly de-ritualised and individualized as a
reaction to the legal framework was common among the interviewed people.
While nobody was against the criminalization of the practice, they believed
that coercion in itself was not useful unless sensitization was done to convince
people about the harmful effects of it. A member from a women’s organization
claimed that the excessive media attention on FGCmight have harmed the cause
against FGC, pushing the practice underground, and making its eradication
more difficult.
With respect to the health consequences of cutting earlier, a nurse and anti-
FGC campaigner suggested that it can be worse for infants because of their
higher vulnerability to infections23. In another interview, it has been said that
the anatomy of an infant might make cutting more difficult and involuntarly
more severe, in particular if the cutter is not used to carrying out the practice
on girls of such young ages. There is, to my knowledge, no medical literature on
the risks associated to FGC at different ages. Reviews of the existing evidence
on the effects of male circumcision, conclude that it is better to practice it on
infants than on children or young adults (Morris et al., 2012; Weiss et al., 2010).
It is not clear up to what point these findings can be extended to FGC, given the
difference in the nature of the operation. The common belief that infants suffer
less than children (apparently found not only in Senegal but also in Mali, see
Cabane, 2008) is disproved by studies (see, for instance, Taddio et al. (1997) on
the long term effects of male circumcision) pointing at medium and long-term
consequences of neonatal pain experiences.
The disappearance of the rituals (when they were present) and the secrecy
needed to perform the practice also affect family dynamics on FGC. It is more
likely that cutting is performed individually rather than at the village or ex-
tended family level; cutting is done in the family’s compound. In urban ar-
eas, the phenomenon of mothers themselves cutting their daughter seems to be
growing (UNICEF, 2013b), raising additional concerns for the risk associated
the effect of the law on FGC and how FGC was practiced in the past, with a specific focus
on the region of Kolda.
22Author’s translation.
23There is contrasting evidence in the pediatric surgery literature on the presence of a
higher infection risk in newborns with respect to children. There is more consensus instead
on the higher hemorrhagic risk in newborns: from this we might infer that cutting earlier can
increase the risk of excessive bleeding.
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to unexperienced women performing FGC.
As explained above, female family members traditionally play an important
role in the cutting. In Senegal, my informants were unanimous in claiming
that in particular paternal aunts played a crucial role, deciding when a girl
was ready to be cut. According to one informant, they are the representatives
of the father in a situation where men are not present24. Pre-law statistics
presented in Mottin-Sylla (1990) seem to confirm that cutting was a collective
ritual, where the (female) extended family was involved. She finds that among
the Fulani in her sample, 80% of the women interviewed were cut with other
girls, and only in 20% of the cases individually. Of this 80%, 43% of the women
were cut with other girls of similar age of the extended family or neighborhood,
the remaining at the village level 25 (Mottin-Sylla, 1990, p. 13-15).
My data seem to confirm the importance of family. The measure I use
to account for family “network”, “Female family members live in the village”,
in Table 4.6 suggests that the presence of another woman in the family leads
to later cutting. I interpret this effect as the result of a coordination process
within the family: if any female relative lives close to the girl, then she might
be involved in the cutting and extending the length of the organization. If a
mother has no female relatives living close by, then she takes the decision to cut
individually, because she does not need to wait for the other family members
to be present or to take the initiative themselves.
Whatever is the interpretation given to the coefficient, I expect that the
push towards secrecy in the practice affects it. To see if data on Kolda confirms
these changing family relations, I run the same regression as in Table 4.6 on
the two sub-samples, girls born before and after 1999. Results are presented in
Table 4.7.
Again, it shows that there is only a time trend on girls born after 1999, while
the decrease in the coefficient of the family’s network measure and the loss of
its significance is suggestive of a change of path in family dynamics. Having a
woman of the family in the village was positively correlated with age at cutting
before 1999 while it loses significance after 1999 (although the two terms are not
significantly different) On the contrary, the role of religious education remains
stable over time. However, these changes might not be specific to FGC, but
be the result of a more general evolution of intra-family relationships. More
research is needed to properly address these questions.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter provides evidence on the relation between interventions aiming
at stopping FGC and the evolution of the custom. I claim that, even when
24More in general, aunts and uncles are, in the Mandinka society of the High Casamance,
responsible of the transmission of traditions and of the education of their nephews.
25These data can be considered as a good approximation of the way FGC is done among
the Fulani in the Upper Casamance, given the Fulani of the North-East - which have different
customs concerning FGC - are not sampled.
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interventions such as legal prosecution and sensitization campaigns do not lead
to a decrease in FGC prevalence, the custom can change. In particular, people
tend to abandon public rituals and they practice FGC in a more secret way:
this leads in turn to a decrease in age at cutting. First, there is no need to
perform FGC at a specific time if no ritual is required. And second, it is easier
to hide an infant than a child during the cutting and the healing period.
Using DHS data, I show that girls born in a year and region where a case
of legal sanction against the breach of the law has occurred are cut 0.8 year
earlier, but no effect is found on either FGC prevalence or age at cutting in
the medium and long term. Furthermore, exploiting a longer time span, I
provide some evidence that, in the region of Kolda, the growing intensity of
anti-FGC activities corresponds to a decrease in the trend in age at cutting. As
an intepretation of both results, I suggest that the increasing pressure on the
custom pushes the practice underground ,which in turn results in a decrease in
the age at cutting.
Finally, the fear of prosecution can also affect the nature of intra-family re-
lations regarding FGC. While the fact of having female family members living
nearby seems to delay cutting - which I interpret as the result of coordination
within the family - there is some evidence that this effect has become less im-
portant after 1999. This could be seen as a consequence of the individualization
of the practice.
This work is, to my knowledge, the first attempt to discuss the issue of age at
cutting as a way to understand the evolution of the custom. While the results
are in line with the available qualitative evidence, there is a need for more
research on the way people adapt FGC when facing growing pressure to stop.
This is crucial both to better understand how to design anti-FGC interventions
that take into account the risk of unintended harmful effects and as a way to
improve our understanding of the custom itself.
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Table 4.4: Effect of Legal Sanctions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age FGC Age FGC FGC FGC
Legal sanction -0.742*** -0.608* -0.0388 -0.0414
(0.232) (0.318) (0.0661) (0.0879)
Pular or Mandinka 0.00723 -0.265 0.0256 -0.0273
(0.221) (0.734) (0.0345) (0.146)
Attended formal school 0.0788 0.555 -0.101*** -0.0762
(0.155) (0.340) (0.0309) (0.0821)
Urban household 0.0958 -0.180***
(0.217) (0.0430)
All sisters underwent FGC -0.543*** -0.0756
(0.147) (0.279)
Year of interview=2013 0.127 0.0494
(0.151) (0.0336)
Wealth Index:
Poorer -0.301* 0.0399
(0.164) (0.0406)
Middle -0.510** 0.0709
(0.201) (0.0477)
Richer -0.758*** 0.0424
(0.231) (0.0509)
Richest -0.494 0.125*
(0.430) (0.0698)
Constant 3.575*** 2.425*** 0.268*** 0.647***
(0.997) (0.689) (0.0807) (0.122)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 1385 1385 2764 2764
Data: Continuous DHS 2012-13. Standard errors clustered at the village (cluster) level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4.5: Effect of Legal Sanctions: Medium and Long Term Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age FGC FGC Age FGC FGC Age FGC FGC
Legal sanction -0.608* -0.0414
(0.318) (0.0879)
Born maximum 2 years after sanction -0.295 0.0159
(0.203) (0.0391)
Born after legal sanction -0.117 -0.0298
(0.307) (0.0428)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1385 2764 1385 2764 1385 2764
Data: Continuous DHS 2012-13. Standard errors clustered at the village (cluster) level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4.6: Dependent Variable: Age at Cutting
(1) (2) (3)
At least one parent attended formal school -0.346 -0.221
(0.248) (0.250)
Mother had Koranic education 0.683*** 0.756***
(0.201) (0.216)
Father had Koranic education, not Talibé 0.0658 -0.0620
(0.234) (0.248)
Father was a talibé but no Koranic education (in the village) -1.075*** -1.217***
(0.290) (0.258)
Father had Koranic education and was a talibé -0.206 -0.315
(0.267) (0.270)
House has cement walls 0.120 0.234
(0.236) (0.232)
Number aunts -0.0213 -0.0524
(0.0687) (0.0620)
Number Uncles -0.0454 -0.0432
(0.0521) (0.0519)
Female family members live in the village 0.307 0.439*
(0.217) (0.231)
Year birth centered on 1999 -0.00516 0.00359 0.00517
(0.0190) (0.0205) (0.0287)
Born after 1999 0.127 0.0445 0.0153
(0.279) (0.283) (0.278)
(Born after 1999) X (Year birth centered on 1999) -0.133** -0.144** -0.130
(0.0629) (0.0630) (0.0786)
Administrative area of Sare Colly Sallé 0.115**
(0.0547)
Constant 1.924*** 2.792*** 2.767***
(0.507) (0.396) (0.178)
Village FE No Yes No
Household FE No No Yes
Observations 578 578 578
Data: Kolda database. Standard errors clustered at the household level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4.7: Dependent Variable: Age at Cutting
(1) (2)
<=1999 >1999
At least one parent attended formal school -0.118 (0.314) -0.353 (0.308)
Mother had Koranic education 0.862*** (0.279) 0.579* (0.320)
Father had Koranic education, not Talibé -0.159 (0.311) -0.0319 (0.316)
Father was a talibé but no Koranic education (in the village) -1.174*** (0.318) -1.007** (0.446)
Father had Koranic education and was a talibé -0.483 (0.344) -0.178 (0.371)
House has cement walls 0.353 (0.293) 0.324 (0.367)
Number aunts -0.123 (0.0758) 0.0172 (0.0762)
Number Uncles -0.0543 (0.0656) -0.0223 (0.0712)
Female family members live in the village 0.559* (0.293) 0.234 (0.338)
Year birth centered on 1999 0.00781 (0.0211) -0.159** (0.0693)
Constant 3.041*** (0.473) 2.701*** (0.482)
Village FE Yes Yes
Observations 377 201
Data: Kolda database. Standard errors clustered at the household level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Chapter 5
Eradicating Women-Hurting
Customs: What Role for
Social Engineering?1
5.1 Introduction
Since the birth of modern development economics in the period immediately
following World War II, attention has been mostly directed to the determinants
of long term economic growth performance and, in a subsequent stage, to issues
of income distribution and poverty reduction. The implicit assumption was
that the material level of living is the critical component of individual welfare
and that non-economic factors, social norms and practices in particular, change
gradually in response to the enlargement of opportunities that accompanies
economic growth. Regarding the latter preconceived view, pioneer development
economists such as Arthur Lewis (1955), Peter Bauer and B.S. Yamey (1957),
Gerald Meyer and Robert Baldwin (1957), and Alfred Hirschman (1958) did
not believe that there existed definite social and cultural prerequisites of de-
velopment but that norms, customs and religious beliefs would evolve and be
reinterpreted depending on the economic environment facing societies.
Recent thinking has called into question this “organic approach” to devel-
opment in two ways. First, Amartya Sen in his works has emphasized that
personal welfare or human happiness is crucially influenced by non-economic
factors, such as autonomy, participation in a communal life, freedom to develop
our talents and pursue our ends, dignity and self esteem (Sen, 1999). These
factors make the whole difference between poverty and destitution (Dasgupta,
1993). Development cannot therefore be reduced to progress along a purely
economic scale. Second, even if non-economic aspects are overlooked, the abil-
ity to seize upon economic opportunities, which affects economic progress, may
1This chapter is co-authored with Jean-Philippe Platteau.
81
FIGHTING AGAINST HARMFUL CUSTOMS
be constrained by social norms and informal rules that do not automatically
vanish as growth proceeds (Platteau, 2000; Platteau and Peccoud, 2010).
Reflecting the above questioning is the growing tendency to promote de-
liberate changes in customs, particularly oppressive ones. This active attitude
toward harmful customs is characteristic of what may be called social engineer-
ing of which the human rights approach that has gained increasing currency
since the eighties is part and parcel. In matters of gender equality, for example,
the first visible step in that direction was the Convention to Eliminate all forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), adopted by the United Nations
in 1979. For the first time, it was stated explicitly that member states “should
engage to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women,
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all
other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superior-
ity of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women” (United
Nations, 1979). This document opened the way for actions combining legal
interventions in the name of universal human rights, and effective mobilization
of victims so that they can perceive themselves as right-holders. In short, le-
gal and preference changes are advocated. Non-Governmental Organisations
(NGOs) and international agencies, UNICEF in particular, have run many ini-
tiatives which both refer to legal or quasi-legal principles and attempt to drive
preference change. The importance of the human rights approach is well ex-
emplified by the UN fact sheet on Harmful Traditional Practices Affecting the
Health of Women and Children published in 1995 (OHCHR, 1995). It identifies
five main harmful practices, namely, female genital cutting, early marriage and
dowry, son preference, female infanticide, and early pregnancy and practices
related to child delivery, which are clearly identified as human rights violations.
An essential feature of the “social engineering” approach is thus that it di-
rectly confronts the oppressive custom with a view to eradicating it, often in
the name of human rights. An alternative, more indirect approach, consists
of encouraging changes in the technological/economic environment in order to
modify the costs and benefits of norm abeyance. The difference between this
indirect approach and the “organic” approach advocated by many development
economists of the 1950s (see above) arises from the possibility that endogenous
growth processes do not necessarily lead to the cost/benefit changes that cause
oppressive customs to disappear: specific policies are required to generate the
economic incentives needed to alter those customs.
In this chapter, we want to explore the analytical conditions under which
social engineering is more likely to succeed or fail when it comes to suppress
gender-asymmetric customs. A dominant theory that has guided many efforts
on the ground is a coordination game in which a bad Nash equilibrium has
been selected because of pessimistic expectations of agents. There are other
possible situations, however, and they need to be represented by other games.
What we set out to do is to discuss the main possible interaction frameworks
that can produce anti-women (Nash) equilibria, and to derive policy implica-
tions from the corresponding games. This will necessitate that we differenti-
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ate between bargaining games and coordination games, games involving agents
with homogenous preferences from those involving agents with heterogeneous
preferences (here, great attention will be paid to different possible shapes of
the distribution of preferences and their differentiated effects), and the rival
claimants’ game from coordination games.
Only then will we be able to determine which approach is more appropriate
to fight against oppressive customs in varying contexts and what is the appro-
priate time frame within which it is realistic to expect results. In particular, we
aim at understanding the various roles that the statutory law can play and at
highlighting the conditions under which legal interventions can be expected to
be effective and whether and when they need to be supplemented, or replaced,
by other strategies.
To probe into this issue we start by looking at the possible impact of the law
on oppressive customs in different situations depicted as games. We first look
at situations in which the law has an expressive effect, starting with the most
well-known model which assumes that all agents have identical anti-custom
preferences (Section 5.2). We then remove the assumption of preference ho-
mogeneity to consider the more general case in which agents with different
preferences interact in a purely decentralized manner (Section 5.3). In a third
step, we review attempts to model the impact of the law assuming that it has
a deterrence effect. Deterrence can be activated by the people themselves, by
the state or by the informal authority (Section 5.4). After we will have thus
understood under which conditions the law can be effective, we turn to the pos-
sibility of changing preferences, which will be done in a heterogeneous agents’
framework (Section 5.5). In the next step (Section 5.6), attention is shifted to
situations where oppressive customs are modified as a result of changes in the
cost-benefit environment. Section 5.7 then discusses the role of culture and the
way strong feelings of identity can make eradication of harmful practices more
difficult. Section 5.8 concludes by deriving the main lessons from our attempt to
clarify the issue of eradication of oppressive customs with the help of economic
analysis.
Note that, to help the reader better perceive their relevance, the theoreti-
cal arguments exposed in the different sections will be illustrated by examples
drawn from available empirical works. Besides providing a theoretical scaffold-
ing to analyse the soundness of strategies aimed at combatting harmful customs,
this chapter therefore proposes a reasoned survey of the relevant literature.
5.2 The expressive effect of the law: homoge-
neous agents
A first mechanism through which the law can affect a custom is the so called “ex-
pressive” effect of the law (Cooter, 2000; McAdams, 2000), which corresponds,
in economics, to the idea of the law acting as a focal point in a coordination
game (for a ciritical discussion of this approach, see Basu, 2015). Coordina-
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tion games are used to model customs that are considered social norms. The
starting point of the social norms literature, pioneered by Schelling (1960) and
Akerlof (1980), is that individual choice depends on how many people in the
reference group will adopt a given behaviour2. Traditional customs are often
defined as social norms, which is a way to emphasize the difficulty of moving
away from the equilibrium outcome when agents’ expectations have converged
on that outcome.
Let us start from the simplest case in which all agents have identical pref-
erences and therefore agree on the ranking of the various possible equilibrium
outcomes. If a socially inferior outcome prevails, such as is the case when an
oppressive custom is established, it can only be because agents have (converg-
ing) pessimistic expectations. In other words, everybody dislikes the norm but
nobody wants to deviate from the habit of following it owing to the expected
behavior of the others. In this framework, the custom is a focal point and,
to remove it, one only needs a mechanism able to make agents change their
expectations in a coordinated manner so that they can establish their preferred
outcome. One such mechanism is a statutory law that would act as a new focal
point.
For the sake of illustration, consider a simple female genital cutting (FGC)
game with a socially inefficient equilibrium. Consider a game with two players
who represent parents belonging to two different households in the community.
They have to decide whether to circumcise their daughter or not. The payoff
matrix displayed in Table 5.1 is based on the common view that female genital
cutting can be analyzed as a coordination game (see Mackie, 1996; Mackie and
LeJeune, 2009). If the other parents choose to follow the practice of female
genital cutting, then any parental couple is better off doing it as well lest their
daughter should remain unmarried. But if no other parents follow the practice,
there is no advantage for any couple of parents to cut their daughter since this
would cause a lot of physical and psychological pain.
In such a game, there are two Nash equilibria (in pure strategies): parents
from the two households cut their daughter, or both of them refuse to do so.
Given their preferences, only the latter equilibrium is socially efficient, yet ex-
pectations may lead to the inefficient outcome. Once trapped in this nasty
equilibrium, players do not want to deviate from their strategy: everybody
agrees that the practice is harmful and should be abandoned but “no one dares
to be the first to abandon it” [Abdalla (1982, pp.94-95) cited from Mackie (1996,
p.1014)]. In this game, with the right kind of focal point - a legal ban of the
practice, for example - people will coordinate their expectations on the socially
efficient equilibrium.
2We do not precise the nature of the reference group, even when it is labelled the “commu-
nity”. A “community”, indeed, needs not correspond to the whole village society, for example.
In Munshi and Myaux’s study of rural Bangladesh (2006), the authors find that the individ-
ual’s contraception decision responds strongly to changes in contraceptive prevalence in her
own religious group within the village whereas cross-religion effects are entirely absent.
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Table 5.1: Game of female genital cutting with two Nash equilibria, one efficient
and another inefficient
Parents of household 2
Circumcise daughter Reject the practice
Parents of
household 2
Circumcise daughter 0,0 -3,-1
Reject the practice -1,-3 5,5
The above game is important precisely because it has been so influential in
Non-Governmental and international organisations working to improve women’s
and children’s well-being in a human rights framework3. In particular, the
social norms approach and its emphasis on coordination incentives has been a
dominant theoretical framework for programs promoting the abandonment of
female genital cutting.
The example of anti-FGC interventions of UNICEF and UNFPA, inspired
by the experience of Tostan, a Senegalese NGO working in Senegal and other
countries in West Africa, is particularly appropriate in the context of our dis-
cussion. Consider the case of Senegal, the country where Tostan started its
activities. There is a law in Senegal, enacted in 1999, that bans female genital
cutting. Tostan worked in rural communities with a view to eradicating FGC.
It did so by framing it as a human rights violation and, as part of a broader
program to empower women, they used existing laws and conventions to pro-
tect women’s and children’s rights. Its strategy was clearly based on the social
norm approach since its ultimate step was to achieve declarations whereby peo-
ple from different village communities publicly announce the abandonment of
the harmful practice. Public declarations were thus intended to serve as both
coordination and commitment devices, expected to become the new focal point
for these communities.
While theoretically appealing, the definition of female genital cutting as a
social norm, therefore giving rise to a coordination problem, has not yet been
empirically validated. Bellemare et al. (2015) in a cross-country analysis of
the custom in West Africa find that, on average, 87% of the variation in FGC
persistence (measured as the individual’s support for the practice) is explained
by individual level and household characteristics. They additionally find that
the more widespread the practice is in a country, the more individuals factors
explain its persistence. Both findings are at odds with the coordination game
used to explain FGC, since, in this game, the persistence of the custom is ex-
plained by how many people practice it rather than by household and individual
characteristics. These results also suggest that strategies other than public dec-
3Female genital cutting is considered as a violation of human rights, in particular: the
right to be free from all forms of discrimination against women; the right to health, to body
integrity and to freedom from violence. All these rights are protected by international treaties
such as the CEDAW.
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larations and pledging, such as targeting individuals, might be more effective
in countries where FGC is pervasive.
In Sudan, Efferson et al. (2015) test the validity of the coordination model
of FGC which has inspired development agencies and NGOs. If FGC is a social
norm at the community level, then communities should have either a zero or
100% FGC incidence and an important discontinuity in FGC rate between the
two types of communities should be observed. Using a sample of girls from 45
communities, they do not find neither extreme rates of FGC nor discontinuity
in the distribution of FGC incidence across communities: this is suggestive of
the absence of a common cutting norm at that level. It is still possible that
coordination takes place at another level than the community, in particular if
this does not completely overlap with the marriage pool (under the assumption
that coordination takes place within the marriage network). However, first, they
find high level of endogamy within communities. Second, in each community
a substantial number of households state that they could marry with families
not practicing FGC. Finally, they run an implicit association test4 within each
community to test if there is any discontinuity in normative attitude towards
FGC . If, within the same community, two separated norms, cutting and not
cutting, would coexist, then a bimodal distribution of the individual scores from
the test should be observed: individuals should either show a positive attitude
towards FGC or a negative one. On the contrary, they do no find any implicit
association between being cut and positive or negative values: the distribution
of test scores is unimodal and centered on zero. The authors conclude that their
findings are not compatible with a model of coordination (with homogenous
preferences) either within the communities or the marriage pool.
Finally, in a study conducted in the Senegalese region of Kolda, (Camilotti,
2015a,b) has explicitly studied the impact of Tostan’s intervention, the potential
role of the public declaration mechanism, and the possible effects of the legal
ban on FGC. Her main findings can be summarised as follows. First, the impact
of the intervention that can be ascribed to Tostan’s program as such exists but
appears to be quite limited: in particular, there is no complete termination
of the cutting practice in the targeted villages. Second, there is evidence that
the new anti-FGC environment, which includes the new law, generates perverse
effects in the form of a decrease in the age at cutting, with potentially noxious
consequences on the level of health. Third, there is no evidence that public
declarations have worked as a coordination and commitment device. Fourth,
there is nevertheless some evidence suggesting that coordination might take
place at the level of the extended family network.
Overall, these results suggest that the conceptualization of FGC as a co-
ordination game across communities might be misleading. A legal ban on the
practice or any other device that should work as focal point might perform
4The implicit association test is a way to test the strenght of the connection people make
between two concepts without explicitly asking their opinion. In this context, individuals
were shown on a screen two drawings of girls, one cut and one uncut, and a set of either
positive or negative words that they had to associate to one of the girls.
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poorly if expectations on other people’s behavior are not the leading deter-
minant of the custom. This said, observations to the effect that there is no
massive abandonment of the FGC practice but that a minority of people re-
spond to a change in the (legal) environment do not, in and of themselves,
form a sufficiently strong basis to dismiss the social norm/coordination analyt-
ical approach. As a matter of fact, such observations are compatible with this
approach if either of the two following situations prevail. First, people have ho-
mogeneous anti-custom preferences, but coordination takes place at other levels
than the village or the inter-village network. For example, there exist strong
sub-village networks through which people coordinate their actions related to
social activities. Second, people have heterogeneous preferences. Although the
former explanation cannot be ruled out, the latter must be taken seriously in
the light of existing evidence (see, in particular, the aforementioned study of
Bellemare et al. (2015)).
We therefore devote the next section to the case of heterogeneous prefer-
ences.
5.3 The expressive effect of the law: heteroge-
neous agents
There is a straightforward way of conceptualising agents’ heterogeneity. In con-
formity with the social norm approach (see Granovetter 1978; Schelling, 1960)
we assume that the positive component of the agent’s utility function varies
positively with the proportion of the population that follows the custom5. The
negative component, however, is idiosyncratic and reflects the agent’s aversion
towards the custom or the cost incurred by following it. The net utility obtained
by an agent from following the (bad) custom can thus be written as:
Ui = u (P )− θiV (E)
where P stands for the proportion of the population that abides by the
custom, θi is the aversion coefficient of individual i, and E represents the (legal)
environment bearing upon the custom while the function V (E) describes its
impact. We thus assume that each member of the population is characterised by
a parameter θi ∈ [0, 1], which is distributed according to the continuous density
f (θ) and cumulative distribution F (θ) functions. For a given environment E,
agents therefore incur different costs depending upon their degree of aversion
towards the custom (the greater this aversion, the higher θi). We assume that
V ′(E) is positive, implying that an environment that has become more hostile
to the custom, reflected in a higher value of E, causes higher costs for those
who continue to follow it. The positive component of the utility function has
the following properties: u′ (P ) > 0, u”(P ) ≥ 0, u (0) = 0, u(1) = u.
5A different way to model social norms is by assuming that non conformity leads to a
decrease in utility due to sanctions or loss of reputation. The utility loss is then proportional
to the number of people following the norm (see Akerlof, 1980; Ambec, 2008).
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At equilibrium, if we consider the case of the indifferent agent whose aversion
coefficient is defined as θi = θ∗ such that her net utility from the custom is
equal to zero, we observe that P =
´ θ∗
0
f(θ)dθ = F (θ∗). This means that the
proportion of the population which has a lower or equal aversion for the custom
than the indifferent agent is equivalent to the proportion of the population that
abide by the custom (having a positive or null net utility from the custom).
The utility of the indifferent agent then is:
u (F (θ∗)) = V (E)θ∗, which implies
u (F (θ∗))
V (E)
= θ∗ (5.1)
where F (θ∗) = P, the proportion of people who abide by the custom. Equa-
tion 5.1 requires that an interior solution exists.
Since there are obviously multiple Nash equilibria in such a static coordi-
nation game (the Nash equilibrium where nobody follows the custom, θ∗, thus
always exists), it is convenient to restrict the number of equilibria by introducing
some dynamics. We thus assume that at each point of time there is a probabil-
ity that a new agent is added to the pool of existing members. This new agent
is drawn at random from the set [0, 1] according to the density function f (θ).
She enters the pool of members with a given θaand will have to decide whether
to follow the custom or not. She chooses to abide by it if u (F (θ∗)) > θαV (E),
where F (θ∗) is the equilibrium point before the introduction of the new agent.
This assumption helps us to solve the selection issue.
It is evident that the characteristics of the equilibria critically depend on
the shape of the distribution function over θi, for a given level of V (E) and
function u(·).
Figure 5.1 shows some possible situations. The horizontal axis represents
the type of agents, θi, and the curve shows the agent’s utility from conforming
to the custom divided by the individual cost, that is, u(F (θ))V (E) . Given equation
(1), an equilibrium is when the 45 degrees line, corresponding to the identity
function θ = θ, crosses the curve. It is a stable equilibrium if, increasing θi, the
curve reaches the point from above the 45 degrees line.
We can now examine important possible equilibrium configurations. To
begin with, Figure 5.1a depicts the case where the density function f(θ) is U-
shaped (i.e. convex), representing a distribution of people which puts more
weight at the extremes. In this bimodal distribution, there are thus two masses
of individuals with very high or very low aversion to the custom. With such
a polarised population, the interior equilibrium, when it exists (that is, when
the two curves have an intersection point, such as they have at point A), is sta-
ble: any random perturbation around the equilibrium point will bring back the
system to that point. Indeed, the curve u(F (θ))V (E) lies above the identity function
below the intersection point and below the identity function beyond that point.6
6At equilibrium, θ∗ is such that any agent with θi > θ∗ refuses to follow the custom and
any agent with θi < θ∗ follows it. Assume now that a new agent is randomly drawn from
the population and comes up with a θi larger than θ∗. Since the curve
u(F (θ))
V (E) lies below
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(a) One stable equilibrium
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(b) Two stable equilibria
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B u¯V (E)
(c) Stable equilibria at (0,0) and (1,1)
0 θ
u(F (θ))
V (E)
B
u¯
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(d) Stable equilibria at (0,0) and (1,1)
Figure 5.1: Examples of coordination games with multiple equilibria
We can therefore conclude that, with a U-shaped density function, a fraction of
the people follows the custom while the remainder does not whenever the curve
crosses the identity line. This (stable) interior equilibrium is unique.
Figure 5.1b describes a quite different situation in which most of the people
tend to be concentrated around the middle of the distribution of θ values: the
density function f(θ) is unimodal and its peak lies around the middle of the
[0, 1] range. This means that the majority of people have a moderate (medium)
aversion to the custom. In our Figure, the first intersection point (denoted
by A) is unstable while the second one (denoted by B) is stable. In such an
instance, there are two possible stable equilibria: either nobody follows the
custom or a rather large proportion of the population does it. It is easy to
check from Figure 5.1c that, if the curve u(F (θ))V (E) were crossing the 45° degree
line only once (at point A) inside the [0, 1] set, the second intersection point
would lie on the vertical axis corresponding to θ = 1. This second intersection
the identity function (the 45° degree line) to the right of A, this agent will refuse to follow
the custom, exactly like an agent from the existing population and with θi > θ∗ would have
done. On the other hand, if the new agent comes up with a θi smaller than θ∗, since the
curve u(F (θ))
V (E) lies above the identity function to the left of A, this agent will decide to follow
the custom, exactly like an agent from the existing population and with θi < θ∗ would have
done. Equilibrium θ∗ is therefore stable.
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point, where uV (E) exceeds θ, corresponds to a corner solution with θ
∗ = 1, as
a possible stable equilibrium. Here is therefore a case where either nobody or
everybody follows the custom.
Let us now turn to extreme situations in which the overwhelming majority
of the people have very low or very large values of θi. It is then easy to see that
a unique stable equilibrium will prevail. If almost all the people are clustered
around a value of θi close to zero, and u¯/V is high enough, the
u(F (θ))
V (E) curve will
have a strongly concave shape which entirely lies above the 45° line and crosses
the vertical axis above the point u(F (θ))V (E) = 1. The only (stable) equilibrium
is then θ∗ = 1: everybody sticks to the custom. Conversely, if almost all the
people are clustered around a value of θi close to one, and u¯/V is small enough,
the u(F (θ))V (E) curve will have a strongly convex shape which entirely lies below
the 45° line and crosses the vertical axis below the point u(F (θ))V (E) = 1: nobody
follows the custom.
A last case to consider is that of a uniform density function that translates
into a linear cumulative distribution function. As Figure 5.1d shows, two main
possibilities arise: either the u(F (θ))V (E) curve lies entirely below, or entirely above
the 45° line. In the former case, which corresponds to a situation where u¯/V < 1,
the unique stable equilibrium is θ∗ = 0: nobody abides by the custom, which
is according to intuition since the utility obtained when everybody follows the
custom, u¯, is smaller than the cost V (E). In the latter case, which corresponds to
a situation where u¯/V > 1, the unique stable equilibrium is θ∗ = 1: everybody
abides by the custom.
We have earlier discussed the role of the law in a coordination game when
multiple stable equilibria exist, highlighting the way it can help to change the
focal point and move from one equilibrium to another. Allowing for prefer-
ence heterogeneity, we now understand that the final equilibrium the law can
lead to fundamentally depends on the underlying distribution of preferences (or
aversion) to the custom. Thus, when many people have a moderate aversion
toward the custom so as to be clustered around the average value of θ (see
Figures 5.1b and 5.1c), the law can possibly act as a new focal point entailing
the disappearance of the harmful custom (the shift from large or total adoption
to zero adoption). But if the distribution of preferences is such that no equi-
librium exists at (0,0), -when the density function is U-shaped, for example-,
the total disappearance of the harmful custom cannot be achieved by changing
people’s expectations. This point has been well emphasised by Cooter (2000),
in particular.
That the distribution of preferences plays a critical role has now become
clear: it determines the type of effect that we should expect from any coordi-
nation device aiming at changing people’s expectations. In particular, coordi-
nation might not be enough to eradicate harmful social norms, as it has been
empirically shown in the aforementioned study of Efferson et al. (2015). As a
consequence, interventions designed for modifying the payoffs or the preferences
of individuals are most likely needed. From the model depicted above, it is ac-
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tually evident that the law can activate another mechanism than the expressive
one: a stricter law can thus increase the cost of following the custom, V (E),
which amounts to changing the payoff matrix. Equilibrium outcomes can be
consequently modified. The increase in the cost is reflected in the fact that be-
ing caught breaking the law now leads to punishment by the formal authority.
This is what in the legal literature is called “the deterrence effect of the law”.
We explore this dimension in the following section.
Before embarking upon that task, however, a remark deserves to be made.
We have assumed above that agents take their decision to follow the harmful
custom or not in a simultaneous manner. It is well known that in coordination
games sequential playing instead of simultaneous playing yields the efficient
equilibrium. For example, in the simple 2x2 FGC game depicted in Table 1, if
one of the parental couples could make the decision in a first move while the
other couple decides therefater, the first-mover would always choose to abstain
from cutting the daughter. This is because, having done so, the first-mover
knows that it will be in the interest of the second-mover to follow suit. This
outcome obeys the logic of a coordination game and obviously causes the so-
cially inefficient (0, 0) equilibrium to vanish. Things are more complicated when
preferences are heterogeneous. Indeed, the outcome then depends upon the
preference of the first-mover. If the first-mover rather likes the custom, she will
follow it and the second-mover may choose to make the same decision although
she is more averse to the custom. But the converse outcome could also happen:
if the first-mover rather dislikes the custom, she will shun it and the second-
mover may choose to also renounce the custom although she is less averse to
it. This nicer result is obtained by Mackie (1996; 2000) in the context of an
n-person game. Considering again the case of female genital cutting, he shows
that the disappearence of the custom can start from a group of individuals with
high aversion for the custom: the group of custom-breakers grows in size until
a critical mass is reached and the utility from non-cutting becomes higher for
everybody. Note that the underlying assumption behind this cascade model is
a distribution of preferences similar to the one assumed in Figures 5.1b and
5.1c. An important question is therefore whether the position of first-mover(s)
is randomly decided, or whether those individuals with highest aversion to the
harmful custom are ready and able to take up the leadership position. It is ob-
vious that the second possibility is more conducive to the demise of the harmful
custom than the first one.
Given that our main objective is to explore the role of preference distribu-
tion within a general social norm framework, we have focused on static games,
where the different assumptions on the preference distribution can be easily
investigated. However, it is worth remembering that dynamic games can be
useful to model FGC as a pre-marital investment: parents cut their daughter
to increase their future value on the marriage market. While this assumption
requires more empirical investigation7, recent work in economics (Chesnokova
7For instance, Shell-Duncan et al. (2011), do not find support for the idea that a circum-
cised woman is more likely to get a “better husband”.
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and Vaithianathan, 2010; Molitor, 2014) has taken this dimension into account
by explicitly modeling the marriage market and how it affects FGC incidence
(when the decision to cut is taken before entering the marriage market). If such
a modelling choice is perhaps well adapted to the FGC problem, it is neverthe-
less too specific to warrant applicability to a wider set of harmful customs.
5.4 The deterrence effect of the law
We are now ready to examine the impact of the law when its function includes
punishing deviant behaviour when detected: the expected cost of punishment
is the ultimate threat that leads people to re-negotiate the custom. This is
a standard element of the law and economics approach, where prominence is
given to the legal tool and to a positive probability of being caught. The law
therefore changes the payoffs of the game, increasing the cost of following the
custom and modifying the agents’ cost-benefit analysis. Such an approach is
therefore based on a conception of the law as a change-driver, and it stands
in striking contrast to the perspective adopted by Benabou and Tirole (2011)
who stress the aforediscussed expressive effect of the law. According to them,
indeed, the law “is not merely a price system for bad and good behaviour, it also
plays an important role in expressing and shaping the values of societies”. Laws
(and policies) thus reflect the knowledge that legislators (and decision-makers)
have about societal preferences, and “these same community standards are also
what shapes social norms (conferring esteem or stigma) and moral sentiments
(pride and shame)” (pp. 1-2).
In the model used in Section 5.3, the government creates an environment,
labeled E, which is more or less hostile to the harmful custom. A larger value
of E means that the environment is more hostile, thereby inflicting greater cost
on custom-followers. A direct effect of a larger E is to cause a fall in u¯V (E) , and
therefore a downward shift of the u(F (θ))V (E) curve. In Figure 5.1a, the effect of that
downward shift is to lower the equilibrium value of θ, and therefore also that of
F (θ). The proportion of custom-followers is thus decreasing. To complete the
argument, we can specify the objective function of the government. A simple
way to do this is to assume that the positive component of its utility increases
as the proportion of custom-followers decreases while the negative component
is a cost function linear in the number of E units. That is, we write:
max
E,θ∗
Up = v (1− F (θ∗))− cE (5.2)
s.t. u (F (θ∗)) = θ∗V (E)
where v′(.) > 0, v”(.) ≤ 0, and c measures the (constant) unit cost. The gov-
ernment, acting as a principal, maximises Up with respect to E and θ∗ subject
to the citizens’ participation constraint. We assume that an interior solution
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exists for θ∗. Replacing E in the principal’s objective function by its value in
the participation constraint, the maximisation problem can be simplified thus:
max
θ∗
v (1− F (θ∗))− cV −1(θ∗)
[
u (F (θ∗)
θ∗
]
where V −1 is the inverse function of V (E).
The first-order condition, with respect to θ, comes out as:
v′(.)f(θ∗) = −c (V −1(θ∗))′ θ∗u′(.)f(θ∗)− u(.)
θ∗2
Since the LHS of this equilibrium condition is positive, the RHS must also be
positive, and this obviously implies that u(.) > θ∗u′f(θ∗). It is worth noticing
that this is precisely the condition under which the comparative-static effect
dθ∗/dE is unambiguously negative8.
If corner solutions are allowed and, as we know, their existence will depend
on the shape of f(θ), other outcomes become possible. In particular, it may
happen that the government’s increased effort to make custom-following more
costly leads to a complete abandonment of the noxious customary practice, as
dreamed up by the proponents of the social engineering approach. This will
happen if, in Figure 5.1a for example, the downward shift of the curve u(F (θ))V (E) is
such that it now lies entirely below the identity function: in this instance, from
a positive value in the [0, 1] range, θ∗ falls to zero. Another possibility, however,
is that the government’s intervention produces no impact at all. Consider the
case in which the function u(F (θ))V (E) is convex and lies entirely above the identity
function, reflecting a situation in which the reward for custom abidance is quite
large. The equilibrium is the corner solution θ∗ = 1. It is quite possible in this
instance that a larger E, translated into a smaller u¯/V (E), will not succeed in
lowering the value of θ∗ below unity.
An interesting question is whether the government will optimally choose θ∗
in the range [0, 1], or θ∗ = 1, given a U-shape density function f(θ) where an
interior solution and a corner solution at θ∗ = 1 exist. The answer to that
question hinges upon a comparison between the sensitivity of the people to the
hostile pressure against the custom measured by E, that is, on the shape of
V (E), on the one hand, and the weight attached by the government to the
objective of fighting that custom, that is, the form of v (1− F (θ)), on the other
hand. When the former is large in relation to the latter, the government will
choose the undesirable corner solution while in the opposite case, it will choose
the interior solution where fewer people (less than the complete population)
8From the participation constraint: u(F (θ∗)) − θ∗V (E)=0 , we get that dθ∗
dE
=
θ∗V ′(E)
u′(.)f(θ∗)−V (E) . In order that dθ
∗/dE is negative, we need u′(.)f(θ∗) < V (E). Since
V (E) = u(.)/θ∗ according to the participation constraint, the condition can also be writ-
ten as u′(.)f(θ∗) < u(.)/θ∗, or, equivalently, u(.) > u′(.)f(θ∗)θ∗ This is identical to the
condition derived from the first-order condition of the principal’s maximisation problem.
93
FIGHTING AGAINST HARMFUL CUSTOMS
abide by the custom.9
The deterrence effect can also be studied in a framework that creates inter-
esting interactions between formal and informal enforcement. One of the most
recent examples is Acemoglu and Jackson (2015), where they focus on the role
of whistle-blowing by law-abiders as an instrument of law enforcement. In their
model, the norm is a continuous rather than dichotomous variable, and agents
have heterogeneous preferred behavior over the norm. The law sets a maximum
value of the tolerated behaviour of the individuals. The latter are assumed to
be randomly matched. In line with the social norm literature, a behaviour is a
social norm in the sense that an agent is better off if she matches her behavior
with the expected average behavior in the society. In the model, a law-breaker
can be detected in two different ways: by the state with a positive probability,
or by being whistle-blowed by the agent she has been randomly matched with,
if the latter is law-abiding. Whistle-blowing happens because the closer the
other agent’s behavior is to her own, the higher the law-abider’s utility. This
is done by denouncing the law-breaker who, once discovered, is forced to ad-
just his behaviour to the level allowed by the law. In this setting, and under
some conditions, laws which are too radical with respect to the existing social
norm can backfire, because there will be little whistle-blowing and then little
enforcement.
An alternative to the social norm (and coordination) framework consists of
assuming antagonistic preferences between alleged oppressors and victims of the
custom: the game is a rival claimants’s game. A first example of this setting is a
bargaining model in which two agents have diverging interests and the resulting
conflicts can be settled by appealing to the court. In this framework, the cost of
legal proceedings for the parties involved in the litigation represents the threat
point, so that a law more favourable to one of the parties will increase her
bargaining power and lead to a Nash bargaining position closer to her preferred
choice.
Assume that X stands for the value of a custom favourable to agent 1 and
harmful for agent 2. We call α the degree to which the customary rule is applied
(with α ∈ [0, 1]). Since agent 1, who earns αX, derives maximum benefit from
the full implementation of the custom, her preferred choice is α = 1. Agent 2
is in the opposite situation and her preferred choice is α = 0, implying that the
custom is not applied at all. If the conflict of interests is not settled informally,
it is referred to the court which always chooses the degree of implementation f .
Since the court is, by assumption, more favourable to the interests of agent 2,
the party victimised by the custom, we have that f < α. Think, for example,
of X as the amount of parental wealth and the custom as the rule governing
its distribution between a son and a daughter. Or X is the amount of wealth
of a deceased husband and the custom is the rule governing its distribution
between the widow and the in-laws (as assumed in Platteau and Wahhaj, 2014).
Functions V1 and V2 measure the utility obtained by each party from the share
9The proof of that result is not easy but can be obtained by analogy with the proof found
in Auriol and Platteau (2015) to which we explicitly refer below.
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of wealth received while (1 − α) and (1 − f) denote the shares accruing to
the daughter in the first example and to the widow in the second example,
respectively according to the custom and to the formal law. Finally, we assume
that C
1
and C2 represent costs, respectively for agents 1 and 2, of accessing
the formal court, including legal fees, and the delay in obtaining a decision. A
change in the formal law which gives the weaker party (the daughter or the
widow) a greater share of the wealth would improve her utility from the threat
point and lower that of the stronger party. In a large number of cases, this
would also improve her welfare from bargaining at the other party’ expense.
Too see this, write the Nash bargaining solution to the problem as:
α∗ = argmax0≤α≤1 [V1(αX)− (V1(fX)− C1)] [V2((1− α)X)− (V2((1− f)X − C2)] (5.3)
Assuming X = 1, , V ′i (.) > 0 and V ”i(.) ≤ 0, with i = 1, 2, the first-order
condition is given by:
V ′1 (α∗) [V2 (1− α∗)− V2(1− f) + C2]− V ′2 (1− α∗) [V1 (α∗)− V1(f) + C1] = 0
(5.4)
The derivative of (5.4) with respect to f gives the following expression:
∂α∗
∂f
= −V
′
1(α∗) [V ′2(1− f)]− V ′2(1− α∗) [−V ′1(f)]
G(α∗, f, C1, C2)
Since the numerator of the above expression is positive and G(.), the deriva-
tive of the FOC with respect to α∗, is negative in the solution to the bargaining
problem, we have that δα∗/δf > 0. Bearing in mind that a legal reform in
favour of agent 2 is reflected by a fall of f , this is seen to cause a decrease in
the share of agent 1, measured by α.
Some recent empirical works on the role of law in combatting harmful cus-
toms present evidence coherent with a bargaining framework. Deininger et al.
(2013) study the impact of the the introduction of the Hindu Succession Act in
India, which gives equal inheritance rights to women. They find that the like-
lihood of inheriting for a Hindu woman has increased, pointing at an effect of
the law (however, gender disparities persist). The outcome can be explained by
a bargaining model where the law improves women’s bargaining position with
respect to husbands and brothers concerning land inheritance. In Ethiopia,
Hallward-Driemeier and Gajigo (2015) exploit geographical variations in the
implementation of a new family law that granted more power to women: some
important dimensions of the law are that women do not need anymore the
spouse’s permission to work outside the house; husband’s administration of
marital property is changed into joint administration; divorce now requires the
consensus of both partners and not only of the husband; the age at marriage
increases to 18 for women. The law also affects traditional family arbitrators
(mainly men), who were the customary authority in charge of adjudicating cases
of divorce, leaving them with reconciliatory power while divorce may only be
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granted by formal courts. The authors find that the law affects both age at mar-
riage and (young) women’s occupational choice: the shares of women employed
in paid activities outside their home have significantly increased in the post-
reform period in the regions where the law was implemented. Age at marriage
for non-married women has also increased. The result is again compatible with
a growing bargaining power of women within the household due to a law-driven
shift in the threat point.
Theoretically, whichever factor affects women’s threat point can increase
their bargaining power in the negotiation over a custom. Such a factor does
not need to be linked to the custom itself. Take the case of domestic violence.
With respect to the US, Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) show that switching
from consensual to unilateral divorce law decreases violence within the mar-
riage. This is not only because violent marriage can more easily dissolve, but
because making the exit option less costly for women increases their credibil-
ity in threatening the end of the marriage. In other words, bargaining power
acquired through the changing law can improve women’s conditions in other di-
mensions that are not targeted by the law. In a study on Ethiopia, Kumar and
Quisumbing (2015) suggest that the interaction of the new family law discussed
above and the process of community land registration have contributed to im-
prove women’s conditions and increase gender equality. In different ways, both
reforms strengthen women’s property rights, increasing their overall bargaining
power within the household.
All these examples refer to legal interventions that directly or indirectly
affect women’s bargaining power vis-à-vis customs. There is however an ex-
tensive literature studying how economic factors can affect women’s bargaining
power and therefore contribute to the disappearence of unfair customs. As an
example, we will discuss the relation between domestic violence and income in
Section 5.6.
In the remainder of the present section, we want to mention two new theoret-
ical approaches to the problem of using the law with the purpose of combatting
noxious social norms or harmful customs. The first one uses the social norm
framework made explicit in Section 5.3 while the second one is based on a bar-
gaining argument. But both approaches share the similar feature that they give
an explicit role to informal, customary authorities. The first approach results
from a free adaptation and reinterpretation of the recent work of Auriol and
Platteau (2015) to the issue at hand. Formally, it is best understood as the com-
bination of a government’s objective function that is a refinement of 5.2, and
an agent’s behaviour akin to the partial model presented in Section 5.3. The
government’s utility is a positive function of the degree of progressive reforms
(or of the extent of measures taken against backward customs) and a negative
function of the wages paid to traditional leaders to obtain their compliance.
The ruler therefore resorts to a co-optation or seduction tactic so as to suppress
criticisms against anti-custom reforms. His chance of staying in power depends
upon the support of traditional leaders who are heterogeneous in their aversion
to progressive reforms (or, conversely, in their attachment to customs), mea-
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sured by θi. Traditional leaders trade off their support for the ruler’s reforms
(or, at least, their silence in the presence of these reforms) against material
privileges. The more attached they are to customs, the larger the material
compensations they require from the ruler. Assuming an interior solution in θ,
the problem of the government can then be written as follows:
max
E,w,θ
F (θ) [G(E)− w]
s.t. F (θ)w − θV (E) = 0,
where G′(E) > 0, G”(E) ≤ 0, w is the wage paid to each traditional leader,
and the other symbols have the same meaning as before.
In such a setting, the ruler may choose to pay sufficiently high wages to
enlist the support of the entire group of traditional leaders, including those in-
trinsically most averse to reforms (in this case, he opts for a corner solution). If
that tactic is too costly, the ruler will stop short of seeking the full support of
traditional leadership (he chooses an interior solution). Whether smaller com-
pensations to traditional leaders are associated with more or fewer progressive
reforms cannot be predicted without an additional assumption regarding the
shape of the function representing the cost of reforms for these leaders. An
important result concerns the way the shape of the distribution of θi affects the
intensity of reforms chosen by the government. In particular, it comes out that
more progressive reforms are undertaken when traditional leadership is quite
homogeneous in terms of attitudes towards customs (the distribution of θi is
unimodal or single-peaked) than when it is split along the θ-axis. In the next
section, we will present a remarkable illustration of this theoretical result.
In the second approach developed by Aldashev et al. (2012a; 2012b), the
custom is no more given but is chosen by a traditional authority. This authority
is intrinsically conservative, implying that it is in favour of the custom that pro-
tects the interests of traditional elite groups, say men. However, it may consider
the possibility of reducing the retrograde character of the custom because it is
also sensitive to its social influence and local power, which itself depends on its
jurisdictional domain. In turn, the size of its jurisdiction is determined by the
number of local residents who seek and abide by its judgement when a conflict
arises. This is where the statutory law performs its role. By assumption, it
is more progressive than the custom and, therefore, people disadvantaged by
the custom may be induced to appeal to the modern court which applies the
law. Yet, they will actually do it only if the better judgement obtained in the
court exceeds the cost of circumventing the customary authority (or ignoring
its judgement), which includes not only the cost of going to the court but also
that of calling the traditional authority into question.
A central result of this second approach is what the authors have called the
“magnet effect of the law”: a more progressive law may induce the traditional
authority to change the custom in the same direction. Although the custom
will not move as far as the law, the important point is that the custom is
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transformed to the benefit of the disadvantaged sections of the population. In
this way, indeed, even the victims who choose to stay within the traditional
jurisdiction will benefit from the legal reform, albeit indirectly. The underlying
mechanism is the following: by improving the exit opportunity available to these
sections, the law enhances their bargaining strength. Their members can now
threaten to appeal to the modern court and the customary authority, which
acts strategically, changes the custom to prevent the threat from being carried
out.
Another challenging result is that too radical a law may defeat its purpose
in the sense that the interests of the intended beneficiaries (say, the women)
may be eventually harmed rather than promoted by the legal intervention. The
mechanism, here, is different from the one at work in the aforementioned study
of Acemoglu and Jackson (2015). If the law is too radical, many members of
the victimised group may decide to leave the community, thereby causing a loss
in the welfare of the poorer ones who are staying behind. Another plausible
mechanism becomes evident once the model is refined by allowing modern judges
to behave in a way similar to that of the customary authority. More precisely,
the modern judges now have their own, intrinsic and idiosyncratic preferences
about the law and, in deciding about the actual settlement of a case, they
balance the cost of departing from their preferred outcome if they were to
implement the law strictly against the benefit of doing what they are supposed
to do, that is, to apply the law (they obtain a positive utility from law abidance).
There exists a threshold value of the statutory law above which a judge will stop
passing judgements prescribed by it and will start to follow her own preferred
judgement. Because of the heterogeneity of the judges, there are as many such
thresholds as there are values of the preferred judgement among the modern
judges. Given these assumptions, it is possible that a radical law will deter
a significant proportion of the judges from applying it strictly so that these
judges will now choose to provide judgements according to their own, more
conservative preferences. The authors show rigorously that the overall effect
may be to decrease the expected judicial outcome for the disadvantaged people
whom the law seeks to protect (Aldashev et al., 2012b).
Note that the same argument can be actually applied to modern law en-
forcers. Legal enforcers have a preference for enforcing the legal verdict, which
is their formal duty, but suffer a loss of utility increasing in the distance be-
tween this verdict and their preferred outcome. If the distance becomes too
large, they stop enforcing the law (Platteau and Wahhaj, 2014, p.659). Such a
line of reasoning has been persuasively followed by Kahan (2000) on the basis
of US evidence. According to him, the resistance of law enforcers sometimes
confounds the efforts of law makers to change social norms. For example, as
legislators (in the United States) expand liability for date rape, domestic vi-
olence, sexual harassment, drugs, and drunk driving, not only do prosecutors
become less likely to charge, jurors to convict, and judges to sentence severely
(our second line of argument), but also the police become less likely to ar-
rest the culprits and enforce the legal verdicts. The conspicuous resistance of
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these decision-makers in turn reinforces the norms that law makers intended
to change. Kahan concludes that the pathology of ‘sticky norms’ can be sur-
mounted if law makers apply ‘gentle nudges’ rather than ‘hard shoves’. When
the law embodies a relatively mild degree of condemnation, the desire of most
decision-makers to discharge their civic duties will override their reluctance to
enforce a law that attacks a widespread social norm.
In their works, the authors of the “magnet effect” theory have provided
a number of illustrations in support of their approach. Interestingly, most of
these examples deal with issues of gender, with a particular focus on inheritance
practices in poor countries of Asia and SubSaharan Africa. It is worth noting
that, in the above-mentioned empirical studies pointing at an effect of legal
reforms on customary practices, the presence of a “magnet effect” cannot be
ruled out and may actually be part of the bargaining argument invoked by
their authors.
5.5 Changing preferences
A limitation of all the models reviewed above is that they rely on the trans-
parency and the credibility of the legal intervention: to change expectations,
agents must not only be reasonably well informed about the content of the law,
but they must also believe that other agents will also expect the law to be effec-
tive. The latter requirement means that payoffs will not be changed unless the
threat of punishment for law-breaking is credible. It is nonetheless a known fact
that laws that criminalize customary practices and protect human rights often
remain dead letters. This is especially true for developing countries where the
legal system is weak, and it is also true whenever laws are introduced under se-
vere international pressure but without a true committment by the government
to implement them. Thus, when in Senegal the law to ban FGC was voted,
the MP who introduced the bill in the parliament hinted that the government
will not really apply the law (Hecht (1999) quoted in Shell-Duncan et al., 2013,
p.817). Enforcing the law could be quite effective if the organisation in charge
is able to punish violations in another, interlinked game where ample benefits
accrue to people. This mechanism could have been used by the Grameen Bank,
for example, since the granting of its loans could be conditioned on the willing-
ness of parents to forsake the payment of dowries and the early marriage (before
the age of 17) of their daughters, as mentioned by La Ferrara (2011, p.120). In
reality, however, and much like what happened in the aforementioned case of
the Senegalese law banning FGC, this provison amounted to no more than a
simple recommendation to the Bank’s clients (Yunus, 1999, pp.135-137).
It is interesting to remark that the analytics of the previous sections is not
entirely helpless regarding the government’s credibility issue. As a matter of
fact, a low commitment of the government can be represented in the model
expounded at the beginning of Section 5.4 since the weight attached by the
government to fighting the custom is then small with the expected consequence
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that the whole population continues to follow the custom10.
An additional limitation of legal interventions is that they do not necessarily
change the perceptions that right-holders have of themselves. A law can protect
a woman against domestic violence, but if the victim does not perceive herself
as such and as a right-holder, it is quite likely that she will not be able to escape
violence.
The process through which victims of unfair customs can change the percep-
tion they have of themselves is therefore a crucial element in achieving change
through a social engineering approach. They must first realise that they are the
victims of a discriminatory treatment and, in a second step, that they have the
right to be in a better situation (Merry, 2009; Nussbaum, 2000, p.140). The
problem is that individuals tend to internalise and appropriate the system of
values they live in whereas no change can take place if the status quo is not
called into question. Coming back to the example of domestic violence, avail-
able data in 2012 show that 29% of women in countries with data on this topic
considered that wife beating is justified when the wife is arguing against the
husband, 25% when she refuses sex, and 21% when she burns food. In Ethiopia,
81% of women justified wife beating for at least one of these reasons (World
Bank, 2012, p.84). Under these conditions, it is difficult for any legal interven-
tion to be effective, since those whom the law seeks to protect do not consider
themselves as victims.
For social change to happen, a process of awareness-building must clearly
take place so that women, or other victimised groups, develop their capacity
to aspire and exert voice (Appadurai, 2004). We focus here on the social norm
setting described in Section 5.3 and explore the role of preference changes.
In order to facilitate the discussion of the effect of the shape of distribution
f(θ), we start by considering an initial situation in which f(θ) is U-shaped.
With respect to the utility function Ui = u (F (θ)) − θiV (E), we assume that
the positive component of people’s utility is a linear and strictly proportional
function u (F (θ)) = aF (θ), and that E is set in such a way that V (E) = a
(with a constant). Since we want E to be fixed, it is immaterial how we set its
value. We then have that the u(F (θ))V (E) function is transformed into the cumulative
distribution function F (θ). In Figure 5.2a, the intersection point between the
transformed function and the identity function may therefore be interpreted
as an equilibrium (In this instance, as it should be, the function is equal to
zero when θ = 0 and to one when θ = 1). We know that this equilibrium is
stable. To suppress the custom entirely, what is required is a shift from that
interior equilibrium to the corner equilibrium (0, 0). Since the latter is not
a stable equilibrium accessible with the initial distribution f(θ), the shape of
that distribution has to be altered. If the transformation results in a cumulative
distribution function that has the shape depicted by the dotted curve in Figure
5.2a, the shift will occur and the harmful custom will disappear. Concretely
10Assume that the positive component of government’s utility, v (1− F (θ∗)), has the fol-
lowing specific form: v = W (1− F (θ∗))β , where W is a constant and 0 < β < 1. A
government with a low (high) credibility is then represented by a low (high) value of W .
100
CHAPTER 5. ERADICATING WOMEN-HURTING CUSTOMS
and in full accordance with intuition, this means that a bunch of people who
initially had a relatively low aversion to the custom must become more averse
so that they move rightwards on the CDF. The move must be important enough
to ensure that the F (θ) curve does not anymore lie above the 45° degree line
even in the range close to θ = 0.
Returning to the example of domestic violence (and assuming that the prac-
tice crucially depends on the number of people following it), the implication is
that individuals who tend to consider the practice as legitimate should be tar-
geted in any awareness-raising campaign. The problem is that they may also
be the most difficult to persuade of the desirability of a behavioural change.
Much easier, as many NGOs have experienced, is to work among women with
a moderate aversion to the harmful custom. As is evident from Figure 5.2b,
changing the attitudes of people located to the immediate left neighbourhood
of A will cause a shift of equilibrium from A to A′. This is of course a much
more modest move than the one envisaged in Figure 5.2a, but it may turn out
to be the only one feasible at least in the short or medium term.
0 θ
F (θ)
A
0.5
A’
(a) Targeting agents with low θ
0 θ
F (θ)
A
A’
(b) Targeting agents with medium-high θ
Figure 5.2: Examples of changing preferences
Note that a different initial distribution of preferences would lead to different
predictions in terms of identification of the people whose preferences should be
moved. Consider the case of a logistic or a normal distribution with two possible
equilibria, one where everybody follows the custom and the other where nobody
does (see Figure 5.1c). To transform such a game in a way that only the (0, 0)
equilibrium is accessible, people to the center-right of the distribution, that
is people with medium-high aversion to the custom, should be targeted for
preference change. In this case, moving people with low aversion to the custom
would not radically affect the equilibrium outcome.
There is another way to read the above figures if some individuals are more
important than others. Instead of defining P , at equilibrium, as the proportion
of people that abide by the custom, we alternatively define it as a weighted sum
of the individuals who adopt it (and the same weights apply to F (θ)). Look
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at the case where some of the individuals whose preferences matter more are
strongly in favour of the custom. In Figure 5.2a, the equilibrium proportion
of custom-followers is no more 50 percent as it was when every individual had
the same weight. It is now much smaller than 50 percent. As a consequence,
to move from the continuous to the dashed line in Figure 5.2a, a smaller mass
of individuals needs be targeted than when the preferences of all agents are
equally weighed.
Empirically, the role of “opinion leaders” in facilitating change has been
studied in different domains such as technological adoption and health educa-
tion. The challenge is to be able to identify those opinion leaders and target
them, which can be seen as trying to define the network structure that mat-
ters for a specific innovation. An insightful illustration is provided by Blaydes
and Platas Izama (2015) who have studied recent changes in FGC prevalence
in Egypt. One of their most striking observations is the contrast between the
perceptible decrease of the practice among the Copts and the rather unchanged
situation among the Muslims. The authors tentatively explain this situation by
the different religious authority structures prevailing in the two communities:
whereas an hierarchical order prevails among the Copts, the Muslims are used
to a much more decentralised system. More precisely, there exists a centralised
Coptic Church that exerts a significant influence on the believers and its leaders
have chosen to take a clear stand against FGC. Muslims go to mosques that are
run by different imams who have themselves varying opinions about FGC. This
example is an apt illustration of the aforementioned prediction of the theory
of Auriol and Platteau (2015) according to which more progressive reforms can
be undertaken with a homogeneous traditional leadership (possibly regrouped
into a centralised structure) than with a heterogeneous one (represented by
decentralised clerics).
Another relevant study that also deals with FGC is that of Diabate and
Mesple-Somps (2014). An interesting result that they have obtained is the fol-
lowing: Malian migrants to non-FGC countries play an important role in influ-
encing decisions about FGC when they come back to their village (the authors
attempt to control for selection into migration and return-migration). Having
observed behaviour in a non-FGC country, they come home with changed opin-
ions on the custom and they eventually become important vectors of change.
In Sourif, a small Palestinian market town not far from Hebron in Cisjorda-
nia, a young woman called Ayah Baradeya was murdered by her uncle on the
grounds that she entertained ‘improper relations’ with a university comrade
who wanted to marry her. The discovery of her dead body one year later (May
2011) aroused a wave of angry reactions among the local community. The im-
portant point is that one brother of Ayah, an educated young man, played a key
role in the protest movement and succeeded in persuading his family to forsake
its customary right to impose a collective punishment on the whole murderer’s
family (expulsion from the area) in revenge for the crime. He and his close
friends and collaborators also used the opportunity to convince their village
community and neighbouring communities as well to change an erstwhile prac-
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tice that harmed the people. Following massive street demonstrations (first in
Sourif, then in Hebron and Ramallah) and protests via internet, the Palestinian
Authority eventually decided to rescind a law which punished honour crimes
very leniently. It is interesting to observe that earlier initiatives to change the
criminal code ended in failure owing to the strong objections of powerful con-
servative members of the Palestinian Parliament who themselves belong to big
patriarchal families.11
5.6 The role of economic environment
In the previous sections, we presented two different social engineering approaches
to harmful customs and their underlying theoretical foundations: legal inter-
ventions and sensitization aimed at changing the victims’ preferences.
One of the risks of the actual focus on the social engineering approach, and
of the human rights discourse in particular, is to associate harmful customs to
a given “culture” or “identity”, often wrongly seen as fixed over time (Merry,
2003a). Harmful customs are the results of particular socio-economic contexts.
Even if they tend to be sticky and survive to mutated economic conditions,
they can over time be modified and abandoned following changes in the macro-
economic environment: technological, economic or demographic changes can
affect the individual-decision making process concerning harmful customs 12.
The effects of a changing environment are easily elucidated with the help
of theoretical approaches that have been already discussed. Thus, in the social
norm framework, a change in the environment that is favourable to the demise
of a harmful custom can be represented as an increase in the cost of following it
(an exogenous increase in E). In a simple bargaining framework, it is conceptu-
alised as an improvement in the victims’ exit opportunities that enhances their
bargaining strength. Such a representation also applies to the “magnet effect”
theory. Interestingly, the authors of the latter have shown that the effect on the
custom of expanded outside economic opportunities for the victims is formally
analogous to the effect of a more progressive legislation. This analogy is not
surprising since the operating mechanism is the same whether the triggering
factor is a change in the statutory law or in the scope of outside opportunities,
i.e., the conferring of increased bargaining power upon the weakest party.
Other mechanisms depicting the effects of changing environments are, of
11The event was reported in the French newspaper Le Monde (19th May 2011). The title
of the article is “L’indignation d’un village palestinien met fin à l’indulgence pour les crimes
d’honneur”.
12In this section we focus on how technological changes can move harmful customs. It
is worth mentioning however that the two can be complements rather than substitutues:
Ashraf et al. (2014) find that projets of school construction in Indonesia and Zambia increase
school enrollement for girls belonging to ethnic groups which practice bride price. No effect
is observed for girls from ethnic groups where such a custom does not exist. One possible
explanation is given by the positive correlation found between bride price and educational
atteinement of a woman. In this context, bride price seems to favor girls’ education, and any
attempt to eradicate the practice should take this dimension into account.
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course, possible. For example, Doepke and Tertilt (2009) construct a theoretical
argument according to which technological change can explain the expansion
of women’s economic rights (in the absence of a change in women’s political
rights). Under the assumptions that men are altruistic towards their children
and women care relatively more about the children’s education, men may be
willing to give economic rights to women13. In their model, when technological
change enhances the importance of human capital, men have more incentives
to grant rights to women, therefore facilitatating human capital accumulation.
Turning to the empirical evidence, let us start by the practice of FGC which
we have mentioned on several occasions. The recent emphasis on FGC as a
social norm - and therefore on coordination - has at least partially originated
from the parallel between this custom and footbinding in China. As accounted
in Mackie (1996), footbinding can be interpreted as a social convention: the
act of binding the feet of a girl signals her good qualities, such as modesty.
Not doing it in a context where everybody follows the practice would leave
the girl unmarried. Appeared in the Sung dynasty (960-1279) and “spread
by imitation until people were ashamed not to practice it”, it became normal
practice by the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) and lasted for no less than 1,000
years (Mackie, 1996, p.1001). It suddenly ended during the years culminating
in the 1911-1912 revolution. Mackie argues that the central factor behind the
rapid disappearance of footbinding consisted of the campaigning efforts of the
natural-foot movement identified with liberal modernizers and women’s rights
advocates. By analogy, FGC could be fought in the same way (pp. 1013-14).
Another explanation of the demise of footbinding nevertheless exists in the
anthropological literature. Gates and others (Gates, 2001; Bossen et al., 2011;
Brown et al., 2012) thus emphasise the importance of quickly changing eco-
nomic conditions during the twentieth century. They see that custom as part of
an economic system that depended on women’s intensive labor, in particular in
the textile sector: binding feet forced girls to become sedentary and start at an
early age domestic activities such as spinning and weaving and other handwork
for whose products there was a high demand. More importantly, they argue
that footbiding declined when industrial textile production - more efficient and
cheaper - developed on a large scale, which undermined the competitiveness of
women’s artisanal, home-based production. Using quantitative and qualitative
data collected in different rural areas of China, they find suggestive evidence
that the presence of footbinding coincided with the presence of sendentary eco-
nomic activities for women14. Furthermore, the timing of its demise corresponds
13While they would prefer not to give rights to their wives, they care about others men’s
wives. The reasons are the following. First, because they want their own daughters, for
whom they care, to have stronger bargaining power with respect to their future husband.
Second, stronger bargaining power of women within a household will increase investment in
the children’s human capital: since fathers care about the quality of their children’s future
spouses, therefore they want the bargaining power of their children’s future mothers-in-law
to increase.
14In Fujian, in the south-eastern part of China, different counties presented heterogeneity
both in the incidence of footbinding and the type of activities available for women. In Tong’an,
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to the emergence of industrially produced textile products on the local markets.
Returning to FGC, the practice has often been analysed as an investment in
the girl for the marriage market. If this is true, FGC could be replaced by an al-
ternative investment in the girl’s education. As a matter of fact, it is negatively
correlated with education virtually in all the countries where it is practiced
(Wagner, 2015). Even though the causality of this relationship has not yet
been established, the correlation suggests that changes in the labour/education
market can affect the custom.
To underline the potential role of economic factors in the decline of these
two customs does not exclude that they can be interpreted as marriageability
conventions: a girl’s footbinding could signal her “economic” value. The fact
remains that massive technological changes could have played a crucial role
in causing the abrupt decline of the practice and could play a similar role for
FGC. In other words, expectations regarding others’ behaviour might not be
the only driving force behind these customs. The same is true for early (and
forced) marriage, another custom which has negative consequences on women’s
health and well-being and which, in some cases, has also been interpreted as a
social norm giving rise to a coordination problem. In India, Maertens (2013)
finds that the ideal age at marriage shapes parents’ educational aspirations
for their daughters, controlling for the expected returns to education. She
therefore suggests that closing the gender gap on the labour market might
not be enough to increase women’s education attainement: marriage norms
should also be changed to make them less binding. In Senegal, Tostan and
other NGOs have thus used public pledges as commitment devices to end both
FGC and early marriage. Yet, the effectiveness of this approach regarding early
marriage in particular remains to be demonstrated. There is some evidence that
economic factors can also influence age at marriage: in Zimbabwe, Hoogeveen
et al. (2003) find that negative idyosincratics shocks to livestocks decreases age
at marriage for unmarried daughters. The family of the groom traditionally pays
a bride price in cattle, which is an important agricultural asset. A decrease in
livestock can then push families to marry daughters as an insurance motive. In
India, in rice-growing areas, a positive rainfall shock delays marriage for girls,
whose labour productivity increases (Mbiti, 2008): this suggests that increasing
women’s productivity could have positive impact on age at marriage.
Customary rules governing marriage are also liable to change under the
pressure of evolving economic or demographic conditions. A striking illustration
of this possibility rests on anecdotal yet insightful evidence (Economist, April
2015) It concerns inter-caste marriage restrictions, ranging from prohibitions of
all unions between people of different castes to restrictions of marriage between
where weaving and spanning persisted over time and there was little agricultural land, 32%
of living informant have been bounded during their life (92% of their mothers). In Hua’an
county, where textile activities have been replaced by portrage, only 17% of living informant
have been bounded (against 91% of their mother). In the interviewed villages in Nanjng, 9%
of the informant and 56% of their mothers experienced footbinding: this was a poor area,
with little spinning and weaving and where women were employed in agricultural activities
(Gates, 2001).
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people of the same village. In north-western India, these rules are laid down by
informal local councils known as khaps, and they are strictly enforced by them,
if needed by resorting to honour killings. While these customs have been in force
for five centuries, even when they were declared illegal by the Supreme Court
of India, they have recently been called into question. Thus, in April 2014,
the Satrol khap, the largest in Haryana, relaxed its ban on inter-caste marriage
and made it easier for villagers to marry among their neighbours. The cause
behind this rather surprising decision was the declining male-female sex ratio
in the state (114 males of all ages for every 100 females in Haryana), which
made marriage increasingly difficult for men. In the eyes of the customary
authorities, a conflict thus arose between two aspects of their traditions: inter-
caste and other marriage prohibitions and the associated value of purity, on the
one hand, and marriage as a source of identity and manhood, on the other hand.
In choosing to relax the former, the khaps aim at keeping the latter tradition
alive.
Preference for sons is also defined as a harmful custom against women and
it has been widely studied in economics. One of its causes is the smaller “eco-
nomic” value, and, therefore, the lower status, of women relative to men in
some societies (Sen, 1992). A change in women’s economic opportunities - and
therefore in their valuation within the household - can affect the birth sex ratio
in favour of the girls. Qian (2008) shows, for example, that an economic reform
in post-Mao China, which had the effect of raising women’s income, led to an
increase in the survival rates for girls. That reform consisted of an increase in
the relative price of tea which benefited women who play a major role in tea
plucking. As stated above, however, customs tend to evolve more slowly than
economic conditions and we cannot rule out the possibility that demographic
changes interact badly with the preference-for-son custom. This is the central
point made by Jayachandran (2014) with respect to India. Her argument is that
a decline in the fertility rate may actually worsen female-to-male birth ratios if
a norm of son’s preference is present. Indeed, the desire to have a son combined
with the desire to have fewer children may well intensify the use of sex-selective
abortion.
Regarding the relation between domestic violence against women and in-
come, the evidence is contrasted. Some studies point at a negative correlation
between domestic violence and income or wealth (Agarwal and Panda, 2007).
Other studies, however, tend to find the opposite relation (Anderson and Geni-
cot, 2015; Luke and Munshi, 2011): within a intra-household bargaining frame-
work, an increase in female income can indeed enhance women’s bargaining
power but, as a consequence, tensions and violence between spouses can be
escalating. In this sense, it is useful to think of customs as being both the ob-
jects of bargaining and as constraints that shape the bargaining process itself,
defining the limit of what can be bargained over (Agarwal, 1997). Interventions
which combine activities to improve women’s economic conditions with sensiti-
zation on gender issues could potentially diminish the risk of domestic violence
caused by the changing power relations within the household (Kim et al., 2007).
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Two final remarks need to be made before moving to the last stage of our
analysis. First, as our above example from Haryana shows, customs may have
to be considered simultaneously rather than separately. This necessity arises
when customs are interlinked, giving rise to the possibility that customs which
were compatible with each other cease to be so as a consequence of changes
in the environment. The consistency of the traditional system of rules is then
disrupted, and the transformation or disapperance of one custom may be the
only way to preserve another custom. The good scenario unfolds if the former
(the banning of inter-caste marriages in our example) is a harmful practice while
the latter (universal marriage) is not.
Another illustration of the interlinked nature of some customs is directly
relevant to the main argument presented in this section. It is indeed obvious
that expansion of outside opportunities for women can increase their bargaining
strength only if they are allowed to participate in the labour market, which
requires that norms or customs limiting women’s economic or physical mobility
(such as women’s seclusion rules in parts of India and the Muslim world) are
modified or abandoned. In other words, the impact of new outside opportunities
on some customs (say, patriarchal rules ensuring submission of wife to husband
in a series of matters) is conditional on the relaxing of a particular norm. The
demise of that critical norm may be facilitated by hard economic conditions that
compel parents or husbands to accept that women work outside their home on
a regular basis. Or, as assumed in the theory of the “magnet effect”, the same
norm is undermined by the fact that women can threaten to leave the family
space on a more or less permanent basis. In such cases, men may feel helpless
and give in to the demand of their daughters or wives.
The second remark is rather straightforward. In the discussion of this sec-
tion, we have assumed that expansion of outside opportunities for women is an
exogenous force, say because it results from the endogenous evolution of the
economy. In actual fact, however, these opportunities may well be promoted
by public agencies and voluntary organisations in a deliberate and purposeful
manner. To put it otherwise, public action may aim at fighting against obnox-
ious customs in a roundabout way rather than through direct means. Precisely
because public action operating through the labour market does not confront
customary ways of living head-on, it can avoid the counter-productive effects
that may be caused by legal reforms and information or sensitisation campaigns.
We now turn our attention to the mechanism liable to yield these unintended
effects of policies generally associated with the social engineering approach, the
legal approach in particular.
5.7 The role of culture
In all the foregoing sections, the role of culture has been overlooked: in the
social norm approach, the focus is on people’s desire to conform while in the
bargaining and the “magnet effect” approaches it is placed on the determi-
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nants of women’s bargaining strength, including the statutory law and outside
economic opportunities. This is ignoring that social norms and customs are
typically embedded in a local culture from which they derive their symbolic
meaning. It is this embedding that makes them part of a community-centered
rather than an individual-centered system of values, and that accounts for the
deep link between custom-following behaviour and expression of identity. Vio-
lating the custom might therefore have wider consequences than what a purely
rational view stressing conventional cost-benefit calculus would suggest. These
effects can nevertheless be predicted in the light of the approaches presented in
Sections 5.3 to 5.5.
In the social norm approach, a natural way to think about the “identity
effect” is to represent communities where traditional identity is strong as sets of
individuals clustered around low values of θ. People strongly attached to their
traditional mores have a low aversion toward harmful customs which are seen
as an ingredient of their culture. Therefore, they are little inclined to depart
from their customary habits.
In the bargaining and “magnet effect” approaches, on the other hand, the
cost of appealing to the modern court system is explicitly modeled. Since it
includes non-material costs such as guilt feelings arising from going against
the will of one’s community, stronger community ties tend to make the cost of
appealing large and, hence, to discourage the questioning of customary norms.
The same consequence arises if severe punishment against norm-breaking (also
explicitly modeled in the “magnet effect” approach) also results from strong
community ties.
It is worth providing a few illustrations of the aforementioned effects.
The example of FGC again seems appropriate. In Senegal, particularly in
the Senegal river valley where Fulani or Toucouleur communities have pow-
erful identity feelings based on their traditional culture, attempts to change
customs, such as that of cutting girls, are strongly resented. Negative reactions
are pervaded by the fear of Westernisation of the local cultures (O’Neill, 2011,
chapter 7). FGC is thus regarded as a cultural trait, or as a symbolic aspect
of a traditional culture that stands on its own in the face of outside influences
and pressures. It is identity-defining, and circumcision is seen as part of the
initiation process that leads girls into genuine and moral womanhood (Gruen-
baum, 2001; O’Neill, 2011) When this happens, ‘outside’ attempts to eradicate
the practice are perceived as an act of cultural aggression. Thus, laws banning
FGC are seen as imposed by the Western world and arouse cultural resistance.
Hence statements such as «They want us to be like them», or «We will not let
our culture be destroyed» (Shell-Duncan et al., 2013, p.830).
In Egypt, where FGC is overwhelmingly dominant, there has been an intense
debate about the introduction of a law criminalizing FGC. The government was
trapped between international pressure and popular support for the practice
(Boyle Heger et al., 2001), usually justified in terms of tradition, control over
women’s sexual desire, and cleanness (Assaad, 1980). More generally, clashing
interpretations regarding the meaning of FGC can lead practicing communities
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to strongly resent attempts to eradicate the custom. The Western description of
FGC as a mutilation which ensures patriarchal control over women’s bodies and
sexuality contrasts with the widespread perception among these communities
that FGC does not affect marital sexual life (Fahmy et al., 2010; Shell-Duncan
and Hernlund, 2000). In this perspective, the criminalisation of FGC is easily
seen as a manifestation of blunt Western imperialism.
In the light of the above, it is not surprising that NGOs which are heav-
ily involved in sensitisation work strive to persuade villagers that the harmful
practice is separable from their cultural makeup. Efforts to fight againts FGC
should not therefore be seen as an attack on the local culture. Our personal
field observations (in October 2012) have shown that entry into strongly tradi-
tional communities is quite hard for external agencies and may even prove to
be infeasible. The latter was true in the Fulani communities around the south-
ern Senegalese town of Medinha-Gounas which are ruled by a puritan Islamist
brotherhood (the Tijane) led by a powerful maraboutic family. Indeed, Tostan
and other NGOs were denied access to this area on the ground that they were
trying to destroy or subvert the local culture.
That strong community ties backed by deep-rooted identity feelings easily
lead to high costs of appealing to modern courts is evident from the following
example. In 1985, the government of Ghana enacted a new inheritance law,
known as PNDC Law 111. This law was designed to regulate practices of
intestate succession in favour of the wives and children of a deceased man,
particularly among people (the Akans) governed by a matrilineal system15.
The nuclear family thus became the focus of succession, which explains why
Law 111 appeared to many to be “an attack on customary law” (Josiah-Aryeh,
2008, p.29). The take-up rate of litigation has been quite low, which tends to be
attributed to women’s perception of the high cost of a legal recourse, typically
the fear of severe sanctions in the form of separation from their children, ejection
from their house, and loss of valuable family and clan relationships (Gedzi (2009,
p.16-17); see also Benneh et al. (1995); Fenrich and Higgins (2001)). Due to
“fear of spiritual reprisals from the family, family and community pressure and
the strong moral sense not to wash the family linen in public”, they are reluctant
to take the family members of their deceased husband to the formal courts when
these members infringe on their inheritance rights Gedzi (2009, p.27). In short,
most disputants prefer to solve their cases in local informal settings than in the
formal court. This is not only because the procedure is less adversarial in these
settings, centered on reconciliation and repair of damaged relationships, but also
because reporting local affairs before an outside agency generally arouses the
grave accusation of betrayal of the community and the family. Interestingly,
the few women who seek formal litigation to defend their rights are strong
characters, often with a comparatively high level of education (and outside
option), and ready to defy the social pressure and threats emanating from the
extended family.
In a field study on female domestic violence in the Hawai’i, Merry (2003b)
15The example is taken from Platteau and Wahhaj (2014).
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analyses the complex process through which battered women develop, or fail
to develop, a (human) rights-defined self with respect to violence. The implied
shift in identity requires to move away from a sense of self based on family, kin
and community to one relying on state protection. It is moreover argued that,
until the end of the whole prosecuting process, support by formal institutions
(police, court etc), and by family and friends, are important determinants of a
victim’s ability to pursue the charges against the abuser. Local women’s shelters
and support groups also turn out to play a crucial role in forging the new sense
of identity and in raising the victims’ use of the legal tool.
5.8 Conclusion
How to fight against harmful customs is a complex issue that has attracted re-
newed interest during the last decades, particularly when the so-called human
rights approach came to center stage. Economic analysis can be quite useful
to clarify a number of aspects related to this issue, especially so because that
approach involves social engineering. In actual fact, the dominant model in the
minds of the proponents of the new approach corresponds to a well-known game
of strategic interactions: a coordination game with multiple (Nash) equilibria
which are not equivalent in social efficiency terms. It provides a strong ratio-
nale for the enacting of pro-women laws whose expressive effect should cause
the socially efficient outcome to replace the bad outcome represented by the
harmful custom. Unfortunately, things are not so simple, and there is little em-
pirical evidence supporting the coordination story. The most naïve underlying
assumption is the idea that all the people dislike the custom and follow it only
because they hold pessimistic expectations about others’ behaviour.
Much more realistic is the alternative assumption that people have different
preferences regarding the desirability of the custom. Allowing for preference
heterogeneity complicates the problem quite a bit: the impact of the law now
depends critically on the distribution of individual preferences, even if we re-
strict our attention to its “expressive” function. If the distribution is bimodal
with many people strongly averse to the custom and many people strongly sup-
porting it, or if the distribution is uniform, just enacting a pro-women law will
be of no avail since the (stable) equilibrium is unique. By contrast, when many
people have a moderate aversion to the custom, the law can possibly act as a
new focal point with the effect of destroying the harmful custom.
To eradicate oppressive social norms, interventions aimed at modifying indi-
vidual preferences or payoffs may therefore be required. Modifying preferences
is typically not done with the help of legal means. It requires the intervention
of non-governmental organisations operating at the grassroots level and/or the
staging of nationwide awareness campaigns. The purpose of these actions is
to make people aware that they are the victims of a discriminatory treatment
and that they are entitled to be in a better situation. Again, it is probably
too much to expect that a radical departure from the bad customary habit will
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result from them. Given the difficulty of converting the most ardent supporters
of the custom, it is reasonable to bank on its partial rather than its complete
abandonment.
Modifying payoffs can be achieved either through a legislative process or
through economic policies. In the former case, violation of legal prescriptions
must trigger sufficiently severe sanctions, which implies not only that punish-
ment is sufficiently severe and actually meted out, but also that the detecting
of violations is sufficiently effective. Or, alternatively, quasi-legal means may
be used, such as when public agencies create a ‘shaming’ environment that in-
creases the cost of following the custom. The impact of these interventions
may be the total or the partial disappearance of the custom, or it may be nil
depending upon the initial distribution of the preferences.
Payoffs can also be modified as a result of economic policies, or endogenous
economic processes, that have the effect of expanding economic opportunities
for the victimised sections of the population, or of changing the costs of fol-
lowing the custom. A great advantage of this approach, compared to the legal
approach, lies in the fact that, being indirect, it avoids a head-on confrontation
with the tradition and the identity-defining culture in which it is embedded.
Changes appear to be imposed by abstract forces that are beyond the con-
trol of customary authorities, and they better allow for face-saving among the
upholders of tradition. The opposite happens when pro-women lawmaking is
clearly inspired, or influenced, by the universalistic norms and values originated
in the Western world.
Instead of examining the role of outside economic opportunities within a
social norm (and coordination) framework, we can use the lens of a bargaining
setup in which the oppressors (men) and the victims (women) have antago-
nistic preferences. Outside economic opportunities then appear as conferring
enhanced bargaining strength upon women. But legal reforms can be analysed
as another way to increase their negotiating power, and it has in fact been shown
that the effect of pro-women laws on oppressive customs is formally analogous
to that of new economic opportunities available to women (Aldashev et al.,
2012b; Platteau and Wahhaj, 2014). The idea is that in both cases women can
threaten to exit from the traditional judicial domain and escape the rule of the
associated customary authority: they either appeal directly to the formal court
system, or they seize economic opportunities outside their home and in this way
hopefully place themselves under the purview of the same system.
The interesting point is that, in a bargaining framework, legal reforms
and the development of outside economic opportunities generate similar effects
which can be added up. Since the two strategies are substitutes, one strategy
can be used in preference to the other if circumstances (not allowed for in the
model) make either strategy relatively difficult to implement. Two main limi-
tations thus jeopardise the success of the legal reform strategy. First, if the law
needs to yield a deterring effect, and not only an expressive effect, it must be
credible, implying that the court system works impartially and effectively. Sec-
ond, almost by definition, it involves a head-on confrontation with traditional
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culture (see above).
On the other hand, the major limitation of the economic approach is that,
in order to work, it must be the case that women are able to move, or threaten
to move, to locations outside their home where new economic opportunities are
available. Seclusion norms can precisely prevent that outcome from occurring,
indicating that one social norm may inhibit the change in other anti-women
norms (say, norms associated with patriarchal control). Therefore, traditional
social norms are better seen as being interlinked inside a customary system and,
when this is done, different situations can arise.
For example, economic forces or policies can undermine all anti-women
norms or customs, but over different time frames. In other words, all customs
are eventually transformed yet some are more sticky than others. Alternatively,
economic (or demographic) changes can break the complementarity between
various parts of the customary system by significantly increasing the cost of
following some norms while leaving unchanged the cost-benefit structure per-
taining to the other norms. The best scenario unfolds when anti-women norms
are those under attack, and the worst scenario corresponds to the opposite case.
It is under this second scenario that the law should lend a helping hand to eco-
nomic processes and strategies. Unfortunately, the same noxious custom that
withstands the pressure of economic change may also put up strong resistance
against law-induced change. This is probably the situation that most evidently
calls for a combined effort on the three fronts of a broad social engineering
approach: economic policies, legal reforms, and preference change. The latter
component of the overall strategy, which together with legal reforms forms the
basis of the human rights approach, can be achieved by all the actors and organ-
isations working in close relationship with the women who are victims of abuse.
In particular, community-based projects have the advantage of being based on a
deep understanding of the local context and on long-term relationships with the
victims, a setting that better enables them to transform the victims’ perception
of themselves.
The role of awareness-building campaigns and grassroots activities is also
justified when economic forces or strategies take a rather long time to produce
their effects. When women’s empowerment is thus slow to materialize, the
struggle to achieve gender parity must be supported by reforms and institutional
interventions directly addressing the problem (Duflo, 2012).
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